A Biography of Endocrine Disruptors: The Narrative Surrounding the Appearance and  Regulation of a New Category of Toxic Substances by Abboud, Alexis (Author) et al.
A Biography of Endocrine Disruptors:  
The Narrative Surrounding the Appearance and  
Regulation of a New Category of Toxic Substances  
by 
Alexis J. Abboud 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved March 2018 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Jane Maienschein, Chair 
Gary Marchant 
J. Benjamin Hurlbut 
Michael Crow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2018  
  i 
ABSTRACT  
   
Endocrine disruptors are chemicals that interact with the hormone system to 
negative effect. They ‘disrupt’ normal processes to cause diseases like vaginal cancer and 
obesity, reproductive issues like t-shaped uteri and infertility, and developmental 
abnormalities like spina bifida and cleft palate. These chemicals are ubiquitous in our 
daily lives, components in everything from toothpaste to microwave popcorn to plastic 
water bottles. My dissertation looks at the history, science, and regulation of these 
impactful substances in order to answer the question of how endocrine disruptors 
appeared, got interpreted by different groups, and what role science played in the process. 
My analysis reveals that endocrine disruptors followed a unique science policy trajectory 
in the US, rapidly going from their proposal in 1991 to their federal regulation in 1996, 
even amid intense and majority scientific disagreement over whether the substances 
existed at all. That trajectory resulted from the work of a small number of scientist-
activists who constructed a concept and category as scientific, social, and regulatory. By 
playing actors from each sphere against each other and advancing a very specific 
scientific narrative that fit into a regulatory and social window of opportunity in the 
1990s, those scientist-activists made endocrine disruptors a national issue that few could 
ignore. Those actions resulted in the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program, a heavily-
criticized and ineffective regulatory program. My dissertation tells a story of the past that 
informs the present. In 2018, the work of researchers, public media, and policymakers in 
the 1990s continues to play out, evident in the deep scientific division over endocrine 
disrupting effects and the inability of the European Union to settle on even a definition of 
endocrine disruptors for regulation purposes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Endocrine disruptors are not well known in the US in 2018. Over the last four 
years, I have expended a tremendous amount of time and breath explaining my 
dissertation topic to people who quickly become interested (and a bit terrified) when I 
explain. The little-known substances have a profound impact on all of our lives. 
Endocrine disruptors pervade modern manufacturing, food packaging, and food 
production (TEDX 2018). They are, in a word, ubiquitous.  
The endocrine disruptor bisphenol A (BPA) is perhaps the most well-known and 
the most common endocrine disruptor. BPA is a plasticizer and resin. Without BPA, one-
use plastic water bottles would not crush underfoot without cracking, thicker plastic used 
in Tupperware would not clearly show the delicious food inside, and canned tomatoes 
would consistently rust through their containers, leaving a bloody red mess. Many of us 
are more familiar with BPA as a loss, having come across the many products labeled 
“BPA Free” in the grocery store. Just those instances make BPA ubiquitous in our lives. 
But those examples barely scratch the surface. Each year in the US, we manufacture over 
two billion pounds of BPA. Worldwide, BPA production tops eight billion pounds, 
making it a multimillion dollar industry (EPA 2010; CDC 2016). It lines cans, wraps our 
food, sprays our produce, and colors our toys. Nearly every piece of processed food in 
America has been exposed to BPA, either through a nozzle, pipe, or package. Nearly 
every American, 93 percent, carries BPA in their body, detectable in blood or urine 
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(NIEHS n.d.; Biello 2009). And yet, in talking about my project with people, I 
encountered very few who knew what BPA was, what it does, or why it matters.  
BPA is a weakly estrogenic chemical, meaning that it has been shown to interact 
with estrogen receptors acting as either an agonist or antagonist. BPA has been linked to 
female and male infertility, precocious puberty, breast and prostate cancer, and metabolic 
disorders like polycystic ovary syndrome (Jalal et al. 2018; Konieczna, Rutkowska, and 
Rachon 2015). Those are among the milder effects. Powerful estrogens, like 
diethylstilbestrol, which at one point was in most beef and chicken produced in the US, 
have been linked to aggressive and rare cancers, significant reproductive abnormalities, 
and fertility problems.   
Why, if these substances have been linked to such effects, do most people not 
know about them? What does the US do about such substances? Why do we still use 
these chemicals? When I first learned of endocrine disruptors in my last undergraduate 
year, I considered all of those questions and pursued a doctorate to find answers. This 
dissertation is the result. 
 
THIS DISSERTATION 
My focus in this dissertation is on the endocrine disruptor concept and the 
associated category of toxic substances called endocrine disruptors. Throughout, I 
examine the concept and substances from a scientific, political, and social perspective, 
especially during the period from 1991 to 1996. I am interested in how endocrine 
disruptors came to be scientifically, politically, and socially interesting.  
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Researchers first defined the concept and the category in 1991. At a work session 
organized by environmental health scientist Theo Colborn, twenty-one handpicked 
researchers determined that chemicals contaminating natural environments posed a risk to 
the wildlife in those environments (Colborn and Clement 1992; Abboud 2014). The 
group analyzed studies showing negative reproductive and developmental effects as a 
result of chemical exposure before agreeing to two claims, laid out in what is called the 
Wingspread consensus statement. Those two claims make up the endocrine disruptor 
concept that is the focus of this dissertation. The concept is as follows:  
1. That chemicals that interfere with the hormone system of organisms to negative 
effect exist and are rightly called endocrine disruptors, and  
2. That endocrine disruptors pose a clear and immediate threat to the health of 
wildlife and human populations.  
In conjunction with that concept, Colborn and her colleagues proposed endocrine 
disruptors as a category of toxic substances in 1991. The category is made up of those 
chemicals to which the concept applies, the chemicals that threaten the health of humans 
and wildlife through their endocrine activity. The group laid out four characteristics of 
endocrine disrupting chemicals: 
1. The chemicals affect different developmental stages differently. Effects seen in 
embryos, fetuses, or perinatal organisms differ from those seen in adult 
organisms.  
2. The chemicals often affect the offspring of individuals exposed.  
3. At what point an organism is exposed to the chemical changes the effects of that 
chemical.  
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4. When exposure occurs during development, effects may not be seen until 
adulthood. (Colborn and Clement 1992) 
This dissertation traces the trajectory of the concept and the category from 1991 forward. 
In particular, I focus on two threads. First: how the scientific, social, and regulatory 
nature of the concept effected its interaction with actors in various areas. And second: 
how the lack of substance in the proposed category was received and how it did or did 
not cause problems in scientific, social, and regulatory settings.  
When the researchers at Wingspread proposed the endocrine disruptor concept, 
they clearly and explicitly situated it as a scientific, social, and regulatory object (Colborn 
and Clement 1992; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993). In their statement, the researchers 
lay out their goals moving forward on the problem of endocrine disruptors, and those 
goals included furthering scientific study, increasing public awareness of the threat, and 
achieving regulatory action. They make clear that they do not see scientific investigation 
as sufficient for addressing the problem posed by endocrine disruptors, arguing that 
social and regulatory action are necessary. An examination of their actions after 
Wingspread shows that proponents of the concept pursued each of those goals, further 
cementing the endocrine disruptor concept as a tripartite concept, scientific, social, and 
regulatory.  
As I explore in this dissertation, the multi-faceted nature of the concept caused 
scientific, social, and regulatory actors to interact with the concept and each other in 
interesting ways. Never could the scientific research conducted on endocrine disrupting 
chemicals be separated from the question of whether and how the chemicals should be 
regulated. Nor could the pressure to address the public fear of endocrine disruptors not 
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influence the scientific and regulatory decisions of the time. In each chapter of this 
dissertation, I focus on how the three parts of the concept impacted its trajectory from 
original inception in 1991 to regulation in 1996 to discussions in 2018.  
Throughout my work, I also follow on a second thread, the emptiness of the 
endocrine disruptor category. In the Wingspread consensus statement, Colborn and her 
colleagues laid out the characteristics of endocrine disrupting chemicals. In essence, they 
proposed a box. The box’s edges were made up of the known characteristics of endocrine 
disruptors from the Wingspread meeting. That box proposed in 1991 then had to be filled, 
raising a question of what chemicals fit in the box. 
 My project tells the story of how that box was created, put out into the world, and 
acted upon, even as the question of its contents remained. That box, though quickly filled 
with chemicals by proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept, is contentious into the 
modern day, with little agreement on what counts as an endocrine disruptor. Throughout 
this dissertation, I pay attention to the many different actors and kinds of actors who 
interacted with the box (endocrine disruptors)—how they understood what endocrine 
disruptors were, what scientific evidence said of endocrine disruptors, and whether and 
how endocrine disruptors should be regulated.  
The bulk of my analysis ends in 1996, when Congressional action in the US 
codified the concept and the category in the context of serious scientific disagreement. In 
1996, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act and amendments to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. Both acts amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act and 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which charged the EPA with the 
regulation of pesticide levels in food and water. The Food Quality Protection Act and the 
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Safe Drinking Water Act required the EPA to screen chemicals for possible estrogenic 
activity. Neither act silenced arguments over the characteristics of endocrine disruptors 
nor questions over the threat they pose to humans and wildlife. In 2018, those arguments 
and questions remain, playing out in new and old arenas. What Congressional action did 
do for the endocrine disruptor concept and category was cement their place as continuing 
areas of research and discussion. With federal laws requiring action on the substances, 
regardless of widespread dissent, endocrine disruptors remain relevant.  
In response to the Food Quality Protection Act and the amendments to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, the EPA convened the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing 
Advisory Committee to determine the best methods to evaluate hormonally active 
pesticides. In 1998, the Committee released its final report, urging the EPA to expand the 
testing of pesticides to commercial chemicals, environmental contaminants, cosmetics, 
polymers, and several other substances, as well as to include estrogen, androgen, and 
thyroid effects (EDSTAC 1998). Following the Committee’s report, the EPA spent close 
to a decade creating the initial list of chemicals to be tested and the tests that would be 
used to screen those chemicals. 
The result of the Committee report and subsequent discussions is called the 
Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program. The EPA established a two-tiered screening 
program for possible endocrine disruptors. The purpose of Tier 1 is to identify the 
chemical substance’s interactions with estrogen, androgen, and thyroid screening 
pathways (Marty 2014, 1). Tier 2 aims to identify the adverse effects from the 
substance’s interactions with the endocrine pathways identified in Tier 1 as well as to 
generate dose response data. The Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program represents the 
  7 
totality of the US’s attempts to regulate possible endocrine disruptors. Once a chemical 
has successfully made it through the program, companies are able to use the chemical 
largely with impunity. However, the program has received much scrutiny (Marty and 
O’Connor 2014; Maffini, Neltner, and Vogel 2017).  
The story I tell here largely takes place between the initial conceptualization of 
the endocrine disruptor concept by Colborn and her colleagues in 1991 and the modern 
debates over the efficacy of the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program and the threat 
posed by endocrine disruptors. My dissertation sits at a meeting point between studies of 
history of science and science policy. I use historical methods to comment on past and 
current science policy issues surrounding the endocrine disruptor concept and category. 
As such, key to my work but not central to this publication are the ways in which the 
endocrine disruptor story fits in to the larger history of toxic substances regulation in the 
US, a history that continues in 2018.  
Surrounding endocrine disruptors and their regulation in the 1990s is a path-
dependent story about how commitments made in the 1970s drove what happened to 
endocrine disruptors in the 1990s. Endocrine disruptors, at their root, are environmental 
contaminants and our concern about them and regulation of them can be traced to the 
environmental movement started by Rachel Carson’s publication of Silent Spring in 1962 
(Carson 1962a). In that work, Carson pointed to the direct impact of industrial and 
agricultural chemicals on the natural environments throughout the country and on human 
health.  
Silent Spring and the work of early environmentalists like Carson accomplished 
several things integral to the story of endocrine disruptors: they raised public 
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consciousness about environmental issues, they demanded and saw the creation of an 
agency devoted to environmental threats (the Environmental Protection Agency or EPA), 
and they defined environmental concerns as political issues that citizens could demand 
action on. Carson and the environmental movement drove much of the discussion around 
endocrine disruptors, something that I intend to focus more on in later work. For this 
dissertation, I keep endocrine disruptors as the focus, as impactful and important 
substances in and of themselves.  
Several other historical trends played out in the endocrine disruptor story I tell 
here: the US regulatory system’s focus on cancer endpoints to determine toxicity, the 
post-World War II boom in chemical development and use, the setup of the US 
regulatory system throughout the twentieth century. Each historical path created a set of 
constraints that the story of endocrine disruptors unfolded within during the 1990s. 
Without the commitments made and the systems set up in the preceding decades, the 
regulation of endocrine disruptors would have looked very different and there are many 
interesting stories to be told about how the bureaucratic structure created in the 1970s led 
to a very particular set of circumstances surrounding endocrine disruptors in the 1990s. I 
refer to all those historical trends in this work, but here I am telling a story about 
endocrine disruptors and how a small group of scientists took advantage of the system 
created by Carson and the environmental movement, by the US emphasis on cancer, by 
the reactionary nature of US regulations, to get a new category of chemicals noticed and 
regulated.  
I focus on endocrine disruptors for several reasons. First and foremost, endocrine 
disruptors are ubiquitous substances that impact all of our lives and therefore 
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understanding their history matters. The history of endocrine disruptors and their 
regulation impacts how we understand the substances, how we think about their effects, 
and how we justify their regulation. Who put forward the category and pushed for 
regulation influenced the type of regulation passed, regulation that is still in place in 
2018. The lack of scientific consensus that developed around the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category in the 1990s has direct consequences for how we study and regulate 
the chemicals in the twenty-first century. The reliance on few human studies to justify the 
threat posed by endocrine disruptors continues to play out in industry response to 
regulations. The story of endocrine disruptors is a story of the past that informs the 
present. By understanding their history, who had a voice and how evidence was used, we 
can better reflect on what to do about endocrine disruptors moving forward.  
I also draw attention to some interesting characteristics of endocrine disruptors as 
scientific and policy problems. As a category, endocrine disruptors perturb many 
toxicological assumptions or norms. They follow non-linear dose response curves, they 
are active in very small doses, they show effects decades or generations after exposure, 
and evidence of their effects continues to be interpreted in opposite ways: as an 
indictment against them or commendation for them (Anway et al. 2005; Braun and Gray 
2017; Conolly and Lutz 2004; Lanphear 2017; Schug et al. 2016; Vandenberg et al. 2009; 
Wang and Baskin 2008; Wolstenholme, Goldsby, and Rissman 2013). They are a 
complex category of interest to varied actors, not simply corn farmers or cattle ranchers, 
baby bottle producers or tomato can manufacturers, environmentally conscious 
consumers or health aware buyers, but all those groups. There are few industries 
endocrine disruptors do not touch, making them a tricky regulatory hurdle.  
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From a science policy standpoint, the case of endocrine disruptors is unique. 
Many science policy problems follow one model. Under that model, the issue is well 
known and there is broad scientific consensus but for a small number of skeptics who 
become magnified by the media in a way that undermines policy progress. Vaccines, 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), climate change, the effects of tobacco use all 
follow that model. In the case of climate change, almost every scientist in the world 
agrees that the actions of humans have caused the climate to change and that that change 
comes with damaging consequences. Yet, the very small minority who disagree continue 
to have a loud voice in social and political discussions. As Bill Nye put it early in 2017, 
“[media outlets] are doing a disservice by having one climate change skeptic and not 97 
or 98 scientists or engineers concerned about climate change” (Resnick 2017). Such 
presentation of science has stymied policy action in a variety of ways, leading many to 
foretell disaster.  
Endocrine disruptors are different. First, very few members of the public know 
what endocrine disruptors are or what they do. While there may be slightly more 
awareness of specific endocrine disruptors like BPA, even those are not well known. Just 
that makes endocrine disruptors interesting: a hugely impactful and ubiquitous group of 
chemicals virtually unknown. But endocrine disruptors differ in another way. Where 
many other science policy issues have broad scientific consensus, endocrine disruptors do 
not. The scientific community that studies endocrine disruptors is evenly split between 
believing that the substances pose a large threat to human health and believing that they 
have been overhyped and pose little threat. Consensus cannot even be reached on a 
definition for endocrine disruptors. Where vaccines and GMOs are cases of public 
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controversy perpetuated by a scientific fringe, endocrine disruptors are a case of in house, 
within science controversy that has not been resolved in nearly thirty years. 
And yet policy progress was made within a very short five-year period. Where 
many are still trying to get climate change, a well-documented and agreed-upon scientific 
phenomenon, even acknowledged as a policy problem, a small group of researchers 
managed to get the deeply contested category of endocrine disruptors not only 
acknowledged but quickly and aggressively acted upon. In that way, endocrine disruptors 
are a unique policy case, interesting in their many differences from the norm.  
That does not mean that they cannot also be useful in science policy discussions, 
however. As I stated in my prospectus at the beginning of this project, endocrine 
disruptors draw in and complicate many parts of the regulatory process. Their study and 
regulation in the 1990s sat at the confluence of a large number of interested parties—
science, industry, government, consumers, civil society—and each of those actors and the 
individuals making up those groups had different interests in endocrine disruptors, 
different understandings of the scientific knowledge surrounding endocrine disruptors, 
and different concepts of who should act as expert in determining the use and regulation 
of endocrine disruptors. My historical analysis makes clear the conversations those 
parties had and therefore helps to illuminate one way a science policy problem comes in 
to existence and is addressed.  
 Through my examination of how different actors thought of endocrine disruptors 
and how they saw the science and regulation of endocrine disruptors fitting together, I 
have laid out the life trajectory of the chemicals in a way that helps to show how science 
policy gets done. My focus on the broad category means that I have ended up with a work 
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that is focused on a topic of relevance to any individual who shops at a grocery store. In 
that way, my project is a story of the past that informs that present. Endocrine disruptors 
are important, in and of themselves. The category encompasses chemicals that pervade 
every aspect of modern life and their regulation matters to everyone. It matters why new 
mothers stop to make sure they buy BPA free bottles in the grocery store. It matters why 
people think that chemicals in the water make people gay. It matters why Whole Foods 
hands out yellow receipts instead of white.1 How did it come to be that such thoughts and 
actions were reasonable to people? How did they become justified? Those are some of 
the questions I am answering within this dissertation.  
 
THE CONTENTS 
I have divided this dissertation into five chapters, each with a different focus but 
drawn together by my examination of the effects of the tripartite nature of the endocrine 
disruptor concept and the lacking definition of the endocrine disruptor category. As a 
reminder, the concept proposed in 1991 encompassed two claims: That endocrine 
disruptors exist as a category of toxic substances capable of disrupting normal hormone 
function to negative effect; and that those chemicals pose a threat to the health of humans 
and wildlife. Proponents of the concept explicitly set it up as a scientific, social, and 
                                                 
1 Thermal paper receipts, like those received as gas stations, grocery stores, and retail 
outlets, contain high levels of BPA. The BPA on the receipts is not chemically bound and 
therefore easily rubs off when handled, where it is then absorbed in to the skin. Studies 
have shown that sales associates who handle thermal paper receipts for eight hours per 
day have five times the amount of BPA in their body as the average American. For that 
reason, some stores like Whole Foods have begun to use thermal register tape that is BPA 
free. It is often yellowed as a result. 
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regulatory object, connecting it to a poorly defined category of substances. In each 
chapter of this dissertation, I trace different aspects of the scientific, social, and 
regulatory nature of the concept and the lack of substance in the category.    
The title of this dissertation is A Biography of Endocrine Disruptors. My first 
chapter takes the biography concept quite literally. In Chapter 2, “Origin of the Endocrine 
Disruptor Concept,” I lay out the historical roots of the endocrine disruptor concept. 
Though the start, end, or process could not have been known at the beginning of the life 
of the concept, understanding the genesis of the category requires an examination of 
previous forms, just like in embryogenesis. Precursors in embryogenesis do not look 
anything like the final organism on the surface, but they change and shape the final 
organism in key ways. Similarly, important precursors fundamentally changed the 
conversation surrounding hormonally active chemicals in ways necessary for the 
endocrine disruptor concept.  
In order for proponents of the concept to reasonably situate the concept as 
scientific, social, and regulatory in 1991, previous scientific, social, and regulatory 
moments had to create a world in which that was reasonable. Necessary scientific 
discoveries, like the estrogenicity of non-estrogen resembling chemicals, and social and 
regulatory changes, like the awareness of the sensitivity of in utero development, helped 
to create the world where the endocrine disruptor concept and category could be taken 
seriously. In Chapter 2, using a developmental metaphor, I link together historical 
moments that came together to start the life of endocrine disruptors.  
In my next chapter, Chapter 3 “The Life of Endocrine Disruptors (1991– ),” I 
detail the trajectory of the concept and category in the years after their proposal in 1991. 
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In that trajectory, I take as my focus how proponents pushed the concept and category 
into different arenas and how actors in their arenas pushed back in a variety of ways. I 
argue that when proponents introduced the concept and category in 1991, they did not 
define key aspects of endocrine disruptors necessary for their study and regulation, things 
like mechanisms of action, and they also lacked key evidence necessary to support the 
idea that endocrine disruptor threatened human health. Throughout the history of 
endocrine disruptors, actors in different areas responded differently to those deficiencies, 
with scientific actors probing deeply at what was missing, social actors largely ignoring 
any missing pieces in favor fear-mongering, and regulatory actors filling in with 
politically useful pieces. Chapter 3 traces those actions and their effects into the modern 
day.  
Following my history of the endocrine disruptor concept and category in the first 
chapters, I use my last three chapters to focus in on particular actors and their interactions 
with both. In Chapter 4, “Disagreement Dissected, The Spectrum of Agreement about the 
Endocrine Disruptor Concept in the 1990s,” I categorize the varying scientific views on 
the endocrine disruptor concept as laying along a spectrum. On one side were those 
researchers who originally drafted the idea, who viewed the existence of and threat posed 
by endocrine disruptors as a proven fact. On the other side, different researchers argued 
that very little evidence supported what they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis.  
What I focus on in my chapter is the middle of the spectrum, where the majority 
of endocrine disruptor researchers fell. Many researchers in the 1990s viewed what they 
called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis as still needing more evidence to establish its 
validity. Those researchers were the ones conducting experiments on the substances and 
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contributing to our scientific understanding of their effects. And yet their voices are 
largely erased from the historical and scientific narrative of endocrine disruptors, leaving 
the debate over endocrine disruptors feeling polarized. Throughout Chapter 4, I highlight 
how the scientific aspects of the concept could not be separated from the social and 
regulatory aspects, leaving scientists weighing in on not only the evidence supporting the 
concept but also what should be done about endocrine disruptors. A full examination of 
the different views on the endocrine disruptor concept illustrates the scientific tensions at 
play in the 1990s, tensions that spilled over into the regulatory actions taken then as well 
as the discussion of endocrine disruptors in 2018, which remains polarized.  
In my final two chapters, I examine the movement of the endocrine disruptor 
concept both into and out of the scientific sphere. Science does not occur in a box, 
separated from the rest of society where it remains untouched and unchanged except by 
scientific thought. That is especially true in the case of the endocrine disruptor concept, 
which was positioned clearly as social and regulatory as well as scientific. Chapters 5 and 
6 examine how the different actors interacting with the concept impacted the actions of 
other interacting actors.  
In Chapter 5, “How Non-Scientific Actors Affected the Scientific Discussion of 
Endocrine Disruptors,” I focus on the ways in which endocrine disruptor science—
scientific endeavors, scientific findings, scientific funding, scientists—was changed by a 
number of societal occurrences. The science of endocrine disruptors is a case where a 
scientific field was especially changed by societal actors like media, industry, and 
government. In the chapter, I demonstrate that societal actors can have an outsize role on 
scientific discussion. In the case of endocrine disruptors, actors like media and 
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government took a science that was fringe, pushed it to mainstream, and then contributed 
to the fragmentation of the scientific community interested in endocrine disruptors. That 
resulted in a field of study in which researchers largely cannot agree, something that has 
consequences for the regulation of a category of potentially harmful substances in 2018. 
In my final chapter prior to the conclusion, Chapter 6, “How the Science of 
Endocrine Disruptors Made its Way into Regulation,” I look at how a social opportunity 
and a carefully crafted scientific story led to regulatory success. In the chapter, I advance 
a two-part argument to explain how endocrine disruptors came to be regulated in the US. 
The first part deals with the social and regulatory landscape in the early 1990s that 
significantly aided proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors by creating a window of 
opportunity. The second part focuses on the work of endocrine disruptor researchers in 
Congressional hearings, where they used very specific scientific evidence to argue for a 
particular kind of regulation. As I demonstrate, the result of both the window of 
opportunity and the inclusion of very specific science was the Endocrine Disruptor 
Screening Program, the only regulation of endocrine disruptors in the US as of 2018.   
I finish this dissertation with a conclusion oriented around the ways in which the 
history of endocrine disruptors plays out in the modern world. In 2018, the EU is still 
searching for a way to successfully regulate the chemicals (European Commission 2018b; 
Paun 2018). The US is struggling to update their regulatory testing requirements in an 
administration that has cut their budget significantly (EPA 2011a; EPA 2011b; Erickson, 
Hogue, and Morrison 2017; Song 2017). And the scientific community around the world 
continues to squabble over whether anyone should even be talking about endocrine 
disruptors (Zoeller et al. 2014; Nohynek et al. 2013; Vandenberg et al. 2009). Such things 
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make it clear that endocrine disruptors represent a contested but important category of 
chemicals. My dissertation makes clear that many of the most contested aspects of 
endocrine disruptors originated decades ago and were left unaddressed for reasons as 
trivial as personality of people. By considering current events and the historical ones laid 
out here, we end with a starting point for evaluating how we might move forward better. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORIGIN OF THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR CONCEPT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  In 1991, Theo Colborn and a group of twenty colleagues put forth the endocrine 
disruptor concept. They argued that many industrial and agricultural chemicals acted 
hormonally in the body, interfering with the normal action of hormones and resulting in 
negative health outcomes. Those chemicals, they claimed, affected both humans and 
wildlife, developing organisms and adult. And not just affected, but threatened the health 
and existence of. When Colborn and her colleagues introduced the concept, they situated 
it as a scientific, social, and regulatory object. Something that should be taken seriously 
in all three contexts.   
 This dissertation takes as its focus the endocrine disruptor concept and its 
tripartite existence. The subsequent chapters all pertain to different effects of the 
scientific, social, and regulatory nature of the concept after 1991. This chapter, however, 
starts before 1991 and the introduction of the concept in order to examine the scientific, 
social, and regulatory changes and discoveries necessary for the legitimacy of the 
endocrine disruptor concept in 1991.  
 When proponents introduced the concept in 1991, they relied on a body of 
scientific literature as well as specific social and regulatory systems in the US. For the 
endocrine disruptor concept to be taken seriously by scientists, policymakers, and larger 
US society, as proponents intended, proponents built on scientific knowledge, 
bureaucratic systems, and social concerns developed prior to 1991. For example, because 
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the concept largely focuses on environmental contaminants, earlier work by Rachel 
Carson and the environmental movement to establish the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) was important in creating a regulatory system endocrine disruptors fit in 
as well as a social consciousness that environmental concerns were serious and important 
considerations.  
 In this chapter, I lay out seven necessary historical moments that contributed to 
the endocrine disruptor concept in 1991, along with other broader social and political 
changes that also contributed. I go through those seven steps using the metaphor of 
biological development. Using the metaphor, I link together preceding events into a 
cohesive narrative. Just as during the development of an organism, the development of 
the endocrine disruptor concept followed a series of steps each building on the next to 
allow for change and growth over time. Certain aspects of the modern endocrine 
disruptor concept depended on historical happenings that changed the conversation 
around hormonally active chemicals.  
As I have constructed the narrative, the development of the endocrine disruptor 
concept has seven points, or punctuations, that I connect to seven aspects of human 
development: the release of an egg, fertilization, implantation, gastrulation, the transition 
from embryo to fetus, and fetal movement. Those seven stages connect to the following 
seven points necessary for the endocrine disruptor concept:  
1. Release of an egg: That naturally occurring hormones can cause negative effects 
in humans; first established by the estrogen cancer hypothesis in the 1930s and 
expanded on by Roy Hertz in 1957,   
2. Fertilization: That humans may be exposed to hormonally active substances via a 
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number of routes, including consumption of animal products and produce treated 
with such products; proposed by Hertz in 1957 as a steroid cycle,  
3. Implantation: That unintentional exposure to hormonally active chemicals can 
have detrimental effects on human populations; made clear with the effects of in 
utero exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES) in the 1970s,  
4. Gastrulation: That chemicals need not chemically match estrogen or other 
hormones to act estrogenically in the body; established by researchers at the 
National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) in the mid-1970s 
after problems with kepone production in Hopewell, Virginia,   
5. Transition from embryo to fetus: That non-estrogen resembling industrial and 
agricultural chemicals can cause cancerous effects in humans; formally laid out at 
the first Estrogens in the Environment meet in 1979, where the term 
“environmental estrogens” was coined,  
6. Continued transition from embryo to fetus: That non-estrogen resembling 
industrial and agricultural chemicals can cause noncancerous effects in humans; 
formally laid out at the second Estrogens in the Environment meet in 1985,  
7. Fetal movement: That hormonally active industrial and agricultural chemicals in 
the environment can cause negative cancerous and noncancerous effects in 
humans and wildlife populations; demonstrated in 1990 with the conclusion of 
research on the Great Lakes region. 
Beginning in 1957, Hertz established that estrogen activity could lead to 
noncancerous negative effects in humans, in addition to the cancerous effects already 
known. A first step toward a concept that takes as one of its claims that hormonal action 
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can lead to negative health outcomes. Shortly after, Hertz proposed a means by which 
humans may be exposed to excess estrogen in their environment, solidifying the threat 
posed by the hormone and also laying the groundwork for a concept that requires human 
exposure to unintended endocrine active substances.  
A decade later, amid the burgeoning environmental movement that legitimized 
concerns about the environment and growing awareness of the effects chemicals could 
have in utero via thalidomide, the synthetic estrogen DES demonstrated the severity with 
which unintended exposure to hormonally active substances could affect the health of 
humans. With that, DES became not only the posterchild for endocrine disruption used in 
the 1990s, but also cemented the idea that hormonally active chemicals threatened the 
health of humans, key to the endocrine disruptor concept.  
In the mid 1970s, the discovery of the estrogenicity of kepone, a chemical bearing 
no resemblance to estrogen, furthered the development of the endocrine disruptor concept 
by expanding the number of chemicals to which it applied. That served to widen the 
impact and threat of the concept in the 1990s, as well as spurring research on the many 
industrial and agricultural chemicals that could be endocrine active, research that built a 
foundation for the concept.  
That research led, in 1979, to the creation of a new category of substances, 
environmental estrogens. Those substances and the research on their effects drove toward 
the final concept presented in 1991, both in terms of evidence produced and researchers 
involved. With the work on environmental estrogens came an acknowledgment of the 
many negative effects that could be caused by industrial and agricultural chemicals acting 
hormonally, an acknowledgement vital to the endocrine disruptor concept. 
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The final developmental stage for the endocrine disruptor concept came in 1990, 
when Colborn completed her work in the Great Lakes region. Colborn and others found 
that industrial and agricultural pollution in the Great Lakes caused a wide variety of 
effects in wildlife and humans. In Colborn’s Great Lakes research, all the aspects of the 
endocrine disruptor concept, built up along the six preceding developmental stages, came 
together in one case leading directly to the birth of the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 Each of the seven moments discussed above contributed significantly to the 
proposal of the endocrine disruptor concept in 1991. The twenty-one researchers who 
proposed the concept relied on the scientific discoveries of the previous decades to make 
a case that industrial and agricultural chemicals could impact human health. They used 
the social and regulatory capital around environmental concerns and in utero effects of 
chemicals to make the case that their concept should be taken seriously as a social and 
regulatory concern as well as a scientific one. The developmental steps of the endocrine 
disruptor concept were necessary in the sense that they served as a series of historical 
contingencies that allowed for the tripartite formulation of the concept in 1991. Those 
steps and their role are laid out here.  
 
FAMILY HISTORY: HORMONES AND CANCER 
Before detailing the developmental steps that produced the endocrine disruptor 
concept, it is important first to provide some context regarding the study of hormones and 
their effects, to make clear what changed along the developmental path detailed in the 
next sections. I will detail two main historical threads that play a large role in the 
endocrine disruptor story: the growing field of endocrinology (the study of hormones and 
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their glands) and the estrogen cancer hypothesis. Later actors in the development of the 
endocrine disruptor concept pull heavily on both of those threads. They are necessary to 
the concept’s development just as the events in an individual’s family history are 
necessary to theirs. The field of endocrinology establishes the normal actions of the 
endocrine system and the endogenous hormones within. Only with a footing in what 
should be happening can an assessment of disruption be made, a key aspect of the 
endocrine disruptor concept.  
The estrogen cancer hypothesis, proposed in the 1930s, stemmed from the 
growing field of endocrinology. In 1923, estrogen was one of the first hormones 
discovered and through efforts to identify its normal behavior, researchers discovered its 
ability to cause cancer. That discovery established that hormones and hormonal actions 
could result in negative health outcomes, something that the endocrine disruptor concept 
depends on, given that it deals with the negative outcomes caused by hormonally active 
chemicals. Both threads, the growing field of endocrinology and the estrogen cancer 
hypothesis, are essential pieces of the endocrine disruptor story but are too far removed to 
be considered a part of its development directly, therefore acting as family history: a 
distant ancestor and a not so distant relative.  
 
The Ancestor Who Sailed Across the Sea: Endocrinology 
The family history of the endocrine disruptor concept can reasonably be said to 
have started in 1905 with the work of Ernest Starling. The concept, which describes 
substances that interfere with hormones, relies on an understanding and acceptance of 
hormones. That understanding and acceptance started in 1905, when Starling coined the 
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term “hormone” to describe “chemical messengers … [that] have to be carried from the 
organ where they are produced to the organ which they affect by means of the blood 
stream and the continually recurring physiological needs of the organism must determine 
their repeated production and circulation through the body” (Starling 1905a, 339).2  
With that statement, Starling described the process of chemical messaging used 
within the body as well as the messengers, hormones. Starling’s definition of hormone, 
presented in his first Croonian lecture of 1905 to the Royal College of Physicians of 
London, came out of his work with his brother in law, William Bayliss, on secretin 
(Bayliss and Starling 1902; Henderson 2005). Secretin, a hormone (though the word was 
not used at the time) that stimulates the pancreas, became the second substance found in 
the body to stimulate some sort of action, adrenaline having been extracted by John Abel 
in 1897 (Abel 1898; Aronson 2000).  
 Though Starling defined hormones in that first 1905 lecture, he did not refer to the 
substances again until his fourth lecture, delivered nine days later (Starling 1905d). He 
used it no fewer than seventeen times in that lecture, and thus began a new field of 
research on the chemical signalers of the body. In that way, Starling’s use of the term 
“hormone” in 1905 acted as a sort of great-great grandparent to the endocrine disruptor 
                                                 
2 The idea of substances that move through the body controlling physiological responses 
did not originate with Starling. In 1855, Claude Bernard used the term “internal 
secretion” to describe glucose in the liver (Bernard 1855). Some believe that internal 
secretion was used well before 1855 (Henderson 2005). Nor did the term “hormone” 
itself originate with Starling, the term having been thought up at a dinner at Caius 
College, Cambridge. At the dinner, Starling and biologist William Hardy determined that 
they needed a word to describe stimulating substances in the bloodstream. Classicist 
W.T. Vesey suggested the Greek verb for excite (ormao) and the term appeared in 
Starling’s 1905 lecture (Henderson 2005, 9).  
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concept, a distant ancestor that had to immigrate to a new land and lay down roots for the 
later life of endocrine disruptors to occur. Without an understanding of endocrinology—
how hormones usually work—it would have been difficult to claim that anything was 
being disrupted later.  
 The study of hormones grew rapidly after 1905.3 Edward Calvin Kendall purified 
thyroxine in 1914 (Kendall 1914; Kendall and Osterberg 1919). Frederick Banting and 
Charles Herberg Best characterized insulin in 1921 (Banting and Best 1922; Banting and 
Scott 1923). And in 1923, Edward Aldebert Doisy and Edgar Allen successfully isolated 
the follicular hormone from the grape-sized ovaries of hogs (Allen and Doisy 1923). The 
follicular hormone extracted by Doisy and Allen, and later crystallized independently by 
Doisy and Adolf Butenandt, was later renamed estrone, one of several natural 
estrogens—the premier sex hormone and the hormone most often mimicked or blocked 
by endocrine disruptors (Butenandt 1930).  
The discovery of estrone started the intense study of one particular kind of 
hormone: estrogen. The knowledge produced about the functioning of estrogen in the 
body, particularly when given at certain developmental points or in high quantities, 
established how the hormone worked so that later researchers could identify when 
                                                 
3 The rapid growth of endocrinology led to an increasing recognition of its importance, as 
demonstrated by the many Nobel Prizes awarded to early endocrinologists. Frederick 
Grant Banting and John James Rikard Macleod received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine in 1923 for their work on insulin (Nobel Media 2014a). Adolf Butenandt 
received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1939 (Nobel Media 2014b). Edward Calvin 
Kendall, Tadeus Reichstein, and Philip S. Hench received the Nobel Prize in Physiology 
or Medicine in 1950 for their work on adrenal gland hormones (Nobel Media 2014c). 
Edgar Allen was nominated for the award four times, though he never received it (Nobel 
Media 2014d).  
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estrogenic activities went astray. The first identification of awry estrogen activities came 
with the estrogen cancer hypothesis. While the field of endocrinology continued to grow, 
with researchers producing more work on the actions of more hormones, the estrogen 
cancer hypothesis became a key part of the field and began research into the negative 
effects of hormones.  
 
Closest Known Relative: The Estrogen Cancer Hypothesis 
 The discovery and isolation of estrone in the late 1920s was followed by 
concentrated study of the effects of estrogens in the body. From that study emerged the 
estrogen cancer hypothesis, which held that estrogen played a causative role in the 
development of cancer in estrogen-responsive tissues (Hertz 1977).  
The first evidence for the hypothesis came in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century when researchers showed that removing the ovaries of mice and 
humans stopped the progression of breast cancer (Loeb 1919; Beatson 1896). Given that 
the ovaries produce estrogen in the body, their removal and the subsequent amelioration 
of breast cancer implied a role for estrogen in the progression of cancer. That role was 
further solidified in 1937, when Allen and his colleagues showed that treatment of rat 
vaginas and uteri with estrogen resulted in uncontrolled cell growth generally associated 
with cancer (Allen, Smith, and Gardner 1937).  
 At the same time, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, several clinical preparations 
of estrogen became available for use in humans. The first was diethylstilbestrol (DES), an 
artificial estrogen developed in the labs of Edward Charles Dodds and Robert Robinson 
at the University of Oxford in 1938 (Dodds et al. 1938). DES was an orally-effective, 
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lightweight powder, approximately 150 times cheaper than natural estrogen extracts 
(Meyers 1983; Abboud 2015). When the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first 
approved DES in the US in 1941, physicians prescribed the drug to millions of women 
for menopausal symptoms, postcoital contraception, and a variety of other hormonal 
issues (Meyers 1983). That number only increased when, in 1946, studies by Olive 
Watkins Smith and her husband George van Siclen Smith indicated that DES could be 
used to prevent miscarriages during pregnancy (Smith and Smith 1946; Smith 1948; 
Smith and Smith 1949). The FDA approved DES for that indication in 1947 (Langston 
2010, 48). Between 1948 and 1971, somewhere between four and eight million pregnant 
women took large doses of DES, exposing both them and their fetuses to that artificial 
estrogen (McLachlan 2016).4  
 A year after the initial FDA approval of DES, in 1942, the US approved a second 
estrogen preparation, Premarin (Stefanick 2005). Premarin, manufactured by Wyeth, was 
a mix of conjugated equine estrogens extracted from the urine of pregnant mares and 
marketed as a treatment for menopausal symptoms (Stefanick 2005). Following the 
release of both estrogen-like medications, Premarin and DES, a slew of physicians made 
case reports linking the occurrence of breast and endometrial cancer in women with 
previous exposure to estrogen therapies (Hertz 1977; Allaben and Owen 1939; 
Auchincloss and Haagensen 1940; Parsons and McCall 1941; Fremont-Smith et al. 1946; 
                                                 
4 Within endocrine disruptor literature, DES is almost always discussed with reference to 
its use in pregnant women. However, between 1941 and 1983, the agricultural industry in 
the US used DES as a growth hormone in livestock. By 1971, ranchers fed 75 percent of 
US beef livestock DES (Epstein 1990, 278). The effects of the daily exposure to DES 
residue left in meat are relatively unknown and rarely discussed within endocrine 
disruptor literature.  
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Østergaard 1954; Wallach and Henneman 1959). Though the reports were often on very 
small samples of selected populations of women, they added some weight to the estrogen 
cancer hypothesis.  
 Animal research throughout the 1950s added even more. By the middle of the 
twentieth century, researchers had demonstrated that added estrogen consistently resulted 
in tumors in five different species and eight different tissues. When administering 
estrogen to dogs, hamsters, mice, rabbits, or rats, researchers routinely found tumors in 
the bone marrow, breast, cervix, endometrium, kidney, ovary, pituitary, and testicle 
(Hertz 1977). Though that seems like clear and obvious support for the estrogen cancer 
hypothesis, researchers had failed to show that estrogen administration in primates 
resulted in cancerous growth, which left the application of animal findings to primates, 
and humans in particular, unclear (Hertz 1977). The applicability of animal studies to 
human populations plagued the estrogen cancer hypothesis in much the same way that it 
plagues the endocrine disruptor concept, as detailed later.  
 Regardless, the estrogen cancer hypothesis drew attention to a potential mal-effect 
from exposure to estrogen. Though only focused on cancerous effects, the linkage 
between hormones and negative health outcomes was necessary for the development of 
the endocrine disruptor concept. The linkage between estrogen and cancer opened the 
door for the study of other potential negative effects following exposure to hormones. 
That study began in 1957, which is where I begin the developmental story of the 
endocrine disruptor concept.  
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CONCEPTION: NON-CANCER EFFECTS AND STEROID CYCLES 
 The purpose of using the developmental metaphor throughout the rest of this 
chapter is to link together necessary historical steps for the concept, historical steps that 
the endocrine disruptor concept depended on to make sense. From 1957 to 1991, several 
discoveries established new facts that form key aspects of the concept. The first two of 
those discoveries go hand in hand: noncancerous negative effects of estrogen and a 
method for humans to be exposed to exogenous estrogen. Concern over toxic chemicals 
revolves around two things, the effects of the chemicals and whether or not humans will 
be exposed to levels of the chemical sufficient to cause those effects. The estrogen cancer 
hypothesis began to establish the negative effects of excess estrogen exposure. In 1957, 
Roy Hertz added to that, allowing for an entirely new class of outcomes connected to 
such exposure. Later that same year, he also laid out how humans might be exposed to 
estrogen at high enough levels to cause such outcomes. Seen from a developmental 
perspective, the identification of noncancerous effects from excess estrogen exposure acts 
as the release of an egg, a large part of the developing threat of endocrine disruptors, but 
not enough on its own. Only when combined with a route of exposure, Hertz’s steroid 
cycle, is the egg fertilized and combined with a second necessary part for further 
development.  
 
Release of the Egg: Non-Cancer Effects of Estrogen 
 The estrogen cancer hypothesis provided a foundation for the endocrine disruptor 
concept, supported by some of the first research on the negative effects of hormones. The 
endocrine disruptor concept deals heavily with the negative health outcomes associated 
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with exposure to hormonally active chemicals. However, those negative health outcomes 
are primarily noncancerous. Throughout the twentieth century, the US regulatory system 
dealt almost exclusively with carcinogens, focusing on cancer endpoints to assess the 
toxicity of a chemical (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). 
Endocrine disruptors have been linked to many cancers, but they have also been linked to 
many other health outcomes: decreased fertility, reproductive anatomy abnormalities, 
reproductive disorders (Schug et al. 2016). One of the main arguments made by 
proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors in the 1990s was that testing only for 
cancer endpoints would not adequately identify endocrine disrupting chemicals causing 
noncancerous problems (U.S. Congress House 1993; U.S. Congress House 1995). That is 
why the developmental story of the concept begins in July of 1957, when Roy Hertz 
identified noncancerous negative effects caused by exposure to exogenous estrogen.  
In 1957, Hertz, the director of the endocrinology section of the National Institutes 
of Health’s National Cancer Institute, published a report on four children accidentally 
exposed to large amounts of estrogen. In his report, Hertz notes that the children—three 
males and one female, ages five to ten—developed breasts and other symptoms generally 
not seen until the onset of female puberty (Hertz 1958). While investigating those 
symptoms, Hertz tested vitamins that each child took each morning, finding that each 
capsule contained the equivalent of 150µg of estrone. That estrogen exposure, according 
to Hertz, accounted for the symptoms in the children and marked the first-time exposure 
to hormones had been linked with a negative health outcome other than cancer (Hertz 
1958).  
 
  35 
Following his case presentation, Hertz identified exogenous estrogen as a 
concerning toxic chemical (Hertz 1958, 210). Throughout his article, Hertz acknowledges 
the increasing use of estrogenic compounds in pharmaceutical and agricultural practices, 
establishing his article as the first publication indicating adverse health effects other than 
cancer as a result of exposure to endocrine-active substances. That establishment can be 
likened to the release of an egg, a necessary first step for the later endocrine disruptor 
concept dealing with cancerous and noncancerous effects of hormonally active 
chemicals. However, for the effects of excess estrogen to be concerning, something that 
dictates funding allocation and researcher interest, they needed to be paired with a way 
for humans to be exposed to them. The egg needed to be fertilized, which it was later in 
1957. 
 
Fertilization: Roy Hertz’s Steroid Cycle Idea 
 Following his identification of noncancerous effects of hormone exposure, Hertz 
laid out how humans might be exposed to such hormones. At the end of 1957, he talked 
about a “steroid cycle” in his discussion of an article on the effects of hormones used in 
livestock (Gassner 1957, 211). He stated that  
…[W]e have to consider that the introduction of… [hormones into cattle 
feed lots] leads to the exposure…of individuals who might otherwise not ever in 
their lives come in contact with such materials… This is not a theoretical 
consideration because we…now have encountered two families, each with two 
children, presented with simultaneously developing gynecomastia attributable to 
the accidental contamination of vitamin capsules by estrogens during 
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manufacture. If such estrogens can, by stray handling, get into such 
pharmaceutical preparations, can they not very readily get where they are not 
wanted on the farm? …  
There is one additional consideration in this regard… The fecal excretion 
of these materials…will be dropped on the soil and…over generations there will 
be constant replenishment of the soil surface with steroidal substances of this 
kind. This in turn has its effect potentially on surface water-supply contamination 
and also potentially on the vegetable content of steroids in crops raised on such 
soil… I think that we are now actually setting up a steroid cycle in our 
environment, and we have to give very serious consideration to its implications 
for our subsequent development and growth and possibly reproductive functions. 
(Gassner 1957, 210–1) 
Hertz’s steroid cycle begins with the hormones given to cattle and other livestock. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the agricultural industry gave most cows in the US the estrogen 
DES as a growth hormone (Epstein 1990; Marcus 1994). According to Hertz, those 
animals would excrete that hormone, creating a soil laced with steroids, which could then 
contaminate both water supplies and crops grown in the soil. Humans, through 
consumption of livestock, water, or crops, could become exposed to excess estrogen 
resulting in negative health outcomes. The cycle Hertz proposed was a means by which 
most individuals in the US could be exposed to estrogen.  
 Hertz’s observations that unintended exposure to estrogen could impact the 
development of humans were borne out in two subsequent studies (Beas et al. 1969; 
Weber et al. 1963). For the development of the endocrine disruptor concept, Hertz’s work 
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on effects and exposure routes were pivotal. Hertz was one of the first to establish the 
extended risks of increased hormone use in US food production, outlining the negative 
effects the hormones could have in humans as well as a means by which they might be 
exposed. In that way, he opened the later possibility for endocrine disrupting chemicals, 
chemicals that act hormonally and so could lead to cancerous and noncancerous effects 
especially after they replaced many of the hormones used in food production in the 
1950s. But Hertz and his work were largely localized, meaning that many researchers did 
not know about his revelations or pay them much attention. In order for the endocrine 
disruptor concept to gain the acceptance it did in the 1990s and in the modern day, 
something much larger needed to change, something Rachel Carson and her work Silent 
Spring precipitated.    
 
DEVELOPMENTAL ENVIRONMENT: SILENT SPRING AND THALIDOMIDE 
 This chapter and its developmental metaphor focus on specific moments in 
history that the endocrine disruptor concept depends on because they established certain 
necessary facts, shifted the focus in fields of research, or changed regulatory priorities. 
However, over the course of the thirty-year developmental process of the concept, more 
is going on than the historical moments highlighted as different developmental stages. 
When organisms develop, they move through different stages in a linear way, but 
pervading the entire process is their developmental environment, the conditions in which 
they are developing. Those conditions can include whether the pregnant woman drinks or 
smokes, the external temperature where an egg is laid, or the availability of certain 
nutrients in the environment. The conditions impact many different parts of the 
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developmental process, in innumerable and sometimes unknown ways.  
 Similarly, the changing world throughout the twentieth century impacted the 
development of the endocrine disruptor concept. In particular, two changes—the 
environmental movement and the effects of thalidomide—made room for the endocrine 
disruptor concept. The concept is made up of several concerns: the impact of chemicals 
on human health, on the environment, on a developing organism. For people to take the 
concept seriously, those same people also had to consider legitimate that chemicals could 
harm human beings, the environment, and developing organisms. The environmental 
movement legitimized concerns about the impact of humans on the environment and vice 
versa, while revelations about the in-utero impact of thalidomide legitimized concerns 
about the impact of chemicals on development. Both make up important pieces of the 
endocrine disruptor concept’s developmental environment.  
 
Silent Spring and the Environmental Movement 
In the 1950s, when Hertz identified excess hormone use as a risk to the health of 
humans, few Americans were paying attention to environmental threats—either those 
posed by the environment or to it. Instead, America was focused on other matters. During 
the late 1950s, the US was fighting the unpopular Vietnam War, racing toward the moon, 
and experiencing a revolution in civil rights. Environmental concerns did not take center 
stage. However, the endocrine disruptor concept could thrive only in a world where 
individuals take environmental concerns seriously. The publication of Silent Spring and 
the beginning of the environmental movement partially created that world.  
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Endocrine disrupting chemicals are environmental toxins. The threat they pose is 
due to their effects in humans as part of the environment (in water, food, and other 
products) and their effects in wildlife in the environment. Researchers first identified the 
effects of such chemicals in wildlife species as part of research stemming from 
environmental concerns. For that reason, Rachel Carson and her publication of Silent 
Spring make up the developmental environment of the endocrine disruptor concept. The 
environmental movement, rather than acting as a particular catalyst for the concept as 
Hertz’s work did, instead permeated all aspects of its development after the 1960s, 
driving research, public concern, and regulatory attention.  
Silent Spring, published by Houghton Mifflin in September of 1962 after Carson 
wrote a group of serialized essays for the New Yorker, became an overnight sensation 
(Carson 1962a; Carson 1962b; Carson 1962c; Carson 1962d). In the book, Carson claims 
that humans in modern society are poisoning themselves and the environment with 
reckless use of industrial and agricultural chemicals. Exposure to those chemicals, 
according to Carson, is so damaging that all wildlife in a given area may perish, resulting 
in a silent spring where once there was an abundance of life. Silent Spring provided a 
locus of scientific and public debate over the potential damage caused by the use of 
pesticides in particular, but industrial and agricultural chemicals more broadly (Griswold 
2012). Carson largely won in the court of public opinion, resulting in widespread support 
for the ban of dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) in 1972 and the beginning of the 
environmental movement in the US (EPA 2017; Griswold 2012).  
 Following the publication of Silent Spring and the start of the environmental 
movement, the federal government established two organizations to study and keep track 
  40 
of the environment. The first was the National Institutes of Environmental Health 
Sciences (NIEHS), officially created in 1969, though growing from a department of the 
National Institutes of Health established in 1966 (NIEHS 2017a). Congress charged the 
NIEHS with determining how the environment impacted human health. The second 
organization was the EPA, established in 1970 to protect the environment and human 
health (Ruckelshaus 1970; Nixon 1970).  
 Carson and the environmental movement proved key to the development of the 
endocrine disruptor concept. Her work invited the wider public into a new consciousness 
about industrial chemicals. Silent Spring was widely read, widely reviewed, and widely 
discussed (Griswold 2012). All that discussion made mainstream environmental issues 
and concerns about what man-made chemicals were doing to natural environments and in 
turn to human health. The everyday citizen in the US became aware of such concerns and 
through the creation of federal agencies, holding of Congressional hearings, and meeting 
of committees, environmental concerns became political issues.  
 For the endocrine disruptor concept, the situation of the environment as a social 
and political concern had two effects. First, it led to a proliferation of funding and 
attention for research on industrial and agricultural chemicals and their effects. With the 
creation of the EPA and the NIEHS, federal funds were used to investigate a slew of 
pesticides, most notably DDT, a known endocrine disruptor in 2018 (NIEHS 2017b). 
That research led to many of the following developmental steps for the concept. The 
second effect was that it changed the perspective on threats to and from the environment, 
allowing for concerns about them to be taken seriously. In that way, the endocrine 
disruptor concept and its proponents in the 1990s could be taken seriously, necessary to 
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their success in getting endocrine disruptors regulated and studied.  
 
Thalidomide and In Utero Exposure 
 Silent Spring and the environmental movement made up a large part of the 
endocrine disruptor concept’s developmental environment, but a second factor also bears 
mention: thalidomide and its in utero effects. Just as the environmental movement 
elevated environmental concerns to be taken seriously, the discovery of the effects of 
thalidomide elevated concerns about in utero effects of chemicals. A primary aspect of 
the endocrine disruptor concept is that so many of the chemicals cause effects after in 
utero exposure, and therefore the concept requires an acceptance that chemicals can act in 
utero, resulting in negative outcomes after birth.  
 A German pharmaceutical company, Chemie-Grunenthal, released thalidomide as 
a sedative in Europe in 1957 (Vargesson 2015). Quickly after its release, physicians 
began prescribing the drug to pregnant women to combat nausea and morning sickness. 
Though effective as an antiemetic, physicians soon linked thalidomide to a number of 
side effects, including phocomelia (Vargesson 2015). Phocomelia is a congenital 
condition where an infant’s hands and/or feet are attached close to their trunk due to the 
underdevelopment or absence of limbs. In 1961, two researchers independently sounded 
the alarm regarding the teratogenicity of thalidomide and the drug was banned soon after 
(McBride 1961; Lenz et al. 1962).  
 The FDA never approved thalidomide in the US. An FDA reviewer, Frances 
Kelsey, halted the approval process due to her concerns about the safety of the drug 
(Vargesson 2015). However, the story of thalidomide and its effects certainly reached the 
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country, where the work of Kelsey was widely lauded. The impacts of thalidomide on the 
US regulatory system have been widely analyzed and will not be detailed here.  
In the endocrine disruptor story, thalidomide played an additional role by drawing 
attention to the perturbation of development by chemical exposure in utero. By the 
1990s, the ability of chemicals to act in utero was well known. Women knew not to drink 
or take drugs while pregnant. When proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept 
proposed that industrial and agricultural chemicals could be impacting the health of 
fetuses, that was not a foreign idea in the US. That familiarity made it much easier to 
situate endocrine disruptors as objects of social concern, which in turn made it easier to 
get endocrine disruptors regulated. That familiarity stemmed from the story of 
thalidomide and the research that came after.  
Both thalidomide and the environmental movement changed key aspects of the 
consciousness in the US, making a place for the concerns detailed in the endocrine 
disruptor concept. The funding and attention that followed also facilitated the next 
developmental step of the concept, implantation and the effects of diethylstilbestrol.  
 
IMPLANTATION: ESTROGEN EFFECTS IN HUMANS 
 By 1970, several discoveries had established key facts necessary for the endocrine 
disruptor concept. Researchers had linked estrogen with the onset of cancer. In 1957, 
Hertz demonstrated that hormones could also cause noncancerous negative effects. He 
also proposed a mechanism through which humans may be exposed to exogenous 
hormones. However, a piece was missing: evidence of serious negative health outcomes 
in humans after exposure to hormonally active substances.  
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Up until 1970, researchers had connected exposure to hormonally active 
chemicals with relatively few harmful effects in humans. Hertz described the 
development of gynecomastia and early puberty in children exposed to excess estrogen in 
1957, but he saw the effects in a small population and the effects themselves were minor. 
Therefore, the threat posed by exogenous estrogen was difficult to extrapolate to larger 
human populations. Additionally, the children Hertz treated ingested excess natural 
estrogen, estrogen extracted from animals and purified, rather than a hormonally active 
man-made chemical. The endocrine disruptor concept focuses largely on manmade 
chemicals, as by the 1990s natural hormones had been removed from many food 
production processes. The endocrine disruptor concept depends on an acceptance that 
hormonally active chemicals can seriously impact the health of humans. With no 
evidence in humans, proponents would have had a difficult time convincing audiences in 
the 1990s of the threat posed by endocrine disruptors. The effects of DES served as that 
evidence.  
In 1970, researchers connected prenatal exposure to DES with serious health 
problems, like aggressive cancers and reproductive tract abnormalities. The connection of 
in utero exposure to DES and health outcomes in humans serves as the moment of 
implantation in the development of the endocrine disruptor concept. Implantation, during 
development, allows the growing conceptus to access needed nutrients via the 
bloodstream of the pregnant woman. DES and its effects provided an outflowing of 
resources necessary for the twenty years of research that would support the endocrine 
disruptor concept in 1991.  
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Diethylstilbestrol (DES) Daughters and Sons 
 In 1970, Arthur A. Herbst and Robert E. Scully, physicians at Vincent Memorial 
Hospital in Boston, published a case report linking the occurrence of clear cell 
adenocarcinoma of the vagina5 in young, twenty-year-old women with in utero exposure 
to DES (Herbst and Scully 1970). DES was an artificial estrogen given to pregnant 
women throughout the 1950s and 1960s to prevent miscarriages (Smith and Smith 1946; 
Smith 1948; Smith and Smith 1949; Abboud 2015). Though a study in 1953 
demonstrated DES to be ineffective in that capacity, physicians nonetheless prescribed 
DES to more than four million women prior to 1971 (Dieckmann et al. 1953; Giusti, 
Iwamoto, and Hatch 1995; Abboud 2015). Herbst and Scully’s 1970 case report, along 
with several studies throughout 1971 solidifying the connection noted by Herbst and 
Scully, led the FDA to prohibit the use of DES during pregnancy later that year 
(Greenwald et al. 1971; Hill 1973; Henderson 1973; Giusti, Iwamoto, and Hatch 1995; 
FDA 1972). Soon after Herbst and Scully’s 1970 publication on the effects of in utero 
exposure to DES, researchers began noting other trans-generational effects of DES 
exposure: reproductive tract lesions, structural defects in reproductive organs like vaginas 
and uteri, and fertility problems (Giusti, Iwamoto, and Hatch 1995; NCI 2011). 
Individuals afflicted by those conditions were called DES daughters and DES sons.  
DES served two roles in the development of the endocrine disruptor concept. 
First, the effects of the synthetic estrogen showed that exposure to synthetic hormones 
could cause major problems in humans. With the discovery of the effects of in utero 
                                                 
5 Prior to Herbst and Scully’s study, clear cell adenocarcinoma had rarely, if ever, been 
seen in patients under the age of fifty (Herbst, Ulfelder, and Poskanzer 1971). 
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exposure to DES, researchers had a population of several million individuals as testament 
to the dangers of exposure to synthetic hormones, especially estrogen. That proved key 
for continued research on hormonally active chemicals. Following revelations about the 
effects of DES, more resources became available for the study of endocrine active 
chemicals (Krimsky 2000). The NIEHS and other institutions provided funding and 
grants, researchers took a new interest, and the public engaged with the story of DES and 
its effects throughout the 1970s. Those nutrients allowed for continued work on industrial 
and agricultural chemicals, which in turn built up a body of knowledge necessary to the 
endocrine disruptor concept in 1991. The implantation of the concept through the 
identification of DES effects in humans directly led to the next developmental stage of 
the concept, gastrulation and the discovery of non-estrogenic chemicals acting 
estrogenically.  
The second role that DES played in the development of the concept became clear 
only in the 1990s, when researchers proposed the concept. In 1991, DES served as the 
proof of concept for the endocrine disruptor concept. In the endocrine disruptor concept, 
proponents argued that endocrine disruptors posed a serious threat to the health of 
humans. But by 1991, little evidence supported that claim. Laboratory studies focused on 
animal models like mice in their research while field studies focused on fish, reptiles, and 
birds. Proponents lacked epidemiological studies with data on the effects of hormonally 
active chemicals. Except for the case of DES, which contained all of the aspects of the 
endocrine disruptor concept: the substance acted in utero, the effects were not apparent 
until later in life, exposure could cause many different effects. DES was, in fact, the 
perfect example of the endocrine disruptor concept because it clearly demonstrated that 
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unknowing exposure to hormonally active chemicals could have large impacts on health. 
That meant in the 1990s, proponents of the concept used DES as one of the only 
examples of endocrine disruptors impacting human health (Colborn and Clement 1992). 
In that way, DES and its effects served as a major moment in the development of the 
endocrine disruptor concept, forming one of its main foundations.  
 
GASTRULATION: CHEMICALS THAT ARE ESTROGENIC BUT NOT ESTROGENS 
The attention on DES brought the endocrine disruptor concept necessary 
resources. Those resources—the money, the researchers, and the attention—allowed for 
the further study of hormonally active chemicals. The studies that resulted helped to 
develop the endocrine disruptor concept through the 1970s and 1980s, through a period 
of gastrulation. During gastrulation, the mass of implanted embryonic cells goes from 
being made up of one kind of cell to many. In the case of the endocrine disruptor concept, 
gastrulation occurred through the expansion of substances to which the endocrine 
disruptor concept could apply.  
Up until the mid-1970s, researchers identified hormonally active chemicals as a 
restricted group. In order to be hormonally active, a chemical had to be either a natural 
hormone, extracted and purified for use as a hormonal agent, or a man-made chemical 
that structurally matched natural hormones. In the mid-twentieth century, researchers 
imagined hormones and hormone receptors in the body as keys and locks (Raloff 2014; 
Raloff 2017; Peyser and Hayden 1999). A hormone needed a specific structure to fit into 
a specific hormone receptor and activate a hormonal response. The research on 
hormonally active chemicals fit that model. Both the estrogen cancer hypothesis and the 
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noncancerous effects identified by Hertz dealt exclusively with extracted natural 
estrogens. And diethylstilbestrol, the new mainstay example of hormonally active 
chemicals, structurally matched estradiol and was intentionally manufactured as a 
synthetic estrogen (Dodds et al. 1938; McLachlan 2016). Researchers designed DES as a 
key to fit in the estrogen receptor lock.  
If, in 1991, the category of hormonally active chemicals only included those 
chemicals that structurally matched natural hormones, the endocrine disruptor concept 
would have applied to a much smaller group of chemicals. If endocrine disruptors needed 
to chemically resemble natural hormones to have an effect in the body, then the concern 
they raised would have been lessened. A method to identify such substances would have 
been obvious. Instead, during the mid-1970s, the category of hormonally active 
chemicals rapidly expanded with the investigation of the effects of kepone in Hopewell, 
Virginia. Researchers demonstrated that kepone, a highly-chlorinated molecule that in no 
way resembled estrogen, could act estrogenically in the body (Vogel 2012, 85).  
The discovery that a much larger group of chemicals could act estrogenically in 
the body established an important piece of the endocrine disruptor concept: that many 
industrial and agricultural chemicals could disrupt hormone processes in the body. 
Kepone was a non-key that turned the estrogen receptor lock and opened the potential 
that an unknown number of other chemicals could do the same. Like during gastrulation 
when the kinds of cells diversify, the estrogenic actions of kepone diversified the kinds of 
things the endocrine disruptor concept applied to, which made the concept a far more 
serious and complex concern in the 1990s.   
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Kepone in Hopewell, Virginia  
In early 1974, Life Sciences Products, a subcontractor of Allied Chemicals, began 
manufacturing large amounts of kepone at their plant in Hopewell, Virginia. Kepone, or 
chlordecone, is an organochlorine compound used in the production of several pesticides 
including Mirex, a fire ant killer (Reich and Spong 1983; McLachlan 2016). Soon after 
production started, workers reported experiencing “the Kepone shakes,” severe tremors 
that affected balance and coordination (Reich and Spong 1983, 232). Local doctors could 
find no explanation for the shakes until one physician, Yi-nan Chou, sent a blood sample 
to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in July 1975 (Epstein 1978). 
The CDC concluded that the blood sample from one of the plant workers contained high 
levels of kepone (Epstein 1978). Within months, the EPA and National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) had been notified and began investigating the 
toxicity of kepone. When researchers went to Hopewell, they found that plant workers 
experienced high rates of sterility, loss of libido, tremors, and memory loss (Vogel 2012, 
85). The EPA halted kepone production in August 1975 (Reich and Spong 1983).  
The negative effects experienced by plant workers exposed to kepone spurred 
investigation of the toxicity of the compound (Vogel 2012). In those investigations, 
researchers found that mammals exposed to kepone responded as though they had been 
exposed to estrogen, and in lab screening tests, kepone bound to estrogen receptors 
(Eroschenko and Palmiter 1980; McLachlan 2016; Vogel 2012). However, kepone did 
not chemically resemble estrogen, raising the question of how a chemical that was not 
structured like estrogen could mimic its effects (McLachlan 2016). Kepone was a highly-
chlorinated compound meaning that it should not have fit into the estrogen receptor in the 
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body. Kepone was not the right shaped key, and yet it still unlocked estrogen responses in 
the body.  
 A review of literature at the time showed that several other industrial and 
agricultural chemicals, like DDT, also acted estrogenically while not bearing any 
chemical resemblance to natural estrogens (McLachlan 2016; Kupfer and Bulger 1976). 
By the end of the 1970s, researchers began to realize that the action of hormones and 
hormone receptors was more complicated than a lock and key mechanism. That 
realization only continued research on the endocrine activity of various industrial and 
agricultural chemicals, including lead, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and bisphenol 
A (BPA) (Vogel 2012; Sullivan and Barlow 1979). Those studies connected such 
chemicals with sperm count declines, high rates of miscarriage, and infertility and grew 
the body of evidence the endocrine disruptor concept relied on in 1991 (Vogel 2012; 
Sullivan and Barlow 1979).  
The growing understanding that substances not resembling estrogen could act like 
estrogen in a natural system opened the door for endocrine disruptors by showing that 
substances that were not hormones and not intended to act like hormones could 
nonetheless act as hormones. If only substances with a chemical resemblance to natural 
hormones could behave like hormones in the body and therefore be considered endocrine 
disruptors, scientists in 1991 would have been faced with a significantly shorter list of 
potential endocrine disruptors and a testing mechanism would have been relatively 
apparent. Manufacturers would have only needed to know if the chemical structure of 
their products matched the chemical structure of endogenous hormones. After kepone, 
testing mechanisms would have to test every chemical to see if it had surprising or 
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unexpected hormonal effects. Kepone began a gastrulation process in the development of 
the concept, expanding the chemicals of concern and the research used to support the 
endocrine disruptor concept in the 1990s.  
 
TRANSITION FROM EMBRYO TO FETUS: ENVIRONMENTAL ESTROGENS  
Following the revelations about kepone and estrogenicity, researchers 
investigated the toxicity of industrial and agricultural chemicals in force. For much of the 
twentieth century, toxicological investigation of chemicals focused on carcinogenicity, or 
the ability of a chemical to cause cancer (U.S. Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor 
Chelimksy). Most if not all tests used in toxicology focused on cancer endpoints (U.S. 
Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimksy). The Ames test, which tests for 
mutagenicity by measuring mutations in bacteria exposed to certain chemicals, was often 
used for regulatory approval (Ames et. al 1973; Ames, Lee, and Durston 1973; Clayson 
and Clegg 1991). The focus on cancer only began to shift in the 1980s, after revelations 
surfaced about kepone and other workplace hazards causing reproductive problems in 
exposed workers (Vogel 2012).  
The beginning shift away from the cancer paradigm in toxicology led to two 
important moments in the development of the endocrine disruptor concept: the creation of 
a new category of toxic substances and the connection of those substances to 
noncancerous endpoints. In 1979, at a workshop hosted by the NIEHS, John McLachlan 
and others coined the term “environmental estrogens” to describe industrial and 
agricultural chemicals that acted estrogenically and could cause negative health effects 
(McLachlan 1979). The term brought together all of the pieces of the endocrine disruptor 
  51 
concept up to this point, joining the cancerous effects of natural estrogens, the trans-
generational effects of DES, and the activities of kepone under one umbrella term.  
Environmental estrogens, as a category, closely resembled endocrine disruptors. 
The coinage of environmental estrogens marked a shift in the development of the 
endocrine disruptor concept. Prior to, the developmental moments of the concept 
established important pieces of knowledge that the concept relied on in the 1990s. 
Environmental estrogens continued that, leading directly to the endocrine disruptor 
concept. The researchers who studied them became the researchers who studied (and 
study) endocrine disruptors. The research that supported their existence became the 
research that supported the existence of endocrine disruptors. In that way, the beginning 
of research on environmental estrogens serves as the shift from embryo to fetus in the 
development of the endocrine disruptor concept. Though there is no well-defined 
biological moment that separates an embryo from a fetus, many identify the shift as the 
point at which the conceptus becomes recognizably human in the sense of having all the 
major organ systems in place. Environmental estrogens are recognizably endocrine 
disruptors in that same way.  
The shift from embryo to fetus for the endocrine disruptor concept continued with 
a second important moment in the 1980s: the connection between environmental 
estrogens and noncancerous effects. In 1979, when the term was coined, researchers saw 
the threat of environmental estrogens in their ability to cause cancer, a remnant of the 
decades long cancer paradigm in toxicology. By 1985, when the NIEHS sponsored a 
second meeting on environmental estrogens, the threat of the substances expanded to 
include noncancerous effects more seriously, especially noncancerous developmental 
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effects in children (McLachlan 1985). That expansion shifted environmental estrogens to 
more closely resemble endocrine disruptors, which act as toxicants to cause cancerous 
and noncancerous effects, especially reproductive and developmental effects. By the end 
of the 1980s, the key aspects of the endocrine disruptor concept had become clear: 
industrial and agricultural chemicals could act hormonally to cause reproductive and 
developmental problems as well as causing cancer.  
 
Estrogens in the Environment I, 1979 
In 1979, the NIEHS sponsored the first Estrogens in the Environment meeting in 
Raleigh, North Carolina, at the Velvet Cloak Inn. John McLachlan, then in the 
Laboratory of Reproductive and Developmental Toxicology at the NIEHS, organized the 
meeting around the goal of determining “what an estrogen is and how it works, and what 
effect estrogenic substances might have on human health” (McLachlan 1979, xv). In his 
write up of the meeting, McLachlan points to the estrogenic activities of substances like 
kepone to indicate the timeliness of the meeting (McLachlan 1979, xv).  
 At the meeting itself, attended by a multidisciplinary group of researchers 
including Frederick vom Saal and Ana M. Soto, both early proponents of the endocrine 
disruptor concept, researchers presented on mechanisms of action and potential 
environmental impacts of estrogenic chemicals. As reflective of the still recent emphasis 
on cancer endpoints, researchers at the meeting focused on cancerous effects of 
estrogens. At the meeting, researchers debated how estrogenic chemicals might be 
causing cancer. Prior to the 1970s, many researchers agreed that carcinogens caused 
cancer by inducing mutation in the affected organism (Clayson and Clegg 1991; U.S. 
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Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). Therefore, to determine if a chemical 
was carcinogenic, researchers used mutagenic tests to determine if it was mutagenic 
(Clayson and Clegg 1991; U.S. Senate 1991). However, throughout the 1970s, some 
studies showed that traditional carcinogenic tests did not detect all cancer-causing agents 
(Clayson and Clegg 1991; U.S. Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). DES, for 
example, when tested using the Ames test, did not test positively for genotoxicity 
(McLachlan, Newbold, and Bullock 1980). That left the researchers at the Estrogens in 
the Environment meeting, as well as researchers more broadly, considering by what other 
mechanisms a substance might cause cancer.   
The Estrogens in the Environment meeting in 1979 is notable as being the 
location for the coinage of environmental estrogens to describe estrogenic chemicals that 
humans and other organisms may be exposed to with carcinogenic effect. The term 
identified a group of estrogenic chemicals, used in industry and agriculture, as potentially 
harmful to humans. Environmental estrogens and the research on their effects directly led 
to the endocrine disruptor concept, with the same researchers and same evidence 
involved in both. As research on environmental estrogens continued throughout the 
1980s, the development of the endocrine disruptor concept progressed apace. However, a 
final aspect of the endocrine disruptor concept was still missing: the connection of 
environmental estrogens to noncancerous effects.  
 
Estrogens in the Environment II, 1985 
 In 1985, McLachlan organized the second Estrogens in the Environment meeting, 
once again sponsored by the NIEHS (McLachlan 1985; McLachlan 2016). The second 
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meeting was precipitated by a report of widespread precocious puberty in children in 
Puerto Rico, where it had been shown that meat contained elevated estradiol levels (de 
Rodriguez, Bongiovanni, and de Borrego 1985; McLachlan 1985). According to 
McLachlan, that report shifted the focus to “the influence of estrogenic compounds on 
development in animals and humans” (McLachlan 1985, xix).  
Within the foreword of the compiled works from the conference, McLachlan 
details the characteristics of environmental estrogens and the threat they pose. He argues 
that any chemical with estrogenic properties could cause cancerous and noncancerous 
effects in humans exposed to them through their environment (McLachlan 1985, xix). 
With that, McLachlan laid out a concept that bears striking resemblance to the endocrine 
disruptor concept.  
Research on environmental estrogens in the 1980s directly built up the body of 
evidence used to support the endocrine disruptor concept in the 1990s as well as helping 
the development of the concept via the stimulation of many of the researchers who helped 
to propose the concept in 1991. Those researchers included vom Saal and Soto, both 
attendees at Estrogens in the Environment meetings and strong experimentalists in the 
1980s looking at the effects of environmental estrogens (McLachlan 1979; McLachlan 
1985). Along with Colborn, vom Saal and Soto authored some of the original material on 
endocrine disruptors, showing how directly environmental estrogens played a role in the 
development of the endocrine disruptor concept, truly moving it from embryonic to more 
and more fetal (Colborn and Clement 1992; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993).  
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FETAL MOVEMENT: GREAT LAKES TOXICOLOGY RESEARCH 
By 1990, the individual facts and pieces of knowledge necessary for the endocrine 
disruptor concept had been laid out. However, the concept experienced one final 
developmental step before its birth in 1991: fetal movement. Fetal movement, a time 
referred to traditionally as quickening, is the moment when the pregnant woman can feel 
the movement of the fetus. The endocrine disruptor concept is not a person and does not 
have a mother. The moment of fetal movement for the concept instead occurred when all 
the individual pieces necessary for its legitimacy came together in a single case study. 
That case study, in the Great Lakes region of Canada and the US, sparked the initial 
conception of the endocrine disruptor concept by Colborn, who went on to call together 
the meeting where the concept was laid out (Colborn 1998b).  
 
Great Lakes, Great Legacy?  
Beginning in the 1950s, several studies suggested reproductive problems in some 
species of the Great Lakes region—specifically in the declining numbers of bald eagles 
(Broley 1958). Some linked those reproductive effects to the increasing industrialization 
of the area surrounding the Great Lakes, and following the publication of Silent Spring in 
1962, to the use of DDT. Between 1960 and 1980, several other findings indicated 
potential environmental toxins in the basin, including the 1968 finding that mink-fed 
Lake Michigan coho salmon produced very few viable offspring and the studies 
throughout the 1970s showing the reproductive struggle of fish-eating birds in the region 
(Beland et al. 1991). Such findings resulted in intense rehabilitative efforts by Canadian 
and American environmentalists. 
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In 1987, the Conservation Foundation and the Institute for Research on Public 
Policy funded a two-year research program to evaluate the effectiveness of the efforts and 
the status of the Great Lakes basin (Colborn et al. 1990). Colborn worked with several 
other researchers on the project. Three years later, in 1990, Colborn and her five 
colleagues published Great Lakes, Great Legacy? In the book, they detailed almost three 
decades of research on the effects of industrial and agricultural chemicals in the Great 
Lakes ecosystem.  
In Great Lakes, Great Legacy?, the researchers lay out evidence showing the 
reproductive problems and population declines of many Great Lakes species and the birth 
defects, elevated hormone levels, and trans-generational effects found in those same 
species (Colborn et al. 1990). The authors speculate that the effects noted are a result of 
exposure to certain chemicals, like 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD, dioxin) 
and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The authors are more restrained in their comments 
on the health effects in humans, noting that data collected on cancer incidence and 
reproductive outcomes was inconclusive because such data is rarely collected in humans 
(Colborn et al. 1990). However, they do caution that chemical exposure could be 
detrimental.  
Colborn’s work in the Great Lakes brought together all the aspects of the 
endocrine disruptor concept: that industrial and agricultural chemicals act hormonally, 
thereby causing negative health outcomes in humans and wildlife, making the chemicals 
a threat to both groups. The 1990 publication of Great Lakes research marks the last 
developmental moment for the endocrine disruptor concept. By 1990, all the pieces for 
the concept had been established and only needed to be drawn together for its birth. 
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Arguably, one individual began that process in the 1980s. Before her death, Colborn 
spoke candidly about how her work in the Great Lakes gave rise to her thoughts on 
endocrine disruptors (Colborn 1998b). It was through that work that Colborn became 
aware of the preceding decades of research and called together the group at Wingspread 
to seriously discuss the effects of industrial and agricultural chemicals on humans and 
wildlife. That meeting bore out the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 
BIRTH: THE FINAL FORMULATION OF THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR CONCEPT 
In 1991, the term “endocrine disruptor” was used for the first time. At the meeting 
called together by Colborn, twenty-one researchers discussed the effects of industrial and 
agricultural chemicals on humans and wildlife.6 The attendees dubbed those chemicals 
endocrine disruptors to indicate that the substances worked by interfering with hormonal 
processes. Therefore, endocrine disruptors refer to a category of substances, a kind of 
thing in the world. The category has been populated for the past thirty years.  
 But that category is entwined with, in fact inseparable from, the endocrine 
disruptor concept. The endocrine disruptor concept, as stated in 1991, was: There are 
hormonally active agents in the environment (referring to natural environments as well as 
components of the human environment like food supply) to which humans and wildlife 
are exposed; exposure to those agents results in disruption of endocrine pathways and 
                                                 
6 The twenty-one attendees at the Wingspread meeting were: Howard A. Bern, Phyllis 
Blair, Sophie Brasseur, Theo Colborn, Gerald Cunha, William Davis, Klaus D. Dohler, 
John McLachlan, John Peterson Myers, Richard E. Peterson, P.J.H. Reijnders, Glen Fox, 
Michael Fry, Earl Gray, Richard Green, Melissa Hines, Timothy J. Kubiack, Ana Soto, 
Glen Van Der Kraak, Frederick vom Saal, and Pat Whitten (Colborn and Clement 1992).  
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negative health outcomes in humans and wildlife, especially when exposure occurs 
during development; thus, endocrine disruptors pose a clear and immediate threat to the 
health of humans and wildlife. The individual pieces of that concept were established in 
the preceding decades, as the rest of this chapter has demonstrated. But they were brought 
together and named in 1991. Hence, the 1991 meeting is the birth of endocrine disruptors, 
both the category and the concept.  
 At the birth of the concept, the proponents established endocrine disruptors as 
subjects of scientific, social, and regulatory concern. When laying out their thoughts on 
the substances, the researchers clearly indicated that the substances needed to be 
investigated scientifically, made known to different publics socially, and acted upon 
politically. Those three goals dictated much of the work of the original proponents of the 
endocrine disruptor concept through the 1990s, as detailed in Chapter 3.  
 
First Endocrine Disruptor Meeting, 1991 
Following the publication of the Great Lakes report, Colborn called together a 
meeting in Racine, Wisconsin, at the Wingspread Conference Center. The endocrine 
disruptor concept was born at the work session on “Chemically-Induced Alterations in 
Sexual Development: The Wildlife/Human Connection,” held 26–28 July 1991, when the 
term “endocrine disruptor” was first used by the twenty-one interdisciplinary researchers 
gathered.   
 At the meeting, researchers with a specific perspective weighed in on the 
problems posed by hormonally active chemicals. Colborn organized the meeting with 
John Peterson Myers, Director of the W. Alton Jones Foundation. The Foundation, and 
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Myers himself, sponsored environmental causes in the US. In organizing the 1991 
meeting, both Colborn and Myers sought out researchers from diverse backgrounds who 
would be inclined to have pro-environmentalist concerns about endocrine disruptors. 
While the meetings sponsored by the NIEHS throughout the 1980s were attended by a 
broader and more representative group of researchers, the Wingspread meeting was not. 
The endocrine disruptor concept was formally laid out in 1991 by a group of activist 
researchers who then spent much of the next decade promoting the concept to scientific, 
public, and political audiences.   
They started that process in January of 1992, with the publication of the 
Wingspread consensus statement and the associated scientific data presented at the 1991 
work session. The twenty-one researchers articulated three purposes for their meeting and 
their released statement:  
1. to integrate and evaluate findings from the diverse research disciplines concerning 
the magnitude of the problem of endocrine disruptors in the environment; 
2. to identify the conclusions that can be drawn with confidence from existing data;  
3. and to establish a research agenda that would clarify uncertainties remaining in 
the field. (Colborn and Clement 1992, 1)  
Those three purposes introduced the endocrine disruptor concept as a scientific construct, 
one deserving of more research to further clarify what kind of thing endocrine disruptors 
are. Each purpose dealt explicitly with the collection and analysis of data in order to 
motivate a better research agenda to collect more data and further analysis.  
After identifying endocrine disruptors as a scientific problem, the authors laid out 
what they considered facts about the chemicals. They claimed that manmade chemicals 
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had been released into the environment and that wildlife populations had already been 
affected by those chemicals. Those chemicals could generally be said to differentially 
affect embryos, fetuses, and adults, and to cause problems in offspring rather than 
exposed parents. The authors of the statement also claimed that problematic health effects 
caused by exposure to endocrine disruptors changed as a result of the developmental 
point when exposure took place. The researchers in the consensus statement then further 
claimed that humans could be affected by those same chemicals using DES as the proof 
of concept.  
Importantly, the researchers at Wingspread did not lay out how to identify an 
endocrine disruptor nor what counts as endocrine disruption. In that way, the authors of 
the Wingspread statement created an empty category. Though they laid out general 
characteristics of endocrine disruptors, they left out specifics necessary for scientific and 
regulatory investigation of the substances. The sense that the endocrine disruptor 
category was laid out enough to feel solid, but empty of evidence, caused problems 
throughout the life of the concept from 1991 until 2018. This idea is explored further in 
Chapter 3.  
In their statement, the Wingspread attendees introduced other aspects of the 
endocrine disruptor concept, namely expanding the concept as a regulatory and social 
problem. Within their released statement, the researchers made a series of 
recommendations. The first recommendation offered dealt with the regulation of 
endocrine disruptors and the associated required testing. The researchers stated that 
“[t]esting of products for regulatory purposes should be broadened to include hormonal 
activity in vivo” (Colborn and Clement 1992, 4). That recommendation is distinctly not 
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an establishment of a scientific agenda, but rather a regulatory one. Throughout the 
statement, the authors made clear that they considered endocrine disruptors to be a 
present threat to humans and wildlife, in itself not a purely scientific claim given the 
social construction of risk. With the addition of recommendations regarding regulatory 
action that should be taken on the substances, the proponents of the concept established 
the chemicals as regulatory problems, rather than purely scientific ones.  
With a second recommendation, the authors further identified endocrine 
disruptors as social concerns. The authors stated that:  
The scientific and public health communities' general lack of awareness 
concerning the presence of hormonally active environmental chemicals, 
functional teratogenicity, and the concept of transgenerational exposure must be 
addressed. Because functional deficits are not visible at birth and may not be fully 
manifested until adulthood, they are often missed by physician, parents, and 
regulatory community, and the causal agent in never identified. (Colborn and 
Clement 1992, 5) 
The recommendation here is less obviously social. The authors identified scientific and 
public health communities as the primary focus, however, their concern was that the 
effects of endocrine disruptors were going unnoticed due to lacking awareness about the 
substances. As made clear by their inclusion of physicians, parents, and the regulatory 
community in the recommendation, the authors aimed to increase general awareness of 
endocrine disrupting effects through social education.  
 Additionally, the authors use of the term “endocrine disruptor” further 
demonstrates their goal to center the endocrine disruptor concept as a social concern. As 
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Sarah Vogel reports, the term was the brain child of the meeting cohost, Myers of the W. 
Alton Jones Foundation. Myers, in thinking about a paper on climate change, coined the 
term “climate disruption” to convey negative implications not captured by “climate 
change” or “global warming” (Vogel 2012, 106; OED 2017a; OED 2017b; Lester and 
Myers 1989). He applied that same logic to the term “endocrine disruptor,” meaning to 
clearly indicate the severe impacts of such disruption with the use of the term and to 
inspire reaction in those exposed to the term. In particular, popular media responds well 
to evocative terms, often resulting in broad dissemination of ideas connected to them.  
 The authors goal to establish the endocrine disruptor concept as a social object, as 
well as a scientific and regulatory one, became clearer in the time after the Wingspread 
statement was released, during which proponents of the concept spent most of their time 
spreading the endocrine disruptor concept in widely accessible formats like newspaper 
interviews (Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; Krimsky 2000).  
The birth of the endocrine disruptor concept as a scientific, social, and regulatory 
concern dictated much of the concept’s later life. With the Wingspread consensus 
statement, proponents of the concept established their goals for the next decade: to 
scientifically investigate endocrine disruptors as a category, to socially expand awareness 
of the dangers posed by endocrine disrupting chemicals, and to politically act to ensure 
that those dangers were adequately regulated.  
The Wingspread statement also pulls on all of the developmental pieces of the 
endocrine disruptor concept discussed in this chapter. In it, the authors make clear that 
they are concerned about cancerous and noncancerous effects, that they are aware of the 
hormonal actions of industrial and agricultural chemicals, and that DES serves as proof 
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that endocrine disruptors can cause detrimental effects in human populations. Those 
claims undergird the concept, in many ways allowing it to be taken seriously at the 1991 
meeting and after. The knowledge produced and the changes wrought in the preceding 
decades allowed the concept to be as it was, allowed proponents to reasonably claim that 
hormonally active chemicals that disrupt normal processes to negative effect exist and 
that they threaten the health of human and wildlife populations.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 In this chapter, I have detailed the thirty-year period during which the endocrine 
disruptor concept grew and developed, becoming firmer with increasing scientific 
knowledge and also broader with the inclusion of more substances and effects. Through 
that process, I sought to detail the contours of the endocrine disruptor concept in 1991: 
the claims made, the evidence used, and the historical changes relied on by proponents of 
the concept.  
The seven crucial developmental steps for the endocrine disruptor concept are as 
follows:  
1. That naturally occurring hormones can cause negative effects in humans; first 
established by the estrogen cancer hypothesis in the 1930s and expanded on by 
Roy Hertz in 1957,   
2. That humans may be exposed to hormonally active substances via a number of 
routes, including consumption of animal products and produce treated with such 
products; proposed by Hertz in 1957 as a steroid cycle,  
3. That unintentional exposure to hormonally active chemicals can have detrimental 
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effects on human populations; made clear with the effects of in utero exposure to 
diethylstilbestrol in the 1970s,  
4. That chemicals need not chemically match estrogen or other hormones in order to 
act estrogenically in the body; established by researchers at the NIEHS in the 
mid-1970s after problems with kepone production in Hopewell, Virginia,   
5. That non-estrogen resembling industrial and agricultural chemicals can cause 
cancerous effects in humans; formally laid out at the first Estrogens in the 
Environment meet in 1979, where the term “environmental estrogens” was 
coined,  
6. That non-estrogen resembling industrial and agricultural chemicals can cause 
noncancerous effects in humans; formally laid out at the second Estrogens in the 
Environment meet in 1985,  
7. That hormonally active industrial and agricultural chemicals in the environment 
can cause negative cancerous and noncancerous effects in humans and wildlife 
populations; demonstrated in 1990 with the conclusion of research on the Great 
Lakes region.  
Looking back, it makes sense to link those steps together as a developmental 
process not because one caused another, but because the endocrine disruptor concept was 
dependent on each step in important ways. By examining each step as part of a process, it 
becomes clear why the endocrine disruptor concept looked as it did in 1991. In particular, 
it becomes clear why proponents were able to successfully promote the concept as a 
scientific, social, and regulatory object. Previous scientific discoveries, regulatory 
changes, and social concerns created an environment in the US where environmental 
  65 
concerns like endocrine disruptors could be treated as a serious and immediate problem. 
Proponents of the concept used that to their advantage in the 1990s to gain support for 
regulatory change, which occurred in 1996.  
The next chapter details the different responses to the scientific, social, and 
regulatory nature of the endocrine disruptor concept on its journey to regulation from 
1991 to 1996. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LIFE OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS (1991– ) 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 In Chapter 2, I detailed the scientific discoveries and historical changes that 
allowed proponents to introduce the endocrine disruptor concept as a scientific, social, 
and regulatory object in 1991. Within that concept, the researchers stated that: 1. 
Endocrine disruptors exist as chemicals able to interfere with normal hormone action and 
cause negative health effects, and 2. That those chemicals threatened human and wildlife 
health. In the Wingspread consensus statement, attendees like Theo Colborn and 
Frederick vom Saal crafted the two-part concept so that it connected to a series of goals: 
to continue scientific research on endocrine disruptors, to increase public awareness of 
endocrine disruptors, and to get endocrine disruptors regulated in the US. In setting those 
as goals, the proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept had to describe the category 
of endocrine disrupting chemicals.  
 Therefore, in 1991, proponents proposed not only the endocrine disruptor 
concept, but also the endocrine disruptor category. The category proposed by Colborn 
and her colleagues in 1991 was meant to contain all hormonally-active chemicals that 
threatened the health of human and wildlife populations, as dictated by the endocrine 
disruptor concept. Those chemicals, proponents argued, should be regulated and their 
threat be made known to the public. The category had a general outline, provided by the 
four characteristics of endocrine disruptors proponents laid out:   
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1. The chemicals affect different developmental stages differently. Effects seen in 
embryos, fetuses, or perinatal organisms differ from those seen in adult 
organisms.  
2. The chemicals often affect the offspring of individuals exposed.  
3. At what point an organism is exposed to the chemical changes the effects of that 
chemical.  
4. When exposure occurs during development, effects may not be seen until 
adulthood. (Colborn and Clement 1992) 
 Those parameters lack specifics. In laying out the endocrine disruptor category, 
Colborn and her colleagues used very broad strokes, only including four general 
properties of endocrine disrupting chemicals while leaving out any detail of what counted 
as an endocrine disruptor, how to identify an endocrine disruptor, and through what 
mechanisms an endocrine disruptor functioned. In that way, the category presented was a 
box, or perhaps more accurately, a balloon. The category had a recognizable shape, 
something to contain dangerous hormonally active chemicals, but it was empty of the 
specifics needed to make it solid: what chemicals fit in the category, how to identify such 
chemicals, and how those chemicals work.  
 In this chapter, I trace the trajectory of the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category as they came into contact with actors from different spheres, scientific, social, 
and regulatory. Much of the story is led by the actions of proponents through the 1990s as 
they carried out their goals to increase the scientific study of, social awareness of, and 
regulation of endocrine disruptors. It was through that process that other actors were 
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exposed to the concept and category, ultimately leading to the regulation of endocrine 
disruptors in 1996.  
In walking through the history of the concept and category in the 1990s, I focus 
on two threads: how proponents pushed both constructs into scientific, social, and 
regulatory spheres, and how actors within those spheres pushed back in various ways. 
Those are parallel narratives that took place largely between 1991 and 1996, the focus 
years of this chapter, but also into the modern day, which I focus on in a section at the 
end of the chapter.  
The first thread of this chapter, how proponents pushed the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category into different realms, delves into the actions of proponents as they 
tried to situate both constructs in different contexts. Proponents made it clear in 1991 that 
they saw the concept and category as relevant in scientific, social, and regulatory 
contexts, and they spent much of the 1990s working to make that reality by introducing 
endocrine disruptors in different arenas through mediums like popular newspaper articles 
and Congressional hearings. Importantly, through that work, proponents used similar 
tactics in different arenas, not changing their claims or supporting evidence for different 
audiences. Additionally, the researchers began with regulatory and social audiences, 
rather than scientific ones, which set endocrine disruptors on a unique science policy 
trajectory that ended in quick regulation in the face of deep scientific division.  
In this chapter, I bring out how proponents did that by walking through their 
actions in each of the years between 1991 and 1996. In those years, I also draw attention 
to the scientific, social, and regulatory changes that aided proponents in their attempts to 
situate the concept and category in those areas. Much of proponents’ success in garnering 
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social attention for endocrine disruptors and regulatory action on them came from shifts 
in the 1990s that derived from decades-long contingencies. Among those, the shift away 
from the cancer paradigm in the early 1990s made room for a group of chemicals that act 
through non-cancer endpoints. In following the thread about proponents’ work to make 
room for endocrine disruptors in different spheres, I incorporate the historical 
contingencies that aided them in that process.  
The second thread of this chapter follows the response scientific, social, and 
regulatory actors had to the work of proponents. In particular, I highlight how those 
actors did or did not probe at the endocrine disruptor concept and category. Both the 
concept and category had major issues in the 1990s. Proponents lacked strong human 
evidence for endocrine disrupting effects, calling into question their claim that endocrine 
disruptors made for a public health crisis, and the category they presented lacked 
sufficient detail in terms of what chemicals counted as endocrine disruptors and how 
those chemicals worked.  
Throughout the 1990s, actors in different spheres responded to those missing 
pieces differently. Social actors embraced the concept and category fully, as fear-
inducing constructs that sold newspapers. Scientific actors responded oppositely, probing 
deeply at the concept and category with many ultimately rejecting some parts of both. 
Regulatory actors embraced particular aspects of the concept and category, those that 
proponents worked to present to them as politically actionable and valuable. Each actor’s 
response was again impacted by historical movements that came to fruition in the 1990s, 
like the shift away from the cancer paradigm and focus on developmental perturbations, 
and also on social trends and truths of the 1990s, like the widespread fear of breast cancer 
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and waning masculinity. I include both in my analysis of the trajectory the concept and 
category in the 1990s.  
In following both of those threads, I lay out the notable science policy path 
endocrine disruptors followed and the actions proponents took to make such a path 
possible. Those actions, and the resulting path, had consequences for the study and 
regulation of ubiquitous chemicals that impact all of our lives both in the 1990s and the 
modern day. 
 
1991: REGULATORY INTRODUCTION AND THE CANCER PARADIGM  
 Just months after the Wingspread meeting where Colborn and her colleagues laid 
out the endocrine disruptor concept and category, proponents had an opportunity to begin 
on their project of getting endocrine disruptors regulated. Colborn introduced the concept 
and category in a regulatory setting for the first time in 1991 at a Senate hearing (U.S. 
Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn). There, Colborn argued strongly for 
the need to regulate endocrine disruptors, using studies showing the effects of chemicals 
on pregnant women and children to make her point. The Senate hearing was the first 
attempt by proponents to push the endocrine disruptor concept and category into the 
regulatory sphere, and an examination of how they did so sets the tone for their efforts 
during the 1990s.   
 The Senate hearing in 1991 also reveals some of the changing qualities of the 
world that aided proponents in their attempts to situate the concept and category in 
scientific, social, and regulatory arenas. As discussed in Chapter 2, the endocrine 
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change that helped proponents successfully argue for its relevance in different areas. In 
particular, the environmental movement made environmental concerns socially 
prominent and politically actionable. During the early 1990s, though, proponents were 
especially helped by the regulatory shift away from the cancer paradigm, or the basis of 
toxic chemicals regulation on cancer endpoints. Increased scientific awareness of 
noncancerous effects of chemicals in both humans and wildlife came in the 1970s. But 
the regulatory community’s awareness of such things took longer, not coming to the fore 
until the early 1990s. The regulatory community’s growing awareness that developmental 
and reproductive toxicities needed more regulation presented an opening into which 
proponents pushed the endocrine disruptor concept and category.  
 
First Introduction to the World: the 1991 Senate Hearing on Reproductive Hazards 
In October 1991, the endocrine disruptor concept and category made their first 
regulatory debut at a Senate hearing on “Government Regulation of Reproductive 
Hazards” before the Committee on Governmental Affairs (U.S. Congress Senate 1991). 
Up until the early 1990s, most government regulation of toxic substances focused 
exclusively on carcinogenesis or acute toxicity as endpoints (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 
Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). That meant that substances were largely screened only 
for whether they induced cancer in animal models or whether they resulted in acute 
poisoning of said animal model. That focus has been called the cancer paradigm and 
reflected a parallel focus in science on cancer as an endpoint (Ames et. al 1973; Ames, 
Lee, and Durston 1973; Clayson and Clegg 1991). However, though the scientific 
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community had begun to move past the cancer paradigm before the 1990s, the regulatory 
community largely had not.  
 That began to change in the early 1990s, and the 1991 Senate hearing on the 
regulation of reproductive hazards was part of that. Ohio Senator John Glenn chaired the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs and oversaw the proceedings. Glenn, who had been 
a NASA astronaut before entering politics, started the hearing with a retelling of some 
historical examples highlighting the need to regulate reproductive hazards, including 
thalidomide and its associated birth defects,7 DES and the resulting multigenerational 
cancers, and the Great Lakes research and early indications of pesticides threat to wildlife 
(U.S. Congress Senate, 1–2; Vargesson 2015; Herbst and Scully 1970; Colborn et al. 
1990). The year 1991 was the thirty-year anniversary of the thalidomide tragedy, and 
Great Lakes, Great Legacy? had been released only a year before. After introducing that 
history, Glenn then stated the purpose of the hearing: “to assess the actions of the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify and regulate exposures to 
                                                 
7 Thalidomide was an anti-nausea medication prescribed to women in the 1950s 
(Vargesson 2015). Somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 infants exposed to 
thalidomide in utero had severe birth defects like phocomelia (malformation of the limbs) 
(Vargesson 2015). Though the drug was never approved in the US, the thalidomide 
tragedy, as it has sometimes been called, changed the way many countries tested and 
regulated drugs. Thalidomide and its in utero effects clearly demonstrated that the 
development of fetuses could be disrupted with the introduction of certain substances and 
as such thalidomide is often brought up in the conversations about endocrine disruptors 
and the regulation of reproductive hazards, though it is not an endocrine disruptor.  
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reproductively hazardous environmental contaminants” (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 2–
3).  
Prior to the hearing proceedings, Glenn had asked the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO) to investigate whether the regulations of the time adequately protected 
both humans and wildlife from reproductive and developmental toxins (U.S. Congress 
Senate 1991, 2). During the 1980s, regulatory agencies became increasingly aware of 
such toxicities after incidents like the kepone spill in Hopewell, Virginia, and the 
developing body of work on environmental estrogens led by John McLachlan at the 
National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) (Vogel 2012; Reich and 
Spong 1983; McLachlan 2016). Glenn’s request of the GAO followed in the same vein, 
given the growing pressure to address reproductive and developmental threats.  
As part of the investigation requested by Glenn, the GAO produced a report titled 
“Reproductive and Developmental Hazards: Regulatory Actions Provide Uncertain 
Protection” (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). The title 
says it all. The report, though officially authored by Eleanor Chelimsky as Assistant 
Comptroller General in the Program Evaluation and Methodology Department, was 
produced by Boris Kachura, Barbara Capman, Robert Copeland, and Kwai-Cheung Chan. 
The GAO investigated four questions: 1. What chemicals are highly concerning for 
causing reproductive and developmental diseases?; 2. How are those chemicals 
regulated?; 3. Are those regulations based on the reproductive and developmental 
toxicities?; and 4. Are the regulations sufficient? (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony 
of Eleanor Chelimsky).  
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 In answer to those questions, the GAO developed a list of thirty chemicals of high 
concern, including alcohol, lead, DES, the pesticide Mirex (made with kepone), and the 
class of chemicals called polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Most of the thirty chemicals 
were regulated by one of the four agencies included in the report. That regulation was 
largely not due to the reproductive or developmental toxicities of the substances, but 
instead to the carcinogenicity of the substances. On the whole, the authors of the GAO 
report concluded that the sufficiency of regulations of developmental and reproductive 
toxins was in doubt due to the lack of consideration given to reproductive and 
developmental toxicity data. They ended with a recommendation for a dedicated federal 
office responsible for compiling data on reproductively and developmentally toxic 
substances (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky).  
 Glenn distributed the GAO’s report prior to the hearing, and it played a starring 
role in many of the testimonies. Those testimonies are revelatory of endocrine disruptor’s 
complex relationship with the cancer paradigm, one of the key barriers to their 
acceptance as a regulatory concern. Representatives from the four agencies evaluated 
(and called out) in the report attempted to defend their agency against the accusations 
leveled against them. The EPA’s representative Linda Fisher, the Assistant Administrator 
for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, stated that “[w]e believe that our actions regarding 
these chemicals are protective against all endpoints of toxicity” (U.S. Congress Senate 
1991, 18). She further claimed that the GAO report provided a “poor basis on which to 
evaluate the EPA’s efforts to protect public health from the effects of the developmental 
and reproductive hazards” (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 18). The comments from the 
FDA representative were much the same, highlighting that the FDA did have testing 
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protocols in place for evaluating the developmental and reproductive toxicity of 
chemicals (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 20).8  
That was true. Beginning in the late 1970s, both the EPA and the FDA released 
guidelines for evaluating developmental and reproductive hazards, following the 
thalidomide and DES incidents. However, as pointed to by the FDA representative Fred 
Shank, the Director of Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, the agencies, in determining 
tolerances for chemicals, used the most sensitive endpoints to ensure the lowest tolerance 
(U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 20). In 1991, and for decades prior, the agencies assumed 
that cancer was the most sensitive endpoint and thus the one used to set tolerances.  
Though scientifically, research had called that assumption into question, it was still 
strongly held by regulatory agencies and thus impeded acceptance of endocrine 
disruptors as problematic in a regulatory setting because agencies assumed that 
consumers were already protected against such effects by cancer toxicity testing. That is a 
key point. In order for endocrine disruptors to be regulated, which meant required testing 
of hormonal activity and non-cancer endpoints, there needed to be a shift away from the 
cancer paradigm. The Senate hearing was indicative of the start of that shift, but the 
testimonies by representatives of regulatory agencies show that proponents still needed to 
overcome the cancer paradigm to get endocrine disruptors regulated.  
 Most of the rest of the testimonies at the hearing reaffirmed the findings of the 
GAO and offered an opportunity to introduce endocrine disruptors to the regulatory 
                                                 
8 In fact, the comments of all of the representatives’ other than the OSHA representative 
were along the same lines. The OSHA representative, rather than arguing with the 
conclusions in the GAO report, agreed and highlighted their work with lead as a model 
for what was needed (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 23).  
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community as substances that should fall under the regulation of developmentally and 
reproductively toxic materials. Both Theo Colborn and Lynn Goldman9 testified about 
their own work on the effects of chemicals on reproduction. Goldman discussed the toxic 
effects of dibromochloropropane (DBCP), while Colborn discussed the research laid out 
in Great Lakes, Great Legacy? (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn 
and Lynn Goldman). Both researchers’ work emphasized the particular threat hormonally 
active chemicals posed to children. As I discuss in Chapter 6, proponents in the 1990s 
heavily emphasized the connection between endocrine disruptors and children to solidify 
the endocrine disruptor category in ways that prompted regulation and social awareness 
while also picking up on larger social trends.  
The Senate hearing served as Colborn’s first opportunity to present the recently-
formulated endocrine disruptor concept and category. Within her written statement, 
Colborn discussed the Wingspread work session (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Prepared 
Statement of Theo Colborn). She made an explicit argument for the primacy of 
reproductive effects of chemicals over carcinogenic or acute effects, thereby calling for 
the abandonment of the cancer paradigm (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 103). She also 
called for the redress of the public’s lack of knowledge regarding hormonally active 
chemicals and their exposure, something she herself sought to address following the 
Senate hearing.  
                                                 
9 In 1993, Lynn Goldman became the Assistant Administrator for Toxic Substances at the 
EPA (Krimsky 2000). She was partly responsible for pushing for pesticide legislation 
reform. At the time of the Senate hearing in 1991, Goldman worked as the Acting Chief 
of the Office of Environmental and Occupational Epidemiology in the California 
Department of Health Services (U.S. Congress Senate 1991).  
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 The 1991 Senate hearing on “The Government Regulation of Reproductive 
Hazards” accomplished several things. It was the first presentation of the endocrine 
disruptor concept and category, where Colborn made for the first time the argument that 
endocrine disruptors were scientifically, socially, and regulatorily relevant to an audience 
other than those who attended Wingspread. In doing so, she set endocrine disruptors on 
an unusual path. Unlike most science policy issues, proponents of the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category did not start by trying to gain scientific acceptance or work toward 
scientific consensus. Instead, their first action after coining the term “endocrine 
disruptor” was political, a step toward regulating endocrine disruptors when at that point 
only two dozen scientists even acknowledged that they existed.  
 The Senate hearing also shows the regulatory reliance on the cancer paradigm, 
something that needed to change for the regulation of endocrine disruptors. Much of this 
chapter is about how historical contingencies, changes and movements that started well 
before the 1990s, helped to create a space for proponents to advance the endocrine 
disruptor concept and category. The regulatory shift away from the cancer paradigm was 
one such contingency.  
 
Early Independence from the Cancer Paradigm  
The 1991 Senate hearing on the regulation of reproductive hazards was an 
important step in moving away from the cancer paradigm in toxic chemicals regulation. 
That step was necessary to the endocrine disruptor concept and category, which relate to 
chemicals responsible for not only cancer endpoints but also non-cancer endpoints. For 
regulation of endocrine disruptors, which prioritizes non-cancer endpoints to set 
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regulatory tolerances, there needed to be an acknowledgement that cancer endpoints did 
not suffice for toxicity testing. The shift away from the cancer paradigm did not start in 
1991 with the Senate hearing after the formulation of the endocrine disruptor concept. It 
began a decade prior, when reproductive toxicity of chemicals was becoming more 
apparent as the endocrine disruptor concept developed.  
Following the revelations about thalidomide and DES in the 1960s and 1970s, 
regulatory agencies including the FDA released testing protocols for determining 
potential reproductive and developmental health outcomes. That work paralleled a 
scientific shift away from cancer as the most significant endpoint. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, following identification of the reproductive effects of kepone and other work 
place hazards, the NIEHS and others began funding developmental and reproductive 
toxicity research (Vogel 2012). That trend continued in the 1980s, with the founding of a 
new field on environmental estrogens (McLachlan 1979; McLachlan 1985; McLachlan 
2016). Yet, until the 1990s, the cancer paradigm remained supreme. That is especially 
apparent through a comparison between the 1991 Senate hearing and GAO report and a 
House hearing and report from a decade prior.  
By 1980, Jimmy Carter’s Council on Environmental Quality, in conjunction with 
the EPA, the NIEHS, OSHA, and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH), had contracted a science and engineering consulting firm, Clement 
Associates, to: “research and evaluate the extant scientific, medical and regulatory 
literature and documents that relate to the effects of chronic exposure to toxic chemicals 
and their consequence upon human and animal reproductive integrity” (CEQ 1981, iii). In 
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essence, various federal agencies wanted Clement Associates to investigate the 
reproductive toxicity of chemicals.  
Clement Associates investigated for a year before releasing their report, 
“Chemical Hazards to Human Reproduction,” in 1981. Within their final report (referred 
to as the CEQ report), the project directors, Ian Nisbet and Nathan Karch, concluded that 
chemicals may cause a large number of reproductive problems and exposure to such 
chemicals could be a widespread problem, but that the scientific knowledge at the time 
was too sparse to justify regulatory action. They analogized the state of the science of 
reproductive chemical hazards in the 1980s with the state of the science of environmental 
carcinogens in the 1960s, arguing that more knowledge would help to elucidate the 
hazards posed by such chemicals and make clear the necessary regulatory program (CEQ 
1981, VII-5).10 With their final report, Clement Associates essentially argued for more 
scientific research on reproductive toxicities while holding off on recommending 
regulatory changes.  
 Just as the GAO report was pivotal in the 1991 Senate hearing, the CEQ report 
was investigated in depth in a 1982 House hearing on “The Relationship of Exposure to 
Toxic Chemicals and Reproductive Impairment” (U.S. Congress House 1982). The 
hearing indicated the federal government’s awareness of the potential effects of industrial 
and agricultural chemicals on reproductive health well before the 1990s. Most of the 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, the authors of the report expressed doubt that reproductive hazards would 
be as large of a problem as environmental carcinogens. But they acknowledged that the 
purpose of their report was, in part, to gather enough information so as to prevent “public 
controversies,” presumably like those environmental carcinogens previously elicited 
(CEQ 1981, VII-6).  
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issues brought up in the 1991 Senate hearing and the accompanying GAO report were 
also discussed at the 1982 House hearing and the CEQ report: the primacy of the cancer 
paradigm within regulations, the inadequacy of the cancer paradigm to address potential 
reproductive and developmental concerns, and the need for action of some kind. The 
major difference being that the action called for in 1982 was scientific research and the 
action in 1991, regulatory progress.  
 Perhaps the largest change in the decade between 1980 and 1990 was the 
increased certainty of researchers that chemicals posed a threat to developmental and 
reproductive outcomes. That certainty came in part from the research conducted in the 
intervening decade as the endocrine disruptor concept was developing, by researchers 
like John McLachlan (McLachlan 1979; McLachlan 1985; McLachlan 2016). Colborn’s 
work in the Great Lakes added to that corpus (Colborn et al. 1990). There were 
undoubtedly many factors that started to shift attention away from the cancer paradigm in 
the early 1990s. What matters is that that shift started at a key moment for proponents, 
who could use the growing awareness of reproductive and developmental hazards to 
make a case for regulating endocrine disruptors. Throughout the 1990s, proponents 
continued to fit endocrine disruptors into the reproductive and developmental hazard 
space opened by the move away from cancer endpoints as the only relevant endpoints.  
But regardless of the increased certainty and the long awareness of reproductively toxic 
chemicals, regulatory focus was still very much on cancer. It was the focus of the media. 
It was the primary concern. The early life of the endocrine disruptor concept and category 
was marked by the fight by its proponents to make a place for the concept beside 
carcinogens in regulatory and social settings.  
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1992: SOCIAL INTRODUCTION AND CONTINUED FOCUS ON CANCER 
 Because proponents only constructed the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category in the latter half of 1991, the Senate hearing was the only opportunity for them 
to begin to push both into various arenas. Proponents’ focus in 1991 was regulatory, 
making a case for the need to regulate endocrine disruptors to policymakers. In 1992, 
their focus shifted to a second goal: increasing social awareness of the danger posed by 
endocrine disrupting chemicals.  
 In 1992, proponents began to use popular media to alert the public of the hidden 
monster in their pantries and cabinets. In public arenas, proponents of the endocrine 
disruptor concept also had to push to shift the focus from cancer to reproductive 
outcomes. In two newspaper articles in 1992, the only two published on endocrine 
disruptors that year, proponents like Colborn, Michael Fry, and Earl Gray introduced the 
endocrine disruptor concept and category to a public audience for the first time (Krimsky 
2000; Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b). In those articles, the researchers made an explicit 
argument against focus on cancer to an audience who had been focused on the terror of 
cancer for decades: the American public. The year 1992, as 1991, showed proponents 
beginning their push of the endocrine disruptor concept and category into different 
spheres and the various factors that pushed back against them, namely the focus on 
cancer.  
 The newspaper articles in 1992 also begin to reveal how actors in different 
spheres would or would not press back on the concept and category proposed at 
Wingspread. During the Senate hearing in 1991, Colborn had the opportunity to present 
her ideas to a regulatory audience and took pains to solidify the endocrine disruptor 
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concept and category with studies that connected the chemicals with a threat to children, 
something politically motivating. Throughout the 1990s, the regulatory community only 
took notice of the endocrine disruptor concept and category when proponents connected 
them to issues like damage to children and breast cancer. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
proponents used very specific studies to shore up the concept and category for regulatory 
audiences, heading off any concerns of lack of substance by providing flashy (if 
insufficient) substance in the form of scary diseases.  
 In social arenas, proponents did not need to do that. Throughout the 1990s, 
popular media willingly accepted the endocrine disruptor concept and category as stories 
that would sell newspapers. Rarely did popular media publish skeptical articles on the 
subject. Likely, the willingness of social actors to accept the endocrine disruptor concept 
and category as presented by proponents derived from the same reasons as regulatory 
actors: the connection of endocrine disruptors to flashy effects like breast cancer and 
sperm declines (detailed in the next section). But importantly, proponents did not have to 
actively hold those connections up in order to garner and keep the attention of social 
actors. It was much more automatic throughout most of the 1990s, even in the face of 
pubic obsession with cancer.  
 
Cancer as a Social Obsession  
In 1992, the first newspaper article on hormonally active chemicals was published 
in The New York Times. Written by Jon R. Luoma, “New Effect of Pollutants: Hormone 
Mayhem” appeared in the bottom right corner of the first page of the science section on 
Tuesday, 24 March 1992 (Luoma 1992a). In the article, Luoma highlighted DES, DDT, 
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and dioxin as hazardous chemicals for development and reproduction, though he did not 
mention endocrine disruptors as the overarching category of substances.  
Within the article, Luoma featured comments from Colborn, Fry, and Gray, all attendees 
at Wingspread, as well as McLachlan, a major environmental estrogen researcher. All the 
researchers noted the animal studies of chemicals like DDT and dioxin, linking those 
effects with potential human effects. Remember that in 1992, proponents had little, if 
any, evidence that endocrine disruptors impacted humans. They were reliant on animal 
studies and extrapolation to humans as well as the flagship example of DES as proof of 
concept.  
Luoma’s article started to make a place for the endocrine disruptor concept in the 
public arena by drawing attention to the potential for chemicals to cause reproductive and 
developmental abnormalities. The article did not have the hysterical, end of days tone 
that later popular media articles took with endocrine disruptors. Neither the concept nor 
the category had gained momentum in 1992, and proponents were still working to make a 
place for endocrine disruptors beside carcinogens.  
Within Luoma’s article, that came out clearly. He quoted McLachlan and Colborn 
as well as Barry Johnson, the Assistant Administrator of the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry, all of whom called out the regulatory focus on cancer. 
Johnson went so far as to say: “The focus we’ve had on cancer is a product of our culture. 
We find ourselves in this situation because we’ve given disproportionate attention to the 
study of cancer as the only risk from environmental hazards because people are 
frightened by it, and they can understand it. …” (Luoma 1992a, C9). That adequately 
captures the struggle proponents had in making reproductive and developmental effects 
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as scary and as relevant as cancerous effects. Throughout the 1990s, that struggle 
persisted, especially after endocrine disruptors were linked to breast cancer in 1993.  
  
1993: TWO NEW ‘INS’ AND A CONTINUED STRUGGLE AGAINST CANCER FOCUS 
 Both 1991 and 1992 were relatively slow years for the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category. Throughout, researchers completed little if any scientific study of 
endocrine disruptors, with proponents focused on introducing their ideas to regulatory 
and social actors and the rest of the scientific community as yet unintroduced to the 
concept and category.  
That changed in 1993 when three things happened. First, two new studies 
connected endocrine disruptors to attention-grabbing effects: breast cancer and declining 
sperm counts (Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Wolff et al. 1993). Those studies, in turn, 
generated much more public attention on endocrine disruptors and proponents promoted 
both studies heavily (Healy 1993; Beil 1993; Peterson 1993). Following that increased 
public attention and acceptance of the endocrine disruptor concept and category, 
proponents introduced the idea to the scientific community with an article in 
Environmental Health Perspectives (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993). All three things 
continued proponents’ efforts to make endocrine disruptors scientific, social, and 
regulatory objects while also showing how social changes and historical trends helped 
and hindered them in that effort.  
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Making Room for Endocrine Disruptors Using Fears for Fertility 
Luoma’s articles in 1992 as well as the long-standing cultural and regulatory 
focus on cancer make clear that proponents needed to make endocrine disruptors equally 
terrifying or fascinating to gain social and regulatory attention. In 1993, they got help 
with that when Nils E. Skakkebæk and Richard M. Sharpe published their article on “Are 
Oestrogens Involved in Falling Sperm Counts and Disorders of the Male Reproductive 
Tract?” in The Lancet (Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993). In the article, Skakkebæk and 
Sharpe discussed research showing that male sperm counts around the world had 
decreased over the previous thirty years. The authors linked the decrease in sperm to 
men’s increased exposure to estrogenic chemicals and suggested that those chemicals 
were the cause of the sperm decreases, providing several mechanistic explanations 
(Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993, 1395; Sharpe 1993).  
 Sharpe and Skakkebæk’s article was met with tremendous media response. While 
there were only two articles in 1992 on hormonally active chemicals and their potential 
effects, there were closer to ten in 1993, many of which discussed the decreasing sperm 
counts reported in the Lancet and came with accompanying scary titles (Krimsky 2000; 
Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; Healy 1993; Beil 1993; Peterson 1993). Sharpe and 
Skakkebæk’s research helped solidify parts of the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category by connecting endocrine disrupting chemicals with negative health outcomes 
that would affect humans around the world. Up until 1993, Colborn and her colleagues 
relied largely on limited evidence and speculation to link exposure to endocrine 
disruptors with health effects in humans that might motivate regulation and public 
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attention. Sharpe and Skakkebæk’s article and the attention it received helped to solidify 
that link, at least in the public’s mind.  
 The connection between declining sperm counts and endocrine disruptors greatly 
aided proponents in their task of making their concept and category social and regulatory. 
In the previous two years, proponents struggled against the focus on cancer. Cancer, for 
most people, is not an abstract disease. Most people know someone who has had cancer 
and that makes cancer a much realer risk in people’s minds. Reproductive and 
developmental problems, on the other hand, feel more abstract. What is a reproductive 
problem? Do I know someone who has one? Does it ruin lives the way cancer does? 
Those questions are not immediately answered for most people when they think about 
reproductively and developmentally toxic chemicals. So up until 1993, though 
proponents made social and regulatory actors aware of the threat posed by endocrine 
disruptors, they failed to inspire any sense of urgency or fear around the chemicals.  
 Sharpe and Skakkebæk’s research changed that. Declining sperm counts 
worldwide connects the abstract idea of reproductive toxicity to a real impact that leaves 
men clutching their … chests. The finding fed into social worries about the loss of 
masculinity and the feminization of the industrialized world. Sperm declines also pick up 
on perhaps the longest running human obsession: sex. Articles about sperm sell 
newspapers, which means that the study and its link to endocrine disruptors gained 
attention just due to the headlines. For social actors, without much help from proponents, 
it solidified the endocrine disruptor concept and category as real problems that needed to 
be addressed—and written about more in popular media.  
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For regulatory actors, proponents used the finding to solidify what counted as an 
endocrine disruptor. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, the concept and category 
proposed in 1991 lacked specific details in terms of what counted as an endocrine 
disruptor. The scientific community pushed back on the lack throughout most of the 
1990s (see Chapter 4). Though proponents attempted to use the Sharpe and Skakkebæk 
study with scientific audiences, it largely fell flat due to the scientific problems with the 
study and the fact that it was largely speculative (Saidi et al. 1999; Olsen et al. 1995; Safe 
1994; Safe 1995). The study did not actually clarify what counted as an endocrine 
disruptor. But with regulatory audiences, proponents controlled the presentation of the 
study in such a way that they were able to use it to solidify their category in a way that 
spurred regulatory action. Throughout the 1990s, proponents collected several key 
studies, the sperm count study being one, that they used to answer the question of what an 
endocrine disruptor is for regulatory audiences. In the first Senate hearing in 1991, 
Colborn started that work, linking endocrine disruptors to damage in children (U.S. 
Congress Senate, Testimony of Theo Colborn). In later hearings, proponents relied on 
Sharpe and Skakkebæk’s work (U.S. Congress 1993; U.S. Congress House 1993; U.S. 
Congress House 1995a; U.S. Congress House 1995b). Between the two, they answered 
what are endocrine disruptors sufficiently for policymakers.  
However, though the finding that sperm counts were declining worldwide greatly 
helped proponents sell the endocrine disruptor concept and category to social and 
regulatory audiences, their use of it was not without cost. In popular media, journalists 
linked sperm count declines to estrogenic chemicals, in particular, as well as other 
findings about the feminization of fish and amphibians exposed to the same chemicals. 
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Through that, the public spotlight shone more on estrogenic chemicals than on endocrine 
disruptors more broadly. The same process occurred in regulatory settings as proponents 
relied more and more on feminizing effects of endocrine disruptors to prompt regulatory 
action (see Chapter 6). One consequence of that focus was that in the 1996 legislation, 
Congress only mandated an estrogenic substances screening program, rather than an 
endocrine disruptor screening program. Ultimately, the Endocrine Disruptor Screening 
Program was put in place, due to proponents’ work inside the EPA.  
 
Stealing the Spotlight: Breast Cancer  
 The remaining popular press articles published in 1993 focused on a second study 
that linked endocrine disruptors to a human disease: breast cancer. Several studies 
published in 1993 found elevated levels of organochlorines (PCBs and DDT, most 
notably) in the blood and tissue of women with breast cancer, leading some to postulate 
that exposure to such estrogenic compounds was the cause of breast cancer, especially 
given the increased rates of the disease (Wolff et al. 1993; El-Bayoumy 1992; Davis et al. 
1993). Most notably, Mary Wolff and her colleagues used close to 15,000 samples from 
New York University’s Women’s Health Study to make that link (Wolff et al. 1993). The 
link between endocrine disruptors and breast cancer gained widespread public attention 
in newspaper articles, given that it picked up on an increased perception of breast cancer 
risk during the 1990s. The study also featured prominently in a House hearing in 1993.  
In October of 1993, the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment held 
a hearing on “Health Effects of Estrogenic Pesticides,” presided by Henry A. Waxman, 
who started the hearing by noting, “[t]oday we are holding the first Congressional hearing 
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on a topic of potentially far-reaching significance for environmental health, pesticides 
that imitate human hormones, particularly the female hormone estrogen” (U.S. Congress 
House 1993, 1). Waxman continued to note the three major findings of the hearing: 1. 
That estrogenic compounds had been linked to health and environmental mal-effects, 2. 
That such compounds had been found in the food supply, and 3. That the EPA did not 
screen for estrogenic activity. He then promised to work toward legislation that would 
require such screening, before largely confusing his message by stating (for the parents 
and consumers listening in) that the effects of hormonal pesticides were not proven, that 
consumers should not panic (U.S. Congress House 1993, 1).  
 The testimonies from the hearing largely, if not entirely, focused on breast cancer. 
Though many of the scientists present, including Goldman, Colborn, McLachlan, and 
Ana Soto, all focused their statements on the numerous effects endocrine disruptors could 
have, the questions fielded by those researchers were about breast cancer (U.S. Congress 
House 1993, Testimony of Lynn Goldman, Theo Colborn, John McLachlan, and Ana M. 
Soto). Interestingly, though Waxman derided the EPA for their focus only on cancer 
endpoints in his introduction, the entire hearing focused on a single cancer endpoint. That 
is demonstrative of endocrine disruptors’ complicated relationship with cancer and the 
cancer paradigm.  
On the one hand, endocrine disruptors can cause cancer, as in the case of DES and 
clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina, and the connection between breast cancer and 
endocrine disruptors drove the eventual regulation of endocrine disruptors (Herbst and 
Scully 1970; see Chapter 6). Proponents heavily cited Wolff’s study in their 
Congressional testimony as a way to further solidify the endocrine disruptor concept and 
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category (see Chapter 6). In conjunction with effects in children and sperm declines, 
proponents used conspicuous effects of endocrine disruptors to obfuscate that the concept 
and category lacked important specifics, meaning that regulatory and social actors largely 
accepted both constructs without deep probing.  
On the other hand, cancer, and breast cancer in particular, tended to overshadow 
endocrine disruptors in the 1990s. During the early years, regulatory and social focus was 
on cancer endpoints and proponents had to fight to make a place for reproductive and 
developmental endpoints. As the 1990s continued, proponents’ heavy use of Wolff’s 
study helped them, but also put the focus back on cancer. It is not unfair to say that 
endocrine disruptors were regulated in 1996 as a way to combat rising breast cancer rates 
(see Chapter 6). In that way, the connection between breast cancer and endocrine 
disruptors served some of the goals of proponents, in that endocrine disruptors did get 
regulated. But it hindered their goal of increasing public awareness of endocrine 
disruptors as ubiquitous chemicals that could cause a wide range of negative effects in 
humans. It also added to the emphasis on estrogenic chemicals, rather than all hormonally 
active chemicals, which had consequences for regulation.  
 
An Announcement to the Scientific Community 
 The same year as the House hearing and the revelations about sperm counts and 
breast cancer, proponents introduced the endocrine disruptor concept and category for 
scientific actors. Up until 1993, proponents’ focus was on regulatory and social actors, 
rather than scientific ones. They did not first seek scientific buy-in before taking their 
ideas to society. Proponents largely ignored the opinions of the scientific community 
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throughout the 1990s if they did not serve their goals of increasing public awareness and 
generating regulatory action. In the early 1990s, little research dealt specifically with 
endocrine disruptors, the term appearing in fewer than three scientific publications at that 
time. Research continued on environmental estrogens, a holdover from work in the 
1980s, but endocrine disruption remained a fringe idea by virtue of the fact that 
proponents spent little time alerting scientists to their thoughts. In 1993, supporters of the 
endocrine disruptor concept attempted to rectify that.   
 In 1993, Colborn, Soto, and vom Saal detailed the endocrine disruptor concept in 
“Developmental Effects of Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and Humans” in 
Environmental Health Perspectives (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993).11 The seven-
page article was essentially a recapitulation of the endocrine disruptor concept from the 
Wingspread consensus statement. The authors laid out environmental health effects seen 
in wildlife exposed to endocrine disrupting chemicals and then followed with a 
discussion of DES as a “model for exposure to estrogenic chemicals in the environment” 
(Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993, 379). Colborn, Soto, and vom Saal, like in the 
Wingspread consensus statement, relied heavily on DES as the bridge between wildlife 
effects and potential human effects, which remained largely undocumented in 1993 (and 
in 2018).  
 Colborn, Soto, and vom Saal’s article directing scientific attention to the 
endocrine disruptor concept and category, on top of the growing public and regulatory 
attention on the idea, launched widespread study of the substances. In the years 
                                                 
11 Environmental Health Perspectives became the journal where many articles on 
endocrine disruptors were/are published. It is supported by the NIEHS.  
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following, more researchers entered the endocrine disruptor space and found the concept 
and category lacking. Where social actors accepted both constructs at face value, and 
where the perceptions of regulatory actors were tightly controlled by proponents during 
Congressional hearings, scientific actors strongly pushed back at the concept and 
category and found both lacking. This is explored fully in Chapter 4.   
 
1994: SCIENTIFIC LIMBO AND MEDIA ATTENTION 
 In 1994, proponents had to grapple for the first time with pushing the endocrine 
disruptor concept and category into the scientific community. Following their 1993 
article where they laid out the concept for a scientific audience, more researchers began 
probing proponents’ ideas and evidence and found them lacking. Beginning in 1994, 
scientific views on the endocrine disruptor concept and category began to create a 
spectrum, ranging from proponents of the concept who viewed the idea as proven and 
immediately actionable to strong skeptics who viewed what they called the hypothesis as 
critically lacking and deserving of little attention or action. Those groups made up the 
minority, with most researchers sitting somewhere in the middle, spending their time and 
research dollars seriously investigating the missing pieces of the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category. That spectrum, and the different views on the concept and 
category, drove scientific research on endocrine disruptors through the 1990s.  
While that spectrum developed, and proponents attempted to situate their ideas in 
a scientific context, social actors continued their work hyping the endocrine disruptor 
concept as a public health catastrophe. Their coverage of endocrine disruptors in 1994 is 
demonstrative of the tradeoffs proponents made in using particular evidence to argue for 
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the social relevance of the concept and category. In previous years, proponents relied on 
studies linking endocrine disruptors to sperm count declines and breast cancer. Then, in 
1994, another study linked endocrine disruptors to shrinking alligator penises in Florida 
(Guillette et al. 1994). All three studies made for gripping news, but proponents were not 
able to control the popular media’s spin on the findings, which revolved around the loss 
of or attack on masculinity and emphasized estrogenic actions of endocrine disruptors. 
By the end of 1994, proponents had accomplished two of their goals, increasing public 
awareness of endocrine disruptors and sparking scientific investigation of them, but not 
in the way they intended.  
 
The Scientific Community’s Lack of Acceptance 
 The article on the endocrine disruptor concept by Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto, 
published at the end of 1993, did not lead to a widespread scientific acceptance of the 
concept in 1994. When the three proponents laid out their concept and category in 1993, 
they used the same argument and evidence they used in 1991, when initially proposing 
the idea. They first laid out the endocrine disruptor concept, the two-part idea that 
chemicals with the ability to interfere with hormone action to cause negative effects exist, 
and that those chemicals threaten the health of humans and wildlife. Colborn, vom Saal, 
and Soto also included a description of the endocrine disruptor category, outlining three 
criteria: the effects of endocrine disruptors differ based on the time of exposure, can 
impact the development and reproduction of organisms exposed, and may manifest years 
after initial exposure (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993, 378).  
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They then relied heavily on Colborn’s and others’ research in the Great Lakes to 
demonstrate the wide range of effects endocrine disruptors can have before using the 
example of DES to bridge the effects seen in wildlife with the potential effects in humans 
(Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993, 379). The article ends with a section titled 
“Characterization of Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals,” in which the authors listed a 
series of things that endocrine disruptors have done, like accumulating in human tissues 
and causing proliferation in breast cancer cell lines, without actually characterizing the 
chemicals. The authors failed to address how to identify an endocrine disruptor, how an 
endocrine disruptor works, or what counts as an endocrine disruptor.  
In that way, the argument Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto laid out for the scientific 
community was almost exactly the same as the one they used for regulatory and social 
audiences. Just as with non-scientific audiences, proponents relied on conspicuous studies 
that showed dire effects of endocrine disruptors to make the point that such chemicals 
threaten human and wildlife populations and should be acted upon scientifically, socially, 
and politically. But where social actors readily accepted that narrative, and the 
perceptions of regulatory actors could be controlled by the reinforcement of certain 
evidence during Congressional hearings, scientific actors probed deeply at the large 
claims proponents made.  
In 1994, more researchers entered the endocrine disruptor space, with increased 
funding for endocrine disruptor research from organizations like the EPA and the W. 
Alton Jones Foundation (Krimsky 2000, 24). Those researchers addressed not only the 
evidence and claims proponents used in their 1991 and 1993 publications, but also the 
evidence and claims they were using in social and regulatory contexts. In 1994, Stephen 
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Safe, one of the most skeptical researchers of the endocrine disruptor concept, published 
an opinion piece in Environmental Science and Pollution Research International (Safe 
1994). In the article, Safe called out the hysteria generated over studies linking estrogenic 
chemicals12 to breast cancer and sperm count declines, pointing to scientific issues with 
the research while also advancing a counter argument about the threat posed by such 
chemicals. Safe, like many researchers after him, pointed to the very low level of 
chemicals most humans are exposed to as a reason to downgrade the threat posed by 
endocrine disruptors while also noting the wide variety of hormonally active substances 
humans have always been exposed to argue that perhaps all the effects balance out (Stone 
1994; Safe 1994; Safe 1995).  
In his article, Safe clearly picked up on the wider arguments proponents were 
making to get endocrine disruptors regulated, pushing back on their social and regulatory 
arguments as well as their scientific ones. As detailed more fully in Chapter 4, by 1994 
proponents had succeeded in making the endocrine disruptor concept and category 
scientific, social, and regulatory in so far as actors from each sphere could not separate 
those aspects to comment on one. Throughout the 1990s, scientific researchers treated the 
endocrine disruptor concept as a tripartite idea, rarely commenting only on the scientific 
validity of the idea rather than its validity and what actions should be taken based on that 
validity (see Chapter 4). During 1994, scientific actors began to develop a large number 
                                                 
12 Safe rarely, if ever, used the term “endocrine disruptor” in his writing, except in a 
pejorative sense. However, when referring to hormonally active chemicals or estrogenic 
chemicals, it is clear he is speaking about endocrine disruptors and the work of 
proponents. 
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of different opinions on those questions, something that would impact the continued 
trajectory of the concept and category.  
 
Endocrine Disruptors as Attacking and Assaulting in the Media 
 As the scientific community began paying attention to the concept and category, 
popular media increased their attention. The year 1994 saw a six-fold increase in the 
number of popular articles on estrogenic chemicals and endocrine disruptors (Krimsky 
2000). The articles carried a distinct sense of dread, worry, and fear. While many still 
focused on breast cancer as the main terror of estrogenic chemicals, far more had taken 
the reported decrease in sperm counts and the estrogen like actions of chemicals to spin a 
new story: the distortion of sex (Cone 1994a; Cone 1994b; Cone 1994c; Begley and 
Glick 1994; Stevens 1994). Many of the articles published in 1994 had titles like “Gender 
Warp: Sexual Confusion in the Wild,” “Chemicals Tinker with Sexuality,” or 
“Something is Attacking Male Fetus Sex Organs,” with accompanying lines reading 
something like “Sperm counts down? Penises shriveled? Hey, Rush, don’t blame it on 
feminists. It may be from chemical pollutants in water and food” (Cone 1994a; Cone 
1994b; Cone 1994c; Begley and Glick 1994; Goodman 1994). In fact, while some articles 
talked about the ability of chemicals to masculinize females, the large majority focused 
on feminization and disappearance of males.  
 That trend only increased after the publication of Louis Guillette’s research on 
alligators near superfund sites in Florida. Guillette and his team found that alligators 
exposed to estrogenic chemicals presented with hormonal fluctuations and reproductive 
problems. Most especially from a popular media perspective, Guillette found that the 
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penises of male alligators were shrinking. Many newspapers and morning shows picked 
up on Guillette’s study, and the combination of breast cancer, sperm declines, and 
shrinking penises heightened public awareness of endocrine disruptors. During 1994, 
proponents clearly achieved their goal of increasing public awareness of endocrine 
disruptors and the problems they pose, but perhaps not in the ideal way. In the scientific 
community, proponents succeeded in intensifying scientific study of endocrine disruptors 
but only in the face of widespread disagreement with their claims. Similarly, in the social 
arena, impactful studies on shrinking penises and breast cancer assisted proponents in 
bringing awareness, but drew attention to only small parts of the endocrine disruptor 
concept and category, the connection to cancer and the effect on males. Both drew 
attention away from what proponents saw as the much larger problem, the wide range of 
effects from all hormonally active chemicals, not just the two effects from estrogenic 
chemicals.   
 However, proponents continued to use conspicuous studies that advanced their 
goals, while also undercutting their point. In 1994, the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) released a documentary title Assault on the Male (BBC 1994). Though the film 
was largely a flop, airing only two times on the Discovery Channel over Labor Day 
weekend to an audience of perhaps 500,000 households, the film found critical acclaim 
(Krimsky 2000, 64). It won both a British Environment and Media Award as well as an 
Emmy Award for “Outstanding Information or Cultural Program” (Krimsky 2000, 64). In 
the film, individuals discuss several scientific discoveries that led to the endocrine 
disruptor concept, including the shrinking penis size of Florida alligators and the 
hermaphroditism in fish near sewer outfalls, connecting both to what the film called real 
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changes in human reproduction. Supporters of the endocrine disruptor concept distributed 
the BBC film to policymakers and scientists to push their agenda of getting endocrine 
disruptors regulated (Krimsky 2000, 64).  
 The increased scientific and social attention on endocrine disruptors in 1994 
shows the success proponents had with pushing the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category into different arenas. It also shows the varied push back they got from actors 
within those arenas. Scientific actors picked up on weaknesses in the concept and 
category, strongly rejecting the certainty and call for action proponents projected. That 
contributed to endocrine disruptors’ unique path to regulation, which occurred in the 
midst of scientific dissent. Social actors also pushed back, in so far as social trends and 
the spin popular media placed on studies used by proponents drew attention away from 
the much larger point proponents were trying to make. Ultimately, the social attention 
and the trends that attention played into were instrumental in getting endocrine disruptors 
acknowledged, by the public and regulators, but it did push back on some of what 
proponents tried to do in the 1990s.   
 
1995: A REGULATORY PLACE AND GROWING SCIENTIFIC DISSENT  
 In 1995, proponents used their last opportunity to achieve their goal of endocrine 
disruptor regulation. In previous years, proponents testified at Congressional hearings on 
the endocrine disruptor concept and the need to act on hormonally active chemicals, but 
they were fighting an uphill battle against reliance on the cancer paradigm and the 
general inertia of the US regulatory system. That changed in 1995 as a historical 
contingency came to a head. In 1995, Congress was faced with the decision to either 
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revamp the chemical regulation system in the US or see the demise of the US agricultural 
industry. Because of that, policymakers were much more focused on passing a bill that 
would change chemical regulations, a bill that proponents could try to attach endocrine 
disruptor regulation to. That window of opportunity, discussed in more detail in Chapter 
6, created a potential space for endocrine disruptors in the regulatory world that 
proponents took advantage of by continuing their reliance on a small number of 
conspicuous scientific studies in regulatory settings.  
 Amid that effort by proponents, the scientific community continued to grapple 
with endocrine disruptors. Research on the substances greatly expanded, but no studies 
had firmly answered the lingering questions many had: what counts as an endocrine 
disruptor, how do endocrine disruptors work, do endocrine disruptors pose a threat to 
human populations? Those questions came out in a number of meetings and consensus 
reports on endocrine disruptors, which focused on a central question: What is the 
definition of endocrine disruptors? By the end of 1995, an agreement had not been 
reached, even as regulation of endocrine disruptors progressed, a divide that would have 
far reaching implications.  
 
A Changing World with a Space for Endocrine Disruptors 
 While the media hyped the threat posed by endocrine disruptors and the scientific 
community interrogated the substances, the regulatory community began to make room 
for endocrine disruptors and the endocrine disruptor concept in 1995. Regulators did that 
not by acknowledging the problem endocrine disruptors posed, but by acknowledging a 
much older problem: the Delaney Clause and pesticide testing in the US. 
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For most of the 1990s, members of Congress had been proposing bills to overhaul 
the pesticide testing requirements in the US (H.R. 4739 100th Cong.; H.R. 1725 101st 
Cong.; S. 2875 100th Cong.; S. 722 101st Cong.; H.R. 2342 102nd Cong.; S. 1074 102nd 
Cong.; H.R. 2597 102nd Cong.; H.R. 3216 102nd Cong.; S. 331 103rd Cong.; H.R. 872 
103rd Cong.; S. 1478 103rd Cong.; H.R. 4091 103rd Cong.; S. 2084 103rd Cong.; H.R. 
4362 103rd Cong.; H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). Those proposals were not due to any feeling 
that the current system was underperforming, but rather because Congress had been 
backed into a regulatory corner. In 1958, Congress passed an amendment to the 1938 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Pub. L. 75–717, 21 USC § 301 et seq.). The 1958 Food 
Additives Amendment contained what would be the thorn in pesticide regulators’ sides 
for nearly thirty years: the Delaney clause. Suggested by representative James Delaney,13 
the chairman of the committee tasked with investigating the use of chemicals in food 
production, the Delaney clause stated that, “[n]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if it 
is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests 
which are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer 
in man or animal …”14 (52 Stat. 1041-1785). Most, if not all, chemical substances on 
Earth can be shown to cause cancer under the right circumstances. As was clear to many 
at the time of its passage, that meant that the Delaney clause essentially disallowed the 
approval of any chemical (Degnan and Flamm 1995, 237). 
                                                 
13 Delaney also worked to pass a ban on switchblade knives.  
 
14 The Delaney clause applied to food additives, which was broadly enough defined to 
include the residues of pesticides left in foods (Merrill 1997, 319).  
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 Given that (rather large) issue, the FDA and EPA (after its creation in 1972) did 
not strictly enforce the Delaney clause. Instead, both agencies followed a tolerance 
setting model whereby they determined the maximum amount of a given pesticide that 
could safely remain in food (Committee on Pesticide Use Patterns 1987). Though 
everyone was aware that that approach did not satisfy the mandate of the Delaney clause, 
which called for zero tolerance, it was a more practical application. But it generated 
extreme controversy.15 The FDA’s and the EPA’s applications of the clause was 
challenged regularly throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. DHEW 1970; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus 1971; Chemetron 
Corp. v. DHEW 1974; Hess & Clark, Division of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA 1974; Rhone-
Poulenc, Inc., ETC. v. FDA 1980; Scott v. FDA 1984; Public Citizen v. DHHS 1986; 
Public Citizen v Young 1987; Public Citizen v. Bowen 1987; Simpson v. Young 1988; 
Nader v. EPA 1988). For the most part, the court decisions emerging from those 
challenges had relatively little effect on the actions of either agency.  
That changed in 1992, when the Ninth Circuit US Court of Appeals decided that 
the EPA’s approval of four pesticides violated the Delaney clause, thus necessitating the 
EPA revoke approval for four widely used agricultural pesticides—benomyl, mancozeb, 
phosmet, and trifluralin (Les v. Reilly 1992). The Ninth Circuit’s decision set a precedent 
that the EPA must strictly enforce the Delaney clause.  
                                                 
15 Interestingly, the main locus of the controversy around the application of the Delaney 
clause was the use of DES in livestock. DES was used widely as growth hormone in both 
beef and poultry. Eventually, Congress passed the DES proviso, which excepted DES 
from the Delaney clause (Marcus 1994, 65).  
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 The 1992 case Les v. Reilly, along with the many challenges to the Delaney clause 
where courts could do little but point to the clear language of the clause itself, backed 
Congress into a corner where they either had to pass a bill revising the Delaney clause or 
risk revocation of approval for the pesticides required to maintain the nation’s 
agricultural enterprise. Bills began appearing in the early 1990s, many with the title of 
“Food Quality Protection Act” (H.R. 4739 100th Cong.; H.R. 1725 101st Cong.; S. 2875 
100th Cong.; S. 722 101st Cong.; H.R. 2342 102nd Cong.; S. 1074 102nd Cong.; H.R. 2597 
102nd Cong.; H.R. 3216 102nd Cong.; S. 331 103rd Cong.; H.R. 872 103rd Cong.; S. 1478 
103rd Cong.; H.R. 4091 103rd Cong.; S. 2084 103rd Cong.; H.R. 4362 103rd Cong.; H.R. 
1627 104th Cong.). The bills proposed very much focused on dismantling the Delaney 
clause and contained no mention of hormonally active substances.   
 Fortunately, or unfortunately, the corner Congress was occupying got much 
smaller by 1995, when the decision in California v. Browner became clear and they were 
handed a time frame in which they must pass changes to the Delaney clause (California 
v. Browner 1994). In the case, the state of California challenged the EPA’s application of 
the Delaney clause. The court’s decision, which was apparent long before the end of the 
case, required the EPA to revoke approval for any previously approved carcinogenic 
pesticide by 1997 (California v. Browner 1994). That list of pesticides would have 
included thirty-six of the most common pesticides used on crops in the US (Cushman 
1994). Essentially, the result of the case signaled to Congress that if they did not change 
the Delaney clause by 1997, most agriculture in the US would grind to a halt (Merrill 
1997; Cushman 1994). Proposed changes to the Delaney clause were taken much more 
seriously.  
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That created an opportunity for proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors. By 
1995, they knew that a bill was going to pass to update chemical testing in the US. They 
also knew that they had sympathetic policymakers who could be convinced to include a 
section on endocrine disruptor regulation in the bill. Those policymakers had been 
cultivated by proponents in previous Congressional testimonies and in other outreach 
(U.S. Congress Senate 1991; U.S. Congress 1993; U.S. Congress House 1993; Krimsky 
2000). They included Henry Waxman, a California Representative who had overseen 
several hearings on reproductive and developmental toxicities in the preceding years and 
was familiar with, and sympathetic to, regulating endocrine disruptors as a result. 
Friendly policymakers also included Alfonse D’Amato, a Senator from New York who 
was particularly interested in regulating endocrine disruptors as a way to head off rising 
breast cancer rates (U.S. Congress 1993, Testimony of Alfonse D’Amato).  
Waxman and D’Amato are proof of the effectiveness of proponents’ techniques in 
earlier years to push the endocrine disruptor concept into the regulatory arena. From 1991 
to 1995, proponents carefully controlled the scientific narrative about endocrine 
disruptors presented to policymakers, highlighting studies linking the chemicals to breast 
cancer and sperm declines. In doing so, they presented endocrine disruptors as regulatory 
problems that could be acted upon to address effects that policymakers’ constituents 
cared about, something proponents had also worked to ensure through their interviews 
with popular media. This is discussed more in Chapter 6. So, by 1995, there was space 
for the endocrine disruptor concept in regulation. Proponents only needed to capitalize on 
it.  
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The Last Argument for Endocrine Disruptor Regulation 
 In May of 1995, around three months after the end of California v. Browner, 
Thomas J. Bliley Jr. introduced the Food Quality Protection Act of 1995, which would 
eventually pass and include the regulation of endocrine disruptors (H.R. 1627 104th 
Cong.). The bill had ninety-seven cosponsors from both sides of the aisle and made no 
mention of endocrine disruptors, estrogenic pesticides, or hormonally active substances 
(H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). Their potential place within the bill, as substances with effects 
that should be tested for regularly, was not guaranteed. The Food Quality Protection Act 
of 1995 focused on modifying the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to eliminate the 
problem of the Delaney clause and largely allow the EPA and FDA to continue as they 
had. The bill was immediately referred to the House Agriculture Subcommittee on the 
Department of Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture (referred to as the 
Agriculture Subcommittee), which held a hearing on 16 May 1995 (U.S. Congress House 
1995a).  
No endocrine disruptor concept proponents attended the hearing, nor were any 
invited to testify. Endocrine disruptors came up one time at the hearing, in the testimony 
of Jay Feldman, Executive Director of the National Coalition Against the Misuse of 
Pesticides. Feldman acknowledged freely that he was “a minority voice” in the hearing 
but that he represented “a majority of views in terms of the world of public opinion” 
(U.S. Congress House 1995a, Statement of Jay Feldman). Feldman clearly recognized the 
increasing media attention paid to the endocrine disruptor concept and the fear that 
attention had engendered of the chemicals. Feldman argued that the Agriculture 
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Subcommittee should examine endocrine effects and seek to ensure that the bill 
addressed such issues.  
Goldman, who at that point had made her way to the EPA, also testified. She did 
not refer to endocrine disruptors, but highlighted the need to focus on non-cancer 
endpoints in setting tolerances. Her testimony illustrates the continued emphasis on 
cancer in a regulatory setting. In previous years, proponents struggled to turn focus to 
non-cancer endpoints in regulation. In social spheres, they successfully drew attention 
away from cancer through sperm and penises, though still using the connection between 
breast cancer and endocrine disruptors as a key touchstone. Proponents attempted to do 
the same in regulatory settings, but as Goldman’s testimony shows, it was not clear in 
1995 how successful they were. Many policymakers still focused on cancer, as did the 
initial Food Quality Protection Act (U.S. Congress House 1995a; H.R. 1627 104th Cong.).  
A little over ten days after the Agriculture Subcommittee held its hearing, a 
second subcommittee held a hearing on the same bill (U.S. Congress House 1995b). The 
House Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment convened on 29 May 1995 
to once again discuss the Food Quality Protection Act of 1995. The focus of that hearing 
was also on modifications to the Delaney clause and a new pesticide threshold setting 
technique generally, but endocrine disruptors appeared more prominently (U.S. Congress 
House 1995b). Feldman once again testified on behalf of the National Coalition Against 
the Misuse of Pesticides, deriding the proposed bill for not accounting for non-cancer 
endpoints, especially endocrine disrupting endpoints (U.S. Congress House 1995b, 
Testimony of Jay Feldman). Erik Olson testified on behalf of the National Resources 
Defense Council, and his written testimony repeatedly discussed endocrine disrupting 
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chemicals and the lack of protections against them (U.S. Congress House 1995b, 
Statement of Erik Olson).  
Both hearings on the Food Quality Protection Act show the continued effort by 
proponents to get regulatory buy-in for the endocrine disruptor concept and category. 
Though proponents played a smaller role at the final two hearings, they continued to 
work behind the scenes to get endocrine disruptors regulated, shoring up the concept and 
category in specific ways for policymakers. However, by the end of 1995, the effects of 
proponents’ work were not obvious in so far as the final language of the Food Quality 
Protection Act had not been determined. Proponents had to wait.  
 
Science Grapples with Endocrine Disruptors 
 As the regulatory community made a space for endocrine disruptors, or perhaps 
more accurately endocrine disruptors filled a space made by other issues, the scientific 
community continued to push back on the endocrine disruptor concept and category. 
Skeptics of the ideas continued to write scathing opinion pieces, calling into question all 
of the claims made by proponents. Most the scientific community, meanwhile, continued 
to try to solidify what an endocrine disruptor was, or could be, or whether the entire study 
of them should be dropped.  
 In April of 1995, the EPA hosted a work session on the health and environmental 
effects of endocrine disruptors, led by Robert Kavlock (Kavlock et al. 1996). The 
statement that came out of the session encapsulates much of the continued scientific 
disagreement over the endocrine disruptor concept and category. The main conclusion 
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from the work session was that what they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis16 
“was of sufficient concern to warrant a concentrated research effort,” presumably to 
determine the validity of the hypothesis (Kavlock et al. 1996, 733). In his report on the 
workshop, Kavlock noted that the studies at the time were “inadequate for quantitative 
risk assessment” and he emphasized the necessity of the Bradford Hill criteria to 
determine if there was truly a connection between endocrine disrupting chemicals and 
adverse health outcomes (Kavlock et al. 1996). The EPA work session, which brought 
together close to ninety experts, called for further research to reduce uncertainty with the 
endocrine disruptor concept: namely, questions of what endocrine disruptors were and 
whether such substances truly did pose a problem for humans.  
That message is quite a bit different from the one proponents presented in 
hearings before Congress. While endocrine disruptor concept supporters told members of 
Congress that the concept and category were fully valid and ready for regulation, the rest 
of the scientific community maintained that the concept and category needed more 
investigation to make any determination regarding the regulation of endocrine disruptors. 
In all actuality, during the 1990s, proponents made relatively little effort to promote their 
ideas within the scientific community. Instead, proponents focused on their work with 
social and regulatory audiences, not calling for scientific consensus until 1998 (Colborn 
1998a). Proponents like Colborn clearly made efforts to solidify the concept and category 
for social and regulatory actors by connecting endocrine disruptors with attention-
                                                 
16 Scientific critics of the endocrine disruptor concept proposed in 1991 generally referred 
to the concept as the endocrine disruptor hypothesis, demonstrating their lack of 
confidence in the claims (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Kavlock et al. 1996; Stone 1994). This is 
explored in more depth in the next chapter. 
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grabbing diseases and effects like breast cancer and shrinking penises. For those 
audiences, that tactic was successful. Proponents tried to use the same tactic with 
scientific audiences, relying on studies connecting endocrine disruptors with serious 
effects in humans and wildlife while ignoring some of the basic knowledge about 
endocrine disruptors that remained uncertain.  
The failure of that tactic became clearer as the 1990s progressed. In 1995, the 
EPA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of the 
Interior (DOI), and Congress requested that the National Research Council evaluate what 
they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis (NRC 1999). The National Research 
Council was meant not only to review the literature on hormonally active substances, but 
also to identify uncertainties, recommend research, and establish a “science-based 
conceptual framework for assessing observed phenomena” (NRC 1999, ix). Though the 
Council did not publish their report until 1999, its content is equally informative of the 
scientific mindset in 1995. The report concluded that,  
…[L]imitations and uncertainties in the data could lead to different 
judgments among committee members with regard to interpreting the general 
hypothesis, determining appropriate sources of information, evaluating the 
evidence, defining the agents of concern, and evaluating environmental and 
biologic variables.  
Some of the differences reflect areas where additional research would 
help; others reflect differing judgments about the significance of the existing 
information. The differences are not confined to this committee but are reflected 
in the scientific community at large. Some differences appear to stem from 
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different views of the value of different kinds of evidence obtained by 
experiments, observations, weight-of-evidence approaches, and extrapolation of 
results from one compound or organism to others, as well as allowable sources of 
information and criteria for arriving at meaningful conclusions and 
recommendations (NRC 1999, 2) (emphasis added).  
What the report makes clear is that the endocrine disruptor concept was very much 
disputed. The dispute centered on the lack of certain kinds of evidence, like evidence of 
negative health outcomes in humans, but also around the uncertain meaning of some of 
the evidence used (see Chapter 4). The evidence available at the time, mostly deriving 
from animal research, could be interpreted in a number of ways. As the authors of the 
NRC report note, scientists hotly debated whether certain findings, like declining sperm 
counts, actually meant that endocrine disruptors threatened human health or whether the 
declining sperm counts worldwide were a statistical artifact. The largest looming question 
for the endocrine disruptor concept remained whether data could be extrapolated to 
human populations.  
Scientists did not buy in to the endocrine disruptor concept or category in 1995. 
Many researchers continued to investigate hormonally active chemicals, their 
characteristics, effects, and mechanisms of action, but that did not lead to scientific 
consensus. By the end of 1995, scientific disagreement over the endocrine disruptor 
concept had only grown, with a wider range of opinions on the claims made and action 
called for by proponents. That feature is part of what makes endocrine disruptors so 
interesting. Most science policy issues begin with scientific consensus, a broad agreement 
that something poses a threat or needs to be acted upon. Then, a case is made for 
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regulation, during which a vocal minority who disagrees gets amplified in the media 
stalling any regulatory progress. Endocrine disruptors flip that narrative, rapidly getting 
regulated amidst widespread scientific dissensus and the amplification of a vocal 
minority pushing for regulation. How that process occurred is the focus of this chapter, 
while the following chapters details why it was successful.  
 
1996: REGULATION IN THE FACE OF SCIENTIFIC DISAGREEMENT 
 In 1996, proponents attained their goal of seeing endocrine disruptors regulated 
with the passage of the Food Quality Protection Act. The majority of the Act changed the 
approval process for chemicals in the US broadly, but one small section called on the 
EPA to screen new chemicals for hormonal activity. The 1996 Act really was the 
culmination of one line of proponents’ work in the 1990s, to see to the regulation of 
endocrine disruptors. Their efforts in prior years, focusing on presenting a specific 
narrative to regulators combined with intense efforts to make endocrine disruptors a 
social concern, led to their success. However, the tactics they used impacted the language 
of the final Act as well as the work proponents had to keep up after its passage. 
 The year 1996 also saw two publications that played roles in the continued 
scientific discussion of the endocrine disruptor concept. One publication, an article 
published by McLachlan’s lab on the effects of endocrine disruptors at low doses, could 
have served as a foundation for building scientific consensus. It addressed one of the 
main issues scientists continued to have with the concept: that humans are exposed to 
very little amounts of endocrine disrupting chemicals and therefore those chemicals could 
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not have a large effect. As detailed in the next section, the foundation McLachlan’s paper 
could have served as crumbled.  
 The same year, Colborn and two colleagues published a full-length popular book 
on the endocrine disruptor concept, laying out their evidence and thought process going 
into the 1991 creation of the concept and some steps they think every person should 
follow to reduce their exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals. The book, Our Stolen 
Future, and its reviews demonstrate the continued differences in actors’ responses to the 
endocrine disruptor concept and category. Public audiences loved the book, and it 
received high praise in publications like Los Angeles Times (Meadows 1996; Kamrin 
1996; Lemonick 1996; Lee 1996; Krimsky 2000). Reviewers in scientific publications 
like Science took a rather dismal view of the work, calling attention to the scientific 
uncertainty around endocrine disruptors that did not make it into the work (Hirschfield, 
Hirschfield, and Flaws 1996; Lucier and Hook 1996).  
By the end of 1996, it’s clear that actors in different spheres took their positions 
and relatively little changed from 1991 to 1996. Social actors remained receptive for the 
entire five-year period, their focus on endocrine disruptors and proponents’ point of view 
making the substances socially relevant and helping to spur political action. Regulatory 
actors were led by proponents to a particular conclusion, that of the need to regulate 
endocrine disruptors, through their work in social spheres and in Congressional hearings. 
Scientific actors responded to proponents’ claims with questions, questions that 
proponents did not answer and largely ignored. That led to a spectrum of opinions within 
the scientific community, a spectrum that came to resemble a dichotomy more and more 
in the years following the regulation of endocrine disruptors.  
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The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 
Though scientific detractors of the endocrine disruptor concept continued to 
express doubt about its claims into 1996, those detractions did not halt regulatory action. 
In July of 1996, both House committees that held hearings in 1995—the House 
Agriculture Subcommittee on the Department of Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign 
Agriculture and the House Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment—
released their final reports on the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (formerly of 
1995).17  
Both committee reports show the success proponents had with convincing 
policymakers of the dangers posed by endocrine disruptors. The first committee, while 
not recommending any changes to the Act for the regulation of endocrine disruptors, 
noted that the EPA should be screening chemicals for endocrine effects but that they 
already had the authority to do so and therefore did not need that authority granted in the 
Food Quality Protection Act (Committee on Agriculture 1996, 56). The second 
committee concluded rather differently, advocating for significant changes to the bill with 
regard to endocrine disrupting chemicals (Committee on Commerce 1996). First, the 
Committee suggested the codification of the EPA’s ability to request information about 
endocrine effects when evaluating new pesticides. As the first Committee noted, that was 
not strictly necessary, but explicit codification may have caused the EPA to request and 
use the information more frequently.  
                                                 
17 It is important to note that both committees offered many changes to the Food Quality 
Protection Act, but only those relevant to endocrine disruptors are detailed here.  
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But the second Committee took things further, recommending an “Estrogenic 
Substances Screening Program,” whereby the EPA was required to develop “a screening 
program … to determine whether certain substances may have an effect in humans that is 
similar to an effect produced by a naturally occurring estrogen, or such other endocrine 
effect at the Administrator may designate” (Committee on Commerce 1996, 25). Though 
the program did not give the EPA more statutory power, it did issue a direct mandate that 
the EPA consider the issue of hormonally active substances and take action where 
deemed appropriate (Committee on Commerce 1996, 54). The Committee’s 
recommendations, if accepted, constituted a big step for the endocrine disruptor concept, 
official recognition by the federal government of the role of endocrine disruptors in 
pesticide testing. By accepting the recommended changes, Congress would have 
recognized both claims of the concept, that endocrine disruptors exist and that they pose a 
threat to humans and wildlife, as well as the category of endocrine disruptors, even in the 
face of its ambiguity.  
 The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 unanimously passed and was signed into 
law on 3 August 1996 (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). When it was passed in 1996, the bill had 
243 cosponsors (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). The final version contained many of the 
changes suggested by the second committee, including the mandate for an estrogenic 
substances screening program (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.).18 Three days later, President Bill 
                                                 
18 With the passage of the Food Quality Protection Act, Congress further charged the 
EPA with establishing a single health standard for pesticides as well as further protecting 
infants and children, quickly approving safer pesticides, creating incentives for 
development of better farming techniques, and using new scientific data on safety to 
periodically re-evaluate pesticides in use.  
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Clinton signed the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (H.R. 1627 104th 
Cong.). The Amendments also contained an estrogenic substances screening program, 
which referenced the program in the Food Quality Protection Act and extended the 
provisions to potential contaminants in drinking water (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). 
Together, the Acts increased the responsibilities of the EPA generally, but also 
particularly with endocrine disruptors.  
 This was success for proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept. In the five 
years since they started their efforts, they achieved all three of their main goals. They 
increased public awareness of the threat of endocrine disruptors. They stimulated 
scientific investigation of endocrine disruptors and their effects. And they saw the 
passage of a mandated screening program for endocrine activity. However, as with their 
successes in social and scientific arenas, proponents’ success in the regulatory arena took 
a slightly different form than they may have liked.  
 In the Food Quality Protection Act, Congress only required the establishment of 
an estrogenic substances screening program. They made no mention of the term 
“endocrine disruptor,” and though they did allow for focus on other endocrine effects, the 
legislation is largely aimed at estrogenic effects. As detailed more fully in Chapter 6, that 
is a result of the studies proponents used to push for regulation and the emphasis in 
popular media on estrogenic chemicals. Throughout the early 1990s, proponents used 
studies linking hormonally active chemicals to breast cancer, sperm declines, and 
shrinking penises. Each of those effects can be characterized as feminizing, a result of too 
much estrogen in the body. Though proponents certainly tried to link them to endocrine 
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disruptors more broadly, the Acts final language makes it clear that a much stronger 
connection was made between estrogenic chemicals and negative effects.  
 That could have meant that endocrine disruptors as a category would not be 
regulated. However, just after the passage of the Food Quality Protection Act, the EPA 
established the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee 
(EDSTAC) to determine the best methods for evaluating pesticides for hormonal effects 
to be included in the mandated screening program (EDSTAC 1998). Notice that the EPA 
adopted the term “endocrine disruptor” to describe hormonally active pesticides though 
they were not required to by the Act. The inclusion of endocrine disruptors in the EPA 
screening program was due to the work of endocrine disruptor concept sympathizers 
within the Clinton administration. Both Carol Browner, Administrator of the EPA, and 
Goldman, now the Assistant Administrator of the Office for Prevention, Pesticides, and 
Toxic Substances, moved to incorporate endocrine disruptor screening into the EPA 
before passage of the Food Quality Protection Act, and after its passage, helped to ensure 
that endocrine disruptors remained the focus rather than estrogenic chemicals (Friedman 
1992; EPA 1996d; EPA 1996e; EPA 1996f). 
 
A Study that Could Impact Scientific Support 
 Browner and Goldman’s acceptance of endocrine disruptors did not reflect 
broader scientific acceptance or consensus. In 1996, the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category remained divisive due to the same issues as in previous years: a fundamental 
lack of agreement as to what makes an endocrine disruptor and a strong disagreement as 
to whether endocrine disruptors truly posed a threat to human health and therefore needed 
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to be regulated. In 1991, when proponents initially constructed the concept and category, 
they had little evidence of endocrine disruptors impacting human health other than the 
flagship example of DES. By 1996, little more evidence had accumulated, and what had 
was scientifically contested, like Wolff’s breast cancer study and Sharpe and 
Skakkebaek’s sperm decline findings (Saidi et al. 1999; Olsen et al. 1995; Safe 1994; 
Safe 1995; Krieger et al. 1994).  
 Much scientific disagreement centered around the concern that humans are 
exposed to very low doses of endocrine disrupting chemicals and in traditional 
toxicology, the dose makes the poison. With many toxic substances, the more one is 
exposed to, the worse the effects, the dose-response curve following a linear pattern. In 
the case of endocrine disrupting chemicals, like PCBs and dioxin, humans are exposed to 
very low doses throughout their lives, meaning that effects should be quite small. That 
especially made sense to many given the lacking scientific evidence of negative effects in 
humans.  
A study published in 1996 sought to address that issue. In June, John McLachlan 
and his colleagues at the Tulane-Xavier Center for Bioenvironmental Research published 
“Synergistic Activation of Estrogen Receptors with Combinations of Environmental 
Chemicals” in Science (Arnold et al. 1996). In the article, McLachlan and his team 
reported on experiments that showed that mixtures of weakly estrogenic substances (like 
most industrial and agricultural chemicals) were up to 1600 times more potent than the 
chemicals alone (Arnold et al. 1996). The finding was quite spectacular and addressed 
one of the major concerns many scientists had with the endocrine disruptor concept: that 
humans were exposed to such small quantities of such weak estrogens that endocrine 
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disrupting effects would be unlikely. McLachlan and his colleagues showed that it did not 
matter if humans were exposed to small quantities of weak estrogens, if they were 
exposed to mixtures of those estrogens as most humans are through their diet.  
McLachlan’s study seemed to be a starting point for building scientific consensus 
around endocrine disruptors, as it answered a large issue with the concept and category. 
Popular media widely published on the finding, writing nearly 150 articles on endocrine 
disruptors in 1996, showing their acceptance of the endocrine disruptor concept (Krimsky 
2000). Following McLachlan’s publication, several researchers set out to replicate his 
findings.  
 As that potential site for agreement underwent scientific examination, another 
publication showed the continued division between the scientific community’s response 
to the endocrine disruptor concept, and everybody else’s. The same year as increased 
popular publication on endocrine disruptors and the passage of the estrogenic screening 
program, Colborn and her two co-authors, Dianne Dumanoski and John Peterson Myers, 
published Our Stolen Future (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). The book, written 
as a sort of detective story for a public audience, laid out the endocrine disruptor concept 
and the evidence supporting it, using stories from the field, interviews with scientists, and 
a driving message of action. Our Stolen Future was distributed well before it was 
published and was reviewed by scientists and journalists alike. While journalists provided 
largely positive reviews in publications like The Washington Post, scientific reviews were 
much more critical, reflecting the continued disagreement over the endocrine disruptor 
concept (Lee 1996; Krimsky 2000).  
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1997–2018: ENTRENCHED DISSENSUS AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ACTORS 
  In the years after 1996, the original proponents, who saw the endocrine disruptor 
concept situated in scientific, social, and regulatory spheres, played a diminishing role. 
They achieved their goals, if not in the exact way they intended, and the world looked 
very different from 1997 on. Beginning in 1997, after the regulation of endocrine 
disruptors, the scientific community split over the endocrine disruptor concept, becoming 
hostile, polarized between two sides. That hostility began around the time that 
McLachlan was forced to retract his miraculous findings from 1996. As the scientific 
community moved through the end of the 1990s, their disagreements became entrenched 
in a process described more fully in Chapter 5. In 2018, they remain strong and have had 
impacts on regulations in the European Union.  
 The dissolution of the scientific community of endocrine disruptor researchers is 
perhaps reflective of the unique science policy path endocrine disruptors took in the 
1990s. Proponents did not focus on the scientists, the way they did on the general public 
and policymakers, largely ignoring scientific disagreements in order to achieve their 
goals. Once endocrine disruptors were regulated, and victory declared, the scientific 
discussion of endocrine disruptors became very political. Many researchers took sides: 
either the regulation of endocrine disruptors was right or it was ludicrous. Proponents 
worked hard to make the endocrine disruptor concept scientific, social, and regulatory. 
They succeeded in that, but one consequence has been that scientific neutrality is difficult 
to maintain.  
 From a regulatory perspective, the endocrine disruptor concept has faded. After 
the establishment of the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program and the subsequent 
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debates over what that would look like, the system has been operating as is. Though 
leadership within the program has set goals to update the testing requirements to reflect 
updated scientific data, the program, and the EPA more broadly, is facing potential 
budget cuts that would make such changes difficult and there are no longer activist-
scientists working so dedicatedly to convince policymakers of the danger posed by 
endocrine disruptors (EPA 2011a; EPA 2011b; Erickson, Hogue, and Morrison 2017; 
Song 2017).  
 Perhaps the only place where proponents had long term success is the social 
sphere. Though awareness of the endocrine disruptor category as a whole has diminished, 
awareness of particular endocrine disruptors remains high and social actors continue to 
have an outsize role in societal response and treatment of those chemicals. That played 
out particularly in the case of bisphenol-A (BPA) during the early 2000s. The media 
machine proponents took advantage of to bring awareness to endocrine disruptors has 
kept worry over the chemicals alive, with odd tests of what chemicals a reader may have 
been exposed to and the dire effects as a result (Kristoff 2018).  
 
The Retraction of the McLachlan Finding 
  Replication of McLachlan’s findings proved to be impossible. By 1997, it 
became apparent that no other lab could replicate the increased potency of hormonally 
active chemicals in mixture found by the team at Tulane (Vogel 2012, 116). Following 
much scrutiny, McLachlan issued a retraction in 1997 (McLachlan 1997). The retraction 
received very little media coverage, a point emphasized by Diane Katz in an article in the 
Wall Street Journal where she claimed that, “the endocrine disruptor apocalypse has been 
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cancelled” and that poor journalism, paid off by the W. Alton Jones Foundation,19 
overhyped it to begin with (Katz 1997).  
 In that same copy of The Wall Street Journal, Safe wrote a scathing article about 
“Another Enviro-Scare Debunked”—the endocrine disruptor one (Safe 1997). In the 
article, Safe presented the evidence used to gain public support for what he called the 
endocrine disruptor hypothesis: the link to breast cancer, the decreased sperm counts, and 
the additive mixture effects. He then trotted out information discounting them all before 
ending with a musing about whether Congress would revoke the changes to the law in 
light of the new evidence (Safe 1997).  
 Safe’s editorial did not go unanswered, with one researcher castigating Safe for 
using one finding to dismiss an entire theory while another poked fun that he “seems 
obsessed with sperm” (WSJ 1997). Safe’s article and the responses to it are emblematic 
of a schism within the scientific community that grew ever wider in the years after 1996. 
In 1994, 1995, and 1996, the scientific community of endocrine disruptor researchers sat 
along a spectrum, with some seriously doubting the endocrine disruptor concept and 
some taking the concept as fact, but the majority seriously investigating the claims made 
by proponents in order to create more knowledge about endocrine disruptors (see Chapter 
4). That began to change in 1997, with researchers being more clearly divided between 
the two polarized ends of the spectrum (see Chapter 5). The polarization only increased 
after that.   
 
                                                 
19 Colborn and Myers worked for the W. Alton Jones Foundation.  
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Continuing Scientific Disagreement  
 The scientific dissension over the endocrine disruptor concept is evident in a 1999 
report by the National Research Council. In 1999, the National Research Council, which 
had been asked to review endocrine disruptor science in 1995, released their report on 
“Hormonally Active Agents in the Environment” (NRC 1999). The report did not shy 
away from the scientific disagreement on endocrine disruptors, clearly walking through 
the points of contention and describing the tense atmosphere at their meetings to develop 
the report (NRC 1999).  
As mentioned previously, the NRC highlighted that one difficultly with reaching 
scientific agreement on endocrine disruptors was the different interpretation of evidence. 
This is explored more fully in Chapter 4. The NRC report highlighted a second issue as 
well: the definition of endocrine disruptors. The Council, in their report, refused to use 
the term “endocrine disruptor,” due to the ambiguity inherent in it (NRC 1999, 17). As 
noted in the report, “[t]he endocrine system can be disrupted in many ways that would 
lead almost every chemical with a disruptive effect on the organism to be classified as an 
endocrine disruptor” and that “[e]ven the term ‘disrupt’ is subject to differing 
interpretations” (NRC 1999, 17). Instead, the Council used the term “hormonally active 
agent,” undermining a key component of the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 The NRC report lays bare a fundamental division in the scientific community over 
endocrine disruptors. While different interpretations of endocrine disruptor studies and 
evidence may well be an insurmountable divide, the inability to agree on even the basic 
definition of endocrine disruptors certainly is. As the 1990s progressed into the 2000s, 
the scientific schism over endocrine disruptors grew and part of that is due to both sides 
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talking past each other. When proponents talk about endocrine disruptors and their 
effects, the other side refuses to acknowledge endocrine disruptors as scientific objects. 
They disagree on whether the topic up for discussion should be a topic for discussion. 
Due to that, the scientific community on endocrine disruptors in 2018 is deeply divided  
BPA and Public Fear 
 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers, policymakers, and members of the 
public engaged in a conflict to determine the appropriate used of BPA. BPA is a widely-
used plasticizer, used for making plastics clear and strong. Originally discovered in 1891 
and investigated as an artificial estrogen,20 it was rediscovered in the 1950s by 
researchers at Bayer and General Electric (Vogel 2009). By the 1990s, BPA was used in 
the majority of plastic consumer products, including water bottles and baby bottles 
(Vogel 2009). 
In 1997, researchers reported on observed hormonally caused adverse effects in 
BPA exposed animals (vom Saal et al. 1997). Not only did the authors of the study, who 
included vom Saal, find endocrine disruptor effects from exposure to BPA, but they 
found those effects at very low doses of the chemical. The endocrine disrupting activity 
of BPA at low doses was landmark. As discussed previously, one of the key issues many 
scientists had with the endocrine disruptor concept was that humans are only exposed to 
                                                 
20 It is ironic that, as of 2018, BPA is labeled as an endocrine disruptor given that it was 
originally investigated as estrogenic. After Russian chemist Alexander Dianin 
synthesized BPA in 1891, it languished until the 1930s, when Charles Dodds and his 
colleagues investigated its use as an artificial estrogen (Dodds et al. 1938). The irony is 
that in 2018 we recognize that BPA disrupts hormone processes when in the 1930s, that 
was its purpose. Dodds and his colleagues later synthesized DES as a much stronger 
artificial estrogen (Dodds et al. 1938).  
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low levels of the chemical and therefore would not be affected by their hormonal nature. 
Vom Saal’s study addressed that, demonstrating that even those low levels could be 
dangerous.  
 Following the 1997 reports on the adverse health effects of BPA exposure, several 
other studies found similar outcomes (Nagel et al. 1997; Colerangle and Roy 1997; 
Steinmetz et al. 1997; Vogel 2012). Remaining proponents of the endocrine disruptor 
concept labeled BPA an endocrine disruptor, and one that worryingly had effects in very 
small doses. That finding, and in particular the work of activist-scientist vom Saal, 
spurred a large public campaign to desist the use of BPA, particularly in products used by 
infants and children, as they were at higher risk (Vogel 2012). While the public campaign 
was quite successful, a parallel regulatory campaign was less so.  
The continually emerging evidence as to the dangers of BPA led to a number of 
proposed bills to limit its use, all of which failed (Vogel 2009). But continued public 
outcry prompted the FDA, in 2008, to convene a panel to reassess the safety of BPA, 
after reassuring consumers for years that the substance was safe (FDA 2018). The panel’s 
findings were not novel, with members stating that more research was needed to draw 
any firm conclusions as to the toxicity of BPA (FDA 2018). But many supporters of the 
endocrine disruptor concept, including vom Saal, claimed that the evidence of BPA’s 
toxicity was damning and that action was needed (vom Saal et al. 2007).  
BPA and the drama that played out around it represents an interesting reversal in 
the endocrine disruptor story. For much of the 1990s, proponents found a receptive 
audience in policymakers eager to act on endocrine disruptors to protect children and 
reduce breast cancer diagnoses. Regulators were far less receptive to vom Saal and 
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others’ arguments about BPA and the threat posed by the chemical, issuing reports that 
highlighted the divided nature of the scientific community working with endocrine 
disruptors. The reports came back to the same scientific issues of the previous decade: 
endocrine disruptor studies could be widely interpreted by different individuals and there 
was still little agreement on what counted as an endocrine disruptor and therefore what 
study would convince everyone that BPA posed a threat. BPA is one area where the 
division of the scientific community had an impact, one not in the proponents favor as 
regulators did not side with them.  
 Interestingly, in the case of BPA, it was social actors who played the biggest role 
in prompting action. Following the FDA panel report in 2008, the agency took no action. 
But in 2009, following boycotting by a large number of consumers, the use of BPA in 
baby bottles ceased after six producers decided to stop using it. That was action—curbing 
the use of a recognized endocrine disruptor—without the help of the FDA or EPA. 
Instead, the public and their buying habits were in the driver’s seat. In the early history of 
the endocrine disruptor concept and category, public media played a key role, fully 
embracing proponents’ ideas and selling them to a wide public audience. In the 1990s, 
mothers in grocery stores knew about endocrine disruptors because journalists were 
writing articles about them. The media propped up the largely empty concept and 
category in the early years.  
By the 2000s, consumer groups and public fears took over that role. Vom Saal’s 
findings about BPA were picked up by organizations like the Environmental Working 
Group, organizations that them told their members “BPA is a problem, it could be 
damaging your children” (Shannon 2008; Blake 2014a; Blake 2014b). Those members 
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then put pressure on manufacturers to reduce their use of BPA. The public propped up 
one endocrine disruptor, BPA, the same way popular media propped up the entire 
category in the 1990s.  
Several states eventually banned the use of BPA in baby bottles, and in 2012, the 
FDA followed suit, though they maintained the safety of exposure to low levels of BPA 
(FDA 2018). As of 2018, it is common to see products adorned with large “BPA Free” 
labels as testament to the public’s power. Unfortunately, most of the public neglected to 
ask what BPA was replaced with. The answer is usually bisphenol S (BPS), a substance 
that studies have shown may be significantly more toxic than BPA (Ahsan et al. 2018).  
 
CONCLUSION  
 Between 1991 and 1996, endocrine disruptors followed a unique science policy 
trajectory. Proponents of the concept and category started with convincing social and 
regulatory audiences, growing support for what many in the scientific community 
criticized as flawed ideas. Ultimately, the scientific disagreement over the existence of 
endocrine disruptors and the threat they posed did not impact their regulation. Proponents 
saw success in their tactics to introduce endocrine disruptors a serious problem for human 
health and to push for their regulation. Those tactics were based on a small, but powerful 
group of effects and were aided by social trends and changes, like the shift away from the 
cancer paradigm.  
 In this chapter, I have followed the science policy trajectory of endocrine 
disruptors by pulling on two threads: how proponents pushed their concept and category 
in to scientific, social, and regulatory contexts and how actors in those contexts pushed 
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back. Proponents’ tactics remained largely the same in all three arenas, where they 
focused on a narrow set of scientific studies to paint a threatening picture of endocrine 
disrupting chemicals. Through that, proponents gained the support of popular media, who 
accepted their ideas and wrote doomsday predictions of shrinking penises and the loss of 
masculinity as a result. Proponents worked more carefully in regulatory arenas, carefully 
managing the studies they used and the overall image they presented of endocrine 
disruptors. In doing so, they were able to tie endocrine disruptors to effects and diseases 
with social and political capital, thereby making endocrine disruptors something 
policymakers wanted to regulate. In the scientific arena, proponents put little effort and 
that saw the proliferation of opinions on the endocrine disruptor concept and what should 
be done about endocrine disruptors. As the 1990s progressed and proponents made 
progress in social and regulatory context, scientific disagreement increased, ultimately 
resulting in a polarized scientific field.  
 In the next three chapters, I write in more detail about the tactics proponents used 
and their consequences, referring back to much of the history covered in this chapter. 
  
  136 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Ahsan, Nida, Hizb Ullah, Waheed Ullah, and Sarwat Jahan. 2018. “Comparative Effects 
of Bisphenol S and Bisphenol A on the Development of Female Reproductive 
System in Rats; A Neonatal Exposure Study.” Chemosphere 197: 336–43. 
 
Ames, Bruce N., Frank D. Lee, and William E. Durston. 1973. “An Improved Bacterial 
Test System for the Detection and Classification of Mutagens and 
Carcinogens.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 70, no. 3: 782–6. 
 
Ames, Bruce N., William E. Durston, Edith Yamasaki, and Frank D. Lee. 1973. 
“Mutagens: A Simple Test System Combining Liver Homogenates for Activation 
and Bacteria for Detection.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 70, 
no. 8: 2281–5. 
 
Arnold, Steven F., Diane M. Klotz, Bridgette M. Collins, Peter M. Vonier, Louis J. 
Guillette, and John A. McLachlan. 1996. “Synergistic Activation of Estrogen 
Receptor with Combinations of Environmental Chemicals.” Science 272, no. 
5267: 1489–92. 
 
Begley, Sharon, and Daniel Glick. 1994. “The Estrogen Complex.” Newsweek, March 21, 
1994.  
 
Beil, L. 1993. “Toxic Chemicals’ Role in Breast Cancer Studied.” Dallas Morning News, 
November 1, 1993.   
 
Blake, Mariah. 2014a. “Scientists Condemn New FDA Study Saying BPA Is Safe: “It 
Borders on Scientific Misconduct.” Mother Jones, March 24, 2014. 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/03/scientists-slam-fda-study-bpa/2/.  
 
———. 2014b. “The Scary New Evidence on BPA-Free Plastics.” Mother Jones, 
March/April 2014. https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2014/03/tritan-
certichem-eastman-bpa-free-plastic-safe/.  
 
California v. Browner. 1994. People of the State of California, ex rel. Daniel E. Lungren, 
Attorney General, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Carol M. Browner, Administrator of the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, et al., Defendants, and American 
Frozen Food Institute, et al., Defendant-Intervenors. (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
 
California v. Reilly. 1990. California ex. rel. Van de Kamp et al., Plaintiffs, v. William 
K. Reilly, et al., Defendants, and American Frozen Food Institute, et al., 
Defendant-Intervenors. 750 F.Supp. 433 (E.D. Cal. 1990).  
 
  137 
Chemetron v. DHEW. 1974. Chemetron Corporation, A Corporation, et al., Petitioners, v. 
The United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare et al., 
Respondents. 495 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 
Clayson, David B., and David J. Clegg. 1991. “Classification of Carcinogens: Polemics, 
Pedantics, or Progress?” Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 14, no. 2: 
147–66. 
 
Colborn, Theodora E., Alex Davidson, Sharon N. Green, R.A. Hodge, C. Ian Jackson, 
and Richard A. Liroff. 1990. Great Lakes: Great Legacy? Ottawa: World Wildlife 
Fund. 
 
Colborn, Theo, and Coralie Clement, eds. 1992. Chemically-induced Alterations in 
Sexual and Functional Development: The Wildlife/Human Connection. Princeton: 
Princeton Scientific Publishing Co.  
 
Colborn, Theo, Frederick S. vom Saal, and Ana M. Soto. 1993. “Developmental Effects 
of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and Humans.” Environmental 
Health Perspectives 101, no. 5: 378–84. 
 
Colborn, Theo, Dianne Dumanoski, and John Peterson Myers. 1997. Our Stolen Future: 
Are We Threatening Our Fertility, Intelligence and Survival?–A Scientific 
Detective Story. New York City: Plume.  
 
Colerangle, John B., and Deodutta Roy. 1997. “Profound Effects of the Weak 
Environmental Estrogen-like Chemical Bisphenol A on the Growth of the 
Mammary Gland of Noble Rats.” 1997. The Journal of Steroid Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology 60, no. 1–2: 153–60. 
 
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. Congress House. 1996. Report on Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Report 104-669, Part 1, printed July 
11, 1996.  
 
Committee on Commerce, U.S. Congress House. 1996. Report on Food Quality 
Protection Act of 1996. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Report 104-669, Part 2, printed July 
23, 1996.  
 
Committee on Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children, National Research Council 
(Committee on Pesticides). 1993. Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.   
 
Committee on Scientific and Regulatory Issues Underlying Pesticide Use Patterns and 
Agricultural Innovation, Board on Agriculture, National Research Council 
(Committee on Pesticide Use Patterns). 1987. Regulating Pesticides in Food: The 
Delaney Paradox. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987.  
  138 
 
Cone, Marla. 1994a. “The Gender Warp: Sexual Confusion in the Wild.” Los Angeles 
Times, October 2, 1994.  
 
———. 1994b. “The Gender Warp: Pollutions Effect on Sexual Development Fires 
Debate.” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 1994.  
 
———. 1994c. “The Gender Warp: Battle Looms on Chemicals that Disrupt Hormones.” 
Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1994.  
 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). 1981. Chemical Hazards to Human 
Reproduction. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
 
Cushman Jr., John H. 1994. “EPA Settles Suit and Agrees to Move Against 36 
Pesticides.” The New York Times, October 13, 1994. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/13/us/epa-settles-suit-and-agrees-to-move-
against-36-pesticides.html.  
 
Davis, Devra Lee, H. Leon Bradlow, Mary Wolff, Tracey Woodruff, David G. Hoel, and 
Hoda Anton-Culver. 1993. “Medical Hypothesis: Xenoestrogens as Preventable 
Causes of Breast Cancer.” Environmental Health Perspectives 101, no. 5: 372–7. 
 
Degnan, Frederick H., and W. Gary Flamm. 1995. “Living with and Reforming the 
Delaney Clause.” Food and Drug Law Journal 50: 235–56.  
 
Dodds, Edward Charles, Leon Goldberg, Wilfred Lawson, and Robert Robinson. 1938. 
“Oestrogenic Activity of Certain Synthetic Compounds.” Nature 141, no. 3562: 
247–8. 
 
El-Bayoumy, Karam. 1992. “Environmental Carcinogens that May be Involved in 
Human Breast Cancer Etiology.” Chemical Research in Toxicology 5, no. 5: 585–
90. 
 
Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee (EDSTAC). 1998. 
“EDSTAC Final Report.” Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.epa.gov/endocrine-disruption/endocrine-disruptor-screening-and-
testing-advisory-committee-edstac-final  
 
Environmental Defense Fund v. DHEW. 1970. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 
Petitioner, et al., Petitioners, v. United States Department of Health Education and 
Welfare, Robert H. Finch, Secretary, Respondents. 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
 
  139 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus. 1971. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 
Petitioner, v. Environmental Protection Agency and William D. Ruckelshaus, 
Administrator, Respondents. 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 1996d. “Pesticide Program Dialogue 
Committee Meeting Summary.” From meeting held July 9–10, 1996.  
 
———. 1996e. “PA Plans for Advisory Committee on Endocrine Disruptors.” EPA 
Newsroom, October 18, 1996. 
 
———. 1996f. “PA EPA to Hold First Meeting w/Endocrine Disruptor Adv. Comm.” 
EPA Newsroom, November 29, 1996.  
 
———. 2011a. Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program: Weight-of-Evidence: 
Evaluating Results of EDSP Tier 1 Screening to Identify the Need for Tier 2 
Testing. Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OPPT-2010-0877-0021.  
 
———. 2011b. EPA’s Fiscal Year 2011 Management Challenges. Washington, DC: 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
09/documents/mgt_challenges_fy_2011.pdf.  
 
Erickson Britt E., Cheryl Hogue, Jessica Morrison. 2017. “Trump EPA to Shed Chemical 
Programs, Grants.” Chemical & Engineering News 95, no. 17: 21–2. 
https://cen.acs.org/articles/95/i17/Trump-EPA-shed-chemical-programs.html.  
 
Friedman, Thomas L. 1992. “The Transition: Clinton's Cabinet Choices Put Him at 
Center, Balancing Competing Factions.” The New York Times, December 27, 
1992. http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/27/us/transition-clinton-s-cabinet-
choices-put-him-center-balancing-competing-factions.html?pagewanted=all.  
 
Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. 85–929, 21 USC § 321, § 341 et seq.  
 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 2018. “Bisphenol A (BPA): Use in Food Contact 
Application.” Accessed March 2, 2018. 
https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/publichealthfocus/ucm064437.htm.  
 
Food Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. 104–170, 7 USC § 136 et seq.  
 
Goodman, Walter. 1994. “Something Is Attacking Male Fetus Sex Organs.” The New 
York Times, September 2, 1994.   
 
Healy, Melissa. 1993. “Pesticides May Be Linked to Breast Cancer, Scientists Warn 
Health.” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 1993.   
  140 
 
Herbst, Arthur L., and Robert E. Scully. 1970. “Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina in 
Adolescence. A Report of 7 Cases Including 6 Clear-cell 
Carcinomas.” Obstetrical & Gynecological Survey 25, no. 9: 871–5. 
 
Hess & Clark v. FDA. 1974. Hess & Clark, Division of Rhodia, Inc., Petitioner, v. Food 
& Drug Administration et al., Respondents. 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 
Hirschfield, Anne N., Michael F. Hirshfield, and Jodi A. Flaws. 1996. “Problems Beyond 
Pesticides.” Science 272, no. 5267: 1444–5.  
 
H.R. 4739, 100th Congress. 1988. “Food Safety Amendments of 1988.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/100/hr4739.  
 
H.R. 1725, 101st Congress. 1989. “Food Safety Amendments of 1989.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/hr1725.  
 
H.R. 2597, 102nd Congress. 1991. “Food, Drug, Cosmetic, and Device Enforcement 
Amendments of 1991.” https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr2597.  
 
H.R. 3216, 102nd Congress. 1991. “Food Quality Protection Act of 1991.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr3216.  
 
H.R. 2342, 102nd Congress. 1991. “Safety of Pesticides in Food Act of 1991.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/hr2342.  
 
H.R. 872, 103rd Congress. 1993. “Pesticide Food Safety Act of 1993.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr872.  
 
H.R. 4091, 103rd Congress. 1994. “Pesticide Food Safety Act of 1994.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr4091.  
 
H.R. 4362, 103rd Congress. 1994. “Pesticide Reform Act of 1994.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr4362.  
 
H.R. 1627, 104th Congress. 1995. “Food Quality Protection Act of 1996.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr1627.  
 
Kamrin, Michael. 1996. “The Mismeasure of Risk.” Scientific American 275, no. 3: 178–
9.  
 
Katz, Diane. 1997. “The Press’s Ignominious Role.” The Wall Street Journal, August 20, 
1997.  
 
  141 
Kavlock, Robert J., George P. Daston, Chris DeRosa, Penny Fenner-Crisp, L. Earl Gray, 
Steve Kaattari, George Lucier, Michael Luster, Michael J. Mac, Carol Maczka, et 
al. 1996. “Research Needs for the Risk Assessment of Health and Environmental 
Effects of Endocrine Disruptors: A Report of the US EPA-sponsored 
Workshop.” Environmental Health Perspectives 104, Supplement 4: 715–40. 
 
Krieger, Nancy, Mary S. Wolff, Robert A. Hiatt, Marilyn Rivera, Joseph Vogelman, and 
Norman Orentreich. 1994. “Breast Cancer and Serum Organochlorines: A 
Prospective Study among White, Black, and Asian Women.” Journal of the 
National Cancer Institute 86, no. 8: 589–99. 
 
Krimsky, Sheldon. 2000. The Scientific and Social Origins of the Environmental 
Endocrine Hypothesis. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Kristoff, Nicholas. 2018. “What Poisons are in Your Body?” The New York Times, 
February 23, 2018. 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/23/opinion/columnists/poisons-in-
our-bodies.html.  
 
Lee, Gary. 1996. “Poisoned Planet.” Washington Post, April 14, 1996.  
 
Lemonick, Michael. 1996. “No So Fertile Ground.” Time, September 19, 1996.  
 
Lucier, George W., and Gary E. R. Hook. 1996. “Anniversaries and Issues.” 
Environmental Health Perspectives 104, no. 4: 350.  
   
Les. v. Reilly. 1992. Kathleen E. Les; Frances Les Thomas; Manuel Jesus Perez Morales; 
David R. Perez; Manuel R. Perez, Petitioners, AFL-CIO; Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.; Public Citizen, Petitioners-Intervenors, v. William K. 
Reilly, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondents, National Agricultural 
Chemicals Association, et al., Respondents-Intervenors. 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 
1992).  
 
Luoma, Jon R. 1992a. “New Effect of Pollutants: Hormone Mayhem.” The New York 
Times, March 24, 1992.  
 
———. 1992b. “Cancer Not Only Contaminant Concern: Hormonal Systems Profoundly 
Affected.” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 1, 1992.  
 
Marcus, Alan I. 1994. Cancer from Beef: DES, Federal Food Regulation, and Consumer 
Confidence. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
McLachlan, John A., ed. 1979. Estrogens in the Environment. New York, Amsterdam, 
and Oxford: Elsevier/North-Holland.  
  142 
 
———, ed. 1985. Estrogens in the Environment II: Influences on Development. New 
York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co.  
 
———. 1997. “Synergistic Effect of Environmental Estrogens: Report Withdrawn.” 
Science 277, no. 5325: 459–63. 
 
———. 2016. “Environmental Signaling: From Environmental Estrogens to Endocrine‐
disrupting Chemicals and Beyond.” Andrology 4, no. 4: 684–94. 
 
McLachlan, John A., and Kenneth S. Korach. 1995. “Symposium on Estrogens in the 
Environment, III.” Environmental Health Perspectives 103, Supplement 7: 3–4.  
 
Meadows, Donella H. 1996. “A Chemical Whirlwind on the Horizon.” Los Angeles 
Times, January 31, 1996.  
 
Merrill, Richard A. 1997. “Food Safety Regulation: Reforming the Delaney 
Clause.” Annual Review of Public Health 18, no. 1: 313–40. 
 
Nader v. EPA. 1988. Ralph Nader, Natural Resources Defense Council, State of New 
York, Public Citizen, Mark Beyeler, et al., Petitioners, v. United State 
Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, and Uniroyal Chemical 
Company, et al., Respondents-Intervenors. 859 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1988).  
 
Nagel, Susan C., Frederick S. vom Saal, Kristina A. Thayer, Minati G. Dhar, Michael 
Boechler, and Wade V. Welshons. 1997. “Relative Binding Affinity-serum 
Modified Access (RBA-SMA) Assay Predicts the Relative in vivo Bioactivity of 
the Xenoestrogens Bisphenol A and Octylphenol.” Environmental Health 
Perspectives 105, no. 1: 70–6. 
 
National Research Council, Committee on Hormonally Active Agents in the 
Environment (NRC). 1999. Hormonally Active Agents in the Environment. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.  
 
Olsen, Geary W., Kenneth M. Bodner, Jonathan M. Ramlow, Charles E. Ross, and Larry 
I. Lipshultz. 1995. “Have Sperm Counts been Reduced 50 percent in 50 years? A 
Statistical Model Revisited.” Fertility and Sterility 63, no. 4: 887–93. 
 
Peterson, Karin. 1993 “Decreasing Sperm Counts Blamed on the Environment.” USA 
Today, May 28, 1993.  
 
Public Citizen v. DHHS. 1986. Public Citizen, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Department of Health 
and Human Services, et al., Defendants. 632 F.Supp. 220 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  
 
  143 
Public Citizen v. Bowen. 1987. Public Citizen et al., Petitioners, v. Otis R. Bowen, 
Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, et al., Respondents. 833 
F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
 
Public Citizen v. Young. 1987. Public Citizen, et al., Petitioners, v. Dr. Frank Young, 
Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, et al., Respondents, Cosmetic, 
Toiletry and Fragrance Association, Intervenor. 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 
Reich, Michael R., and Jaquelin K. Spong. 1983. “Kepone: A Chemical Disaster in 
Hopewell, Virginia.” International Journal of Health Services 13, no. 2: 227–46. 
 
Rhone-Poulenc v. FDA. 1980. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., Hess & Clark Division, Petitioner, v. 
Food and Drug Administration, Respondent. 636 F.2d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
 
S. 2875, 100th Congress. 1988. “Food Safety Amendments of 1988.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/100/s2875.  
 
S. 722, 101st Congress. 1989. “Food Safety Amendments of 1989.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/101/s722.  
 
S. 1074, 102nd Congress. 1991. “Safety of Pesticides in Food Act of 1991.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/102/s1074.  
 
S. 1478, 103rd Congress. 1993. “Food Quality Protection Act of 1993.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/s1478.  
 
S. 331, 103rd Congress. 1993. “Pesticide Food Safety Act of 1993.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/s331.  
 
S. 2084, 103rd Congress. 1994. “Pesticide Reform Act of 1994.” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/s2084.   
 
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 104–182 § 1316.  
 
Safe, Stephen H. 1994. “Dietary and Environmental Estrogens and Antiestrogens and 
their Possible Role in Human Disease.” Environmental Science and Pollution 
Research 1, no. 1: 29–33. 
 
———. 1995. “Environmental and Dietary Estrogens and Human Health: Is there a 
Problem?” Environmental Health Perspectives 103, no. 4: 346–51. 
 
———. 1997. “Another Enviro-Scare Debunked.” The Wall Street Journal, September 
18, 1997.  
 
  144 
Saidi, James A., David T. Chang, Erik T. Goluboff, Emilia Bagiella, Geary Olsen, and 
Harry Fisch. 1999. “Declining Sperm Counts in the United States? A Critical 
Review.” The Journal of Urology 161, no. 2: 460–2. 
 
Scott v. FDA. 1984. Glenn M.W. Scott, Petitioner, v. Food and Drug Administration, 
Respondent. 728 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 1984).  
 
Shannon, Elaine. 2008. “What the Chemical Industry Doesn’t Want You to Know.” 
Environmental Working Group, September 15, 2008. 
https://www.ewg.org/research/what-chemical-industry-doesnt-want-you-
know#.WouEQmaZNE4.  
 
Sharpe, Richard M. 1993. “Declining Sperm Counts in Men–Is there an Endocrine 
Cause?” Journal of Endocrinology 136, no. 3: 357–60. 
 
Sharpe, Richard M., and Niels E. Skakkebaek. 1993. “Are Oestrogens Involved in Falling 
Sperm Counts and Disorders of the Male Reproductive Tract?” The Lancet 341, 
no. 8857: 1392–6. 
 
Simpson v. Young. 1988. Nancy Hendree Simpson, Public Citizen Health Research 
Group, and Center for Science in the Public Interest, Petitioners, v. Dr. Frank E. 
Young, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration, Respondent. 854 F.2d 
1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 
Song, Lisa. 2017. “As Trump Slashes EPA Budget, Worry Over the Fate of an Agency 
Doing Similar Work.” Salon, March 20, 2017. 
https://www.salon.com/2017/03/20/as-trump-slashes-epa-budget-worry-over-the-
fate-of-an-agency-doing-similar-work_partner/.  
 
Steinmetz, Rosemary, Nancy G. Brown, Donald L. Allen, Robert M. Bigsby, and Nira 
Ben-Jonathan. 1997. “The Environmental Estrogen Bisphenol A Stimulates 
Prolactin Release in vitro and in vivo.” Endocrinology 138, no. 5: 1780–6. 
 
Stevens, William K. 1994. “Pesticides May Leave Legacy of Hormonal Chaos.” The New 
York Times, August 23, 1994.  
 
Stone, Richard. 1994. “Environmental Estrogens Stir Debate.” Science 265, no. 5170: 
308–11. 
 
U.S. Congress. 1993. Safety of Pesticides in Food: Joint Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, House of Representatives, and the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources, United States Senate. 103rd Cong., 1st sess., September 21, 1993.  
 
  145 
U.S. Congress. House. 1982. Relationship of Exposure to Toxic Chemicals and 
Reproductive Impairment: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Investigations 
and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology. 97th Cong., 2nd sess., 
July 27, 1982.  
 
———. 1993. Health Effects of Estrogenic Pesticides: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 103rd 
Cong., 1st sess., October 21, 1993.  
 
———. 1995a. Food Quality Protection Act of 1995: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee 
on Agriculture. 104th Cong., 1st sess., May 16, 1995. 
 
———. 1995b. Food Quality Protection Act of 1995: Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce. 104th Cong., 1st 
sess., June 7 and 29, 1995.   
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. 1991. Government Regulation of Reproductive Hazards: Hearing 
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., October 2, 
1991.  
 
Vargesson, Neil. 2015. “Thalidomide‐induced Teratogenesis: History and 
Mechanisms.” Birth Defects Research Part A: Clinical and Molecular 
Teratology 105, no. 2: 140–56. 
 
Vogel, Sarah A. 2009. Politics of Plastics: The Making and Unmaking of Bisphenol A 
“Safety”.” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. S3: S559–66. 
 
———. 2012. Is it Safe?: BPA and the Struggle to Define the Safety of Chemicals. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
vom Saal, Frederick S., Barry G. Timms, Monica M. Montano, Paola Palanza, Kristina 
A. Thayer, Susan C. Nagel, Minati D. Dhar, V. K. Ganjam, Stefano Parmigiani, 
and Wade V. Welshons. 1997. “Prostate Enlargement in Mice due to Fetal 
Exposure to Low Doses of Estradiol or Diethylstilbestrol and Opposite Effects at 
High Doses.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 94, no. 5: 2056–
61. 
 
vom Saal, Frederick S., Benson T. Akingbemi, Scott M. Belcher, Linda S. Birnbaum, D. 
Andrew Crain, Marcus Eriksen, Francesca Farabollini, Louis J. Guillette Jr., Russ 
Hauser, Jerrold J. Heindel, et al. 2007. “Chapel Hill Bisphenol A Expert Panel 
Consensus Statement: Integration of Mechanisms, Effects in Animals and 
Potential to Impact Human Health at Current Levels of Exposure.” Reproductive 
Toxicology 24, no. 2: 131–8. 
 
  146 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 1997. “Letters to the Editor: Heed Environmental Warnings.” 
Wall Street Journal, September 18, 1997.  
 
Wolff, Mary S., Paolo G. Toniolo, Eric W. Lee, Marilyn Rivera, and Neil Dubin. 1993. 
“Blood Levels of Organochlorine Residues and Risk of Breast Cancer.” Journal 
of the National Cancer Institute 85, no. 8: 648–52. 
  147 
CHAPTER 4 
DISAGREEMENT DISSECTED, THE SPECTRUM OF AGREEMENT ABOUT THE 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR CONCEPT IN THE 1990S 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The endocrine disruptor concept, as a scientific, social, and regulatory object, 
interacted extensively with each of those worlds throughout its life. In the last chapter, I 
showed how individuals in science, society, and regulation responded to the missing 
aspects of the concept. Proponents did not present a way to identify endocrine disrupting 
chemicals, delineate what counted as an endocrine disruptor, or describe mechanisms 
through which endocrine disruption might occur. Those lacks presented different 
problems in different areas. In the following three chapters, I will home in more closely 
on how scientific, social, and regulatory communities dealt with the multifaceted nature 
of the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 In this chapter, I will focus on how different individuals in the scientific 
community studying endocrine disruptors evaluated the concept. The endocrine disruptor 
concept is twofold: that endocrine disruptors exist as chemicals that disrupt hormone 
systems to negative effect, and that such chemicals pose a clear and immediate threat to 
human and wildlife populations. When proponents of the concept first presented it in 
1991, they explicitly identified endocrine disruptors as scientific, social, and regulatory 
concerns. In doing so, they linked the scientific idea that chemicals disrupt hormone 
systems to the need to regulate those chemicals. It was not a case of scientific evidence 
first, regulatory and social response second, but all at the same time. As I will show in 
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this chapter, that meant that individuals weighing in on the concept did not only address 
the scientific legitimacy of the concept but also the regulatory necessity. Researchers 
conflated or linked their ideas about the scientific evidence supporting the existence of 
endocrine disruptors with the need (or not) to regulate them.  
 Throughout the 1990s, endocrine disruptor researchers evaluated the endocrine 
disruptor concept through their own research and in published opinion pieces in scientific 
and popular publications. In analyzing their evaluations, I have found that disagreements 
over the concept abounded. Often, arguments are presented as disagreements between 
two distinct sides. However, in the case of the endocrine disruptor concept, the 
disagreements are more accurately represented as a spectrum of viewpoints. Though 
researchers on either side of the spectrum held strong beliefs about the legitimacy of the 
concept, many more researchers along the spectrum took more measured views.  
On one side were those researchers who originally drafted the idea, who viewed 
the existence of and threat posed by endocrine disruptors as proven fact. Those 
researchers relied largely on animal evidence to support such claims, as well as on the 
effects of the chemical diethylstilbestrol (DES) in humans. Researchers at that end of the 
spectrum included Theo Colborn and Frederick vom Saal, both of whom took their ideas 
about endocrine disruptors to the public and the government to demand action for what 
they saw as an urgent problem. Proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept very 
clearly indicated that because the scientific evidence for endocrine disruption was certain, 
regulatory action was obvious and should be immediate.  
On the other end of the spectrum, different researchers argued that very little 
evidence supported what they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis and that the 
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substances needed no new regulation. Individuals like Stephen Safe noted that animal 
data could not be extrapolated to humans given the lack of human evidence as a guide. 
Going even further, some detractors of the concept argued that evidence at the time 
indicated that endocrine disruptors were distinctly not a threat. They argued that the 
effects of the chemicals were balanced out by exposure to other chemicals, or that the 
chemicals did not push hormonal action outside the normal realm. Researchers holding 
that second extreme view were also vocal in public platforms, opposing the call for action 
due to scant justification. While detractors like Safe argued strongly against new 
regulations for endocrine disruptors, it is interesting to note that they did not decouple the 
scientific and regulatory aspects of the concept, instead following the proponents’ suit 
that to evaluate the endocrine disruptor concept required an evaluation of scientific 
evidence and regulatory action.  
Though researchers on either end of the spectrum dominated popular media 
coverage of endocrine disruptors, the researchers holding such strong views were in the 
minority. The middle of the spectrum, where the majority of endocrine disruptor 
researchers fell, was defined in terms of mights and maybes. Many researchers in the 
1990s viewed what they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis as still needing more 
evidence to establish its validity. Most agreed that animal evidence demonstrated that 
hormonally active chemicals could cause negative effects and that that demonstration 
necessitated further investigation into endocrine disruptors’ potential effects on humans. 
Some advocated for the precautionary principle. Others argued that action could be 
warranted later but should not be taken yet. The middle group did not receive as much 
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attention and was not as ardent or active as the extreme groups, so it was easy to get the 
impression of a heated debate.  
In this chapter, I detail the views held by individuals along the outlined spectrum 
above. I pay special attention to the evidence used by those individuals as well as their 
interpretation of the evidence. Through this, a couple of things become clear. First, that 
researchers in the 1990s were not simply weighing in on the scientific idea that 
substances may disrupt hormones. Instead, researchers evaluated the endocrine disruptor 
concept as it was presented in 1991—as a scientific, social, and regulatory problem. In 
that way, researchers frequently commented on both the scientific evidence for or against 
the concept as well as the impact of that evidence on whether the substances should be 
regulated. That is unique, in that discussions about scientific legitimacy and regulatory 
necessity occurred simultaneously, rather than one after the other. The simultaneous 
discussions are derivative of the activities of proponents to situate the concept in 
scientific, social, and regulatory contexts. The category of toxic substances called 
endocrine disruptors and its parameters was never decoupled from the endocrine 
disruptor concept as a whole, so a study of the substances was an evaluation of the 
concept.  
Second, my analysis in this chapter highlights that researchers along the spectrum 
disagreed in their interpretation of evidence as well as their determination of what 
evidence should count in evaluating the concept. Though researchers on either end of the 
spectrum and through the middle often referenced the same studies and bodies of 
literature, they disagreed on the relevance of the studies to establishing endocrine 
disruption and what information the study provided regarding endocrine disruption. That 
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produced a wide range of views about evidence in the endocrine disruptor concept. Three 
researchers might interpret the same study in three different ways: as proof of endocrine 
disruption, as disproof of endocrine disruption, or as irrelevant to the topic of endocrine 
disruption altogether.  
In that way, many researchers talked past each other on the topic of endocrine 
disruptors, something that was magnified by the popular media’s coverage of the topic. 
As I discuss in the next chapter, that eventually led to strong polarization between 
endocrine disruptor researchers and the fading of the middle of the spectrum. That 
polarization still exists in 2018 and dominates attempts to regulate endocrine disruptors in 
the European Union (EU). This chapter will focus on the origins of disagreements that 
are being played out today: how individual researchers on the spectrum weighed evidence 
differently and called for very different kinds of action on the problem (or non-problem) 
of endocrine disruptors.  
 
THE ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR CONCEPT  
 The endocrine disruptor concept, as presented in the Wingspread consensus 
statement and later publications (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, and Myers 1997), was comprised of two claims:  
1. That certain chemicals can disrupt the hormone system to negative effect and 
that those chemicals are appropriately categorized as endocrine disruptors.  
2. That endocrine disruptors pose a threat to the health of human and wildlife.  
Those claims caught the attention of many in the 1990s. That attention resulted in a 
diversity of opinions that can most accurately be described as a spectrum, pictured below. 
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Individuals in the scientific community weighing in on the concept offered opinions on 
both claims, meaning that they discussed the scientific evidence supporting the idea that 
chemicals can disrupt hormone systems but also that those chemicals threaten the health 
of living organisms. Because the proponents who originally introduced the concept 
clearly linked the certain threat posed by endocrine disruptors to the need to immediately 
regulate them, the scientific aspect of the concept was connected to the social and 
regulatory aspect. That meant that scientists speaking about the concept frequently 
commented on whether endocrine disruptors should be regulated as a product of their 
certainty about the claims made in the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 
Figure 1. Spectrum of opinions on the endocrine disruptor concept 
 
The scientists along the spectrum used three different bodies of evidence to 
support or oppose the claims made in the endocrine disruptor concept: laboratory 
evidence of the effects of different chemicals in animal models, wildlife evidence of the 
effects of chemical exposure in wildlife species, and human evidence of the effects 
chemicals have in different human populations. For proponents, all three bodies of 
evidence were relevant in supporting the endocrine disruptor concept and studies in each 
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clearly demonstrated the existence and danger of endocrine disruption. Skeptics, on the 
other, viewed all three bodies of evidence as problematic, both in terms of relevance to 
the question of endocrine disruption as well as whether the evidence demonstrated the 
existence and threat of endocrine disruptors. Researchers through the middle had varying 
view on the usefulness of laboratory, wildlife, and human evidence for substantiating the 
two claims of the endocrine disruptor concept. Throughout this chapter, I will show how 
researchers along the spectrum evaluated evidence for the endocrine disruptor concept 
and how they subsequently made claims about the need for regulation (or not).  
 
ONE END OF THE SPECTRUM—COMMITTED PROPONENTS  
 On one end of the spectrum, the one that developed first historically, were those 
researchers who viewed the endocrine disruptor concept as proven fact. The individuals 
that populated the proponent end of the spectrum viewed evidence of endocrine 
disruptors as strong enough to support the endocrine disruptor concept entirely—meaning 
that for those researchers, endocrine disruptors posed a clear and imminent threat to the 
health of humans and wildlife. Laboratory, wildlife, and human evidence all undergirded 
the two claims of the concept and clearly showed the danger posed by endocrine 
disrupting chemicals. That threat necessitated action and researchers who saw endocrine 
disruptors as a threat pursued action, both publically and legislatively.  
 Proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept emerged early in the 1990s, 
immediately after the endocrine disruptor concept was proposed at the Wingspread 
meeting. Many proponents attended the Wingspread meeting in 1991, or worked closely 
with attendees (Colborn and Clement 1992; Colborn 1998b; Guillette 1998; vom Saal 
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1998). Committed proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept included Theo Colborn, 
who organized the Wingspread meeting, Frederick vom Saal, and Ana M. Soto. 
Remember that those researchers initially situated the concept as a scientific, social, and 
regulatory object and took actions throughout the 1990s to ensure that the concept was 
known and taken seriously by individuals in each of those worlds. In that way, it is not 
surprising that proponents of the concept argued that the legitimacy of the concept’s 
claims clearly necessitated regulatory action. They made that position clear in their 1991 
Wingspread consensus statement and pursued their goals of regulatory action and social 
awareness quickly thereafter, as shown in Chapters 2 and 3 (Colborn and Clement 1992; 
U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn; Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b).   
 
Three Bodies of Relevant and Certain Evidence 
 Beginning in 1991, proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept used three 
bodies of evidence to support the concept: studies of wildlife species exposed to 
industrial or agricultural chemical pollution, studies of laboratory animals and cell lines 
exposed to hormonally active chemicals (especially estrogen) at different stages of 
development, and any cases of human exposure to endocrine disruptors, especially the 
case of DES. According to proponents, each body of evidence clearly showed that 
endocrine disruptors existed and posed a public and ecological health risk.  
 The bulk of proponents’ evidence as to the existence and harm of endocrine 
disruptors came from several decades of wildlife studies. Beginning in the 1950s, 
researchers throughout the US began to study wildlife species and their reaction to 
industrial and agricultural pollutants (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). Following 
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Rachel Carson’s publication of Silent Spring in 1962, wildlife research expanded further 
(Carson 1962a; Griswold 2012). Proponents relied on wildlife studies to show that 
industrial and agricultural chemicals acted as endocrine disruptors and posed an 
ecological threat to wildlife species. They often pointed to identical wildlife studies to 
illustrate that point: Colborn’s work with fish and bird species in the Great Lakes region, 
Louis Guillette’s work with alligators in Lake Apopka, and Charles Broley’s and others’ 
work with bald eagles in the US and Canada (Colborn et al. 1990; Colborn 1991; 
Guillette et al. 1994; Broley 1958; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). Those works 
provided evidence that exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals, in the form of 
industrial and agricultural pollution, resulted in developmental and reproductive setbacks. 
For proponents, those wildlife studies demonstrated that endocrine disruptors existed and 
harmed living organisms.  
 To illustrate the point more clearly, it is worth looking at a commonly used 
wildlife study more closely: Guillette’s study of alligator populations in Lake Apopka, 
Florida. Guillette, a comparative endocrinologist at the University of Florida, Gainesville, 
began looking at the reproduction of the American alligator in the mid-1980s (Guillette 
1998; Helbing, Tyler, and Iguchi 2015). Through that research, Guillette identified 
several reproductive and developmental abnormalities in alligator populations living in 
the highly-polluted Lake Apopka (Guillette et al. 1994). Those abnormalities included 
increased blood estrogen levels and large number of polynuclear oocytes in females and 
decreased blood testosterone levels and abnormally small phalli in males (Guillette et al. 
1994). Guillette linked those effects with exposure to estrogenic chemicals present in the 
lake due to its proximity to an EPA Superfund site (Guillette et al. 1994).  
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 Proponents used Guillette’s study to support both parts of the endocrine disruptor 
concept. First, that endocrine disruptors exist as chemicals able to disrupt hormone 
systems to negative effect because in Lake Apopka endocrine disrupting contaminants 
did just that. And second, that endocrine disruptors posed a threat to wildlife populations, 
because the Lake Apopka alligator population suffered from decreased reproductive 
success as a result of exposure to endocrine disruptors. The other wildlife studies cited by 
proponents, which resembled Guillette’s study in terms of methodology and findings, 
were used similarly (Colborn et al. 1990; Colborn 1991; Broley 1958; Colborn, vom Saal, 
and Soto 1993; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997).  
 Endocrine disruptor concept proponents used a second body of evidence, 
laboratory studies, to solidify the claim that endocrine disruptors could disrupt hormone 
systems to negative effect, and therefore that they posed a threat not only to wildlife but 
also to humans. In the laboratory studies pointed to by proponents, researchers exposed 
laboratory animals or models to endocrine disruptors and observed the effects. Such 
studies included vom Saal’s work with developing rats and estrogenic chemicals, Soto 
and Carlos Sonnenschein’s work with estrogen contaminated laboratory equipment and a 
breast cancer cell line, and McLachlan’s and others’ decades of research on 
environmental estrogens (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997; McLachlan 2016; Soto 
et al. 1991; vom Saal 1995; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993). Proponents used such 
studies to establish the causal link between exposure to endocrine disruptors and negative 
health effects in organisms.  
 As an example: proponents of the endocrine disruptors concept frequently used a 
story from Soto and Sonnenschein’s laboratory to argue in favor of the concept. In 1989, 
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Sonnenschein and Soto received a delivery of new test tubes from Corning (Gross 2007; 
Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). They were using the test tubes in an experiment 
to determine the role of estrogen in regulating cell proliferation (Colborn, Dumanoski, 
and Myers 1997). Upon using the newly delivered test tubes, Soto and Sonnenschein 
noticed that the breast cancer cells they were using (MCF7 cells) proliferated in all their 
test tubes, regardless of the presence of estrogen—an anomalous result they had not seen 
before (Gross 2007; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997; Soto et al. 1991). The two 
researchers discovered an estrogenic contaminant in the plastic test tubes, nonylphenol 
(Soto et al. 1991). They went on to discover several other estrogenic chemicals in 
commonly used plastic formulations (Cabaton et al. 2011; Markey et al. 2001; Schug et 
al. 2016).  
 Supporters of the concept cited the work of Soto and Sonnenschein as a clear 
demonstration that endocrine disruptors existed and could disrupt endocrine function, in 
that case by causing breast cancer cell proliferation (Soto et al. 1991; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, and Myers 1997; Schug et al. 2016). Further, because Soto and 
Sonnenschein had identified the endocrine disruptor as a component in a ubiquitous 
plastic, proponents argued that endocrine disruptors posed a threat to any humans or 
wildlife exposed to such plastic, which meant most of the human population and many 
wildlife species (Soto et al. 1991; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, and Myers 1997; Schug et al. 2016). Other laboratory studies were used 
similarly, particularly as many in the 1990s focused on estrogenic chemicals in consumer 
products like food packaging (Schug et al. 2016; Vogel 2012).  
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 Proponents heavily relied on both wildlife and laboratory studies to support both 
aspects of the endocrine disruptor concept: that endocrine disruptors existed and that they 
posed a public and ecological health risk. However, both sets of evidence only weakly 
supported endocrine disruptors as a threat to human health because neither wildlife nor 
laboratory studies connected exposure to endocrine disruptors with negative health 
outcomes in human beings. To more fully support that, proponents depended on a third 
body of evidence: human cases of exposure to endocrine disruptors. The human evidence 
that proponents used came in two forms, studies of the effects of DES and studies linking 
exposure to endocrine disruptors with developmental and reproductive anomalies.  
In many ways, proponents depended on the case of DES to support the claim that 
endocrine disruptors threaten human health (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn 
and Clement 1992; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). In the 1990s, DES was the 
only known instance where exposure to an endocrine disruptor had clearly and irrefutably 
been linked to negative human health outcomes (Herbst and Scully 1970; Abboud 2015). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, physicians prescribed DES, an artificial estrogen, to 
pregnant women at risk of miscarriage (Smith and Smith 1946; Smith 1948; Smith and 
Smith 1949; Langston 2010; McLachlan 2016). Starting in the 1970s, researchers found 
that men and women exposed to DES during gestation developed a number of rare 
cancers along with other reproductive abnormalities (Greenwald et al. 1971; Hill 1973; 
Henderson 1973; Giusti, Iwamoto, and Hatch 1995). Proponents frequently cited the case 
of DES to show that humans had been affected by endocrine disruptors before and 
therefore could be affected again, meaning that endocrine disruptors posed a threat to 
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human health (Colborn and Clement 1992; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, and Myers 1997).  
Proponents used the few other studies of endocrine disruptors and human health 
to corroborate that claim. In particular, researchers pointed to Joseph Jacobson and 
Sandra Jacobson’s study on “Intellectual Impairment in Children Exposed to 
Polychlorinated Biphenyls in Utero,” Nils E. Skakkebæk and Richard M. Sharpe’s study 
connecting declining sperm counts and exposure to endocrine disruptors, and early 
studies indicating a potential link between endocrine disruptors and breast cancer (Sharpe 
1993; Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Jacobson and Jacobson 1996; Wolff et al. 1993; El-
Bayoumy 1993; Davis et al. 1993). In each of those studies, researchers correlated some 
measure of endocrine disruptor exposure, most often levels of chemicals in the blood, 
with a negative health outcome. For example, in 1993, Mary Wolff and her research team 
reported that women with breast cancer had higher blood levels of organochlorines 
(Wolff et al. 1993). From that, Wolff and her co-authors suggested that those 
organochlorines may cause breast cancer (Wolff et al. 1993). Proponents of the endocrine 
disruptor concept used studies like Wolff’s to support the claim that endocrine disruptors 
threatened the health of humans.21  
 
                                                 
21 The three studies proponents most often cited to support the threat of endocrine 
disruptors in humans—the Jacobson’s study of developmental impairment in children 
exposed to BPA, Skakkebæk and Sharpe’s study of declining sperm counts as a result of 
increasing use of estrogenic chemicals, and Wolff’s work connecting estrogenic 
chemicals to breast cancer—clearly picked up on social and political fears in the 1990s. 
As I show in Chapter 6, those three studies and their connection to social and political 
trends of the time allowed proponents to create a very specific and powerful narrative 
about endocrine disruptors and the need to regulate them.  
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Figure 2. Proponents lines of evidence for their support of the endocrine disruptor 
concept.   
 
Using three lines of evidence (wildlife, laboratory, and human), committed 
proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept supported both claims of the concept: that 
endocrine disruptors existed, and that they posed a threat to humans and wildlife. For 
proponents, the fully supported concept required action, action that would address the 
threat of endocrine disruptors by reducing exposure and increasing awareness (Colborn 
and Clement 1992; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 
Testimony of Theo Colborn). Proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept started 
calling for action in the Wingspread consensus statement, where they identified several 
needed regulatory changes and called for a public awareness campaign. To those ends, 
proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept frequently spoke about the human health 
threat posed by endocrine disruptors in media interviews and Congressional hearings 
(Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; U.S. Congress Senate 1991; U.S. Congress House 1993; 
U.S. Congress House 1995a; U.S. Congress House 1995b).  
 Proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept, who viewed the concept as wholly 
supported, occupied one end of the spectrum on the validity of the concept. Using several 
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lines of research, proponents argued that endocrine disruptors existed and posed a threat 
to human and wildlife health. Individuals on the opposite side of the spectrum, 
presumably, had objections to the arguments made by proponents and the evidence they 
used.   
 
THE OTHER END—COMMITTED SKEPTICS  
 Committed skeptics were on the opposite side of the spectrum from committed 
proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept. Skeptics emerged several years after 
proponents and doubted both parts of the endocrine disruptor concept proposed in 1991. 
For skeptics, the concept was unsubstantiated by available evidence, so much so that they 
unilaterally referred to the concept as a hypothesis.  Individuals on the skeptics end of the 
spectrum interpreted the evidence used by committed proponents quite differently and 
also introduced other evidence that they claimed disproved the hypothesis, making it not 
only unsubstantiated but also invalid. Due to their opinion of what they called the 
endocrine disruptor hypothesis, committed skeptics argued against any regulatory action, 
following in the footsteps of proponents in their linkage of scientific certainty (or 
uncertainty) and regulatory necessity. Skeptics viewed the regulation of endocrine 
disruptors and the public anxiety around them as mistakes.  
 Following the meeting at Wingspread in 1991 and the conceptualization of the 
endocrine disruptor concept by the attendees, committed proponents began publicizing 
their claims. That publication largely took place in non-scientific spheres, rather in 
regulatory and public settings as discussed in Chapter 3. Just a month after Wingspread, 
one proponent, Theo Colborn, presented the concept at a Senate hearing on the regulation 
  162 
of reproductive hazards (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn). And 
throughout 1992 and 1993, proponents gave many interviews with widely read 
newspapers, like The New York Times, broadcasting the endocrine disruptor concept and 
campaigning for regulatory action.  
Skeptics began the debate over what they called the endocrine disruptor 
hypothesis only after it had been sensationalized by the media and begun to gain traction 
in the regulatory community, late in 1993 and into 1994 (Stone 1994; Safe 1994). The 
committed skeptic end of the spectrum, as with the other extreme, was not the most 
populous area on the gradient. But doubters of the endocrine disruptor concept, like 
Stephen Safe, Elizabeth Whelan, and Bruce Ames, vocally criticized the concept 
throughout the 1990s (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Safe 1997; Kolata 1999; Whelan 1996; 
Stone 1994).  
It is important to note here the nuance of skeptics’ argument against the endocrine 
disruptor concept. Skeptics did not argue that chemicals could not interfere with normal 
hormone actions in the body. Researchers like Safe spent most of the 1980s studying just 
that, contributing to the field studying environmental estrogens (Andres et al. 1983; 
Bandiera et al. 1984; Biegel, Howie, and Safe 1989; Romkes and Safe 1988; Romkes, 
Piskorska-Pliszczynska, Safe 1987; Safe et al. 1989; Safe, Safe, and Mullin 1985; Yao 
and Safe 1989). Nor did skeptics argue that sometimes the effects of chemicals disrupting 
hormone function resulted in catastrophic effects. Safe and his colleagues did not dispute 
the hormonal nature of DES or that that hormonal nature caused negative effects in 
individuals exposed in utero. Instead, skeptics argued against the specific claims of the 
endocrine disruptor concept. First, that chemicals that interfere with endogenous 
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hormones are rightly called endocrine disruptors. Skeptics continued to research 
hormonally active chemicals in the 1990s, but refused to use the term endocrine disruptor 
over more accepted terms like environmental estrogen or hormonally active chemical 
(Safe 1994; Safe 1995).  
Second, skeptics argued against the idea that agricultural and industrial chemicals 
that act hormonally posed any serious threat to the health of humans. Most, if not all, 
researchers studying hormonally active chemicals in the 1990s agreed that those 
chemicals could detrimentally impact the health of wildlife species like bald eagles, if 
those organisms were exposed to high doses through pollution or ecological 
accumulation (Vogel 2012; Schug et al. 2016). Skeptics took umbrage at the claim that 
those same chemicals threatened the health of humans not only because humans were 
exposed to such small doses of the chemicals but also because of the utter lack of human 
evidence demonstrating any effects (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Stone 1994). Both of those 
strikes against the endocrine disruptor concept led skeptics to argue against any 
regulation targeted at endocrine disruptors and spoke out against the legislation passed in 
1996.              
 
Rebuttal of Proponent’s Evidence and New Evidence      
 Committed skeptics marshalled two kinds of evidence against what they called 
the endocrine disruptor hypothesis. First, skeptics rebutted or criticized the evidence used 
by committed proponents. Skeptics argued that certain studies used by proponents were 
methodologically unsound or not applicable to general populations of humans. In other 
words, they argued the relevance of the evidence used by proponents in determining the 
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legitimacy of the endocrine disruptor concept and the regulation argued for by 
proponents. Second, skeptics presented new evidence, evidence that proponents did not 
use, that they argued disproved or greatly called in to question both claims made in the 
endocrine disruptor concept. They applied both kinds of evidence to both claims made by 
proponents, but most skeptics largely focused on pushing back against the claim that 
endocrine disruptors threatened human health (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Stone 1994; Vogel 
2012). Few disagreed that endocrine disruptors posed an ecological risk.  
In their rebuttal of evidence used by proponents, skeptics focused on 
methodological problems with the cited studies as well as the lack of data with regards to 
the effects of endocrine disruptors in humans. Skeptics argued that the evidence 
proponents used to support the claim that endocrine disruptors were a public health risk 
was flawed, meaning the claim was unsupported and therefore questionable. Proponents 
relied on a small number of human studies, along with the significant case of DES, to 
show that endocrine disruptors threatened human health (Colborn and Clement 1992; 
Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). In particular, 
proponents frequently relied on studies linking exposure to endocrine disruptors with 
breast cancer and declining sperm counts (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, and Myers 1997; U.S. Congress House 1993; U.S. Congress House 1995a; 
U.S. Congress House 1995b). Skeptics asserted that those studies that proponents relied 
on had not been substantiated by the scientific process. As they repeatedly highlighted, 
both the studies linking endocrine disruptors to breast cancer and to declining sperm 
counts were the subject of scientific critique (Wolff et al. 1993; Davis et al. 1993; Sharpe 
1993; Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Saidi et al. 1999; Olsen et al. 1995; Safe 1994; Safe 
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1995; Krieger et al. 1994). Other researchers had failed to reproduce the results and noted 
issues with the methodologies of the original studies (Olsen et al. 1995; Saidi et al. 1999; 
Safe 1994). Skeptics therefore saw the evidence proponents relied on as flawed, calling in 
to question their claims that endocrine disruptors threatened human health. 
Beyond criticizing the evidence that proponents did use, skeptics also flagged the 
evidence that proponents did not use: large scale epidemiological data. In the 1990s, there 
were relatively few epidemiological studies showing the effects of endocrine disruptors. 
Of the ones that existed, two were highly criticized for replication problems, Wolff’s 
study of women with breast cancer and Skakkebæk’s study of declining sperm counts 
(Safe 1994; Olsen et al. 1995; Saidi et al. 1999). The remaining epidemiological studies 
were small in scope, with researchers looking at very particular populations exposed to 
abnormally high levels of chemicals, meaning that skeptics refused to generalize them to 
larger human populations (Safe 1994; Safe 1995). Skeptics argued that if endocrine 
disruptors were such a threat to humans, more studies would have found effects (Safe 
1994; Safe 1995; Nohynek et al. 2013; Zoeller et al. 2014). For doubters of the endocrine 
disruptor concept, the lack of large scale epidemiological studies on endocrine disruptor 
effects in humans called into question proponents claims that endocrine disruptors posed 
a public health risk (Nohynek et al. 2013; Zoeller et al. 2014).   
Skeptics rebutted proponents’ evidence for the endocrine disruptor concept in 
order to show that the concept lacked the evidentiary support that proponents claimed it 
had. Skeptics used new evidence to show that what they called the endocrine disruptor 
hypothesis was invalid, meaning that evidence worked against it in significant ways. 
They used three new kinds of evidence to show that: evidence about the dose and potency 
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of hormonally active chemicals, evidence of humans’ natural protections against 
estrogenic chemicals, and evidence of environmental protections against the potential 
action of hormonally active chemicals.  
Individuals who doubted the endocrine disruptor concept employed evidence of 
the dose and potency of endocrine disruptors against both claims made by proponents: 
that endocrine disruptors existed as a class of chemicals capable of disrupting hormone 
systems, and that they threated human health. Proponents of the concept labeled 
chemicals like polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dioxins, and many pesticides (like 
dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) as endocrine disruptors that could impact humans 
(Colborn and Clement 1992; Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993; Vogel 2012). Skeptics 
noted, correctly, that many of those chemicals were only weakly estrogenic and were 
present in the environment at very low levels (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Safe 1998). That 
meant that most organisms, and especially humans, were exposed to extremely low doses 
of the very weakly estrogenic so-called endocrine disruptors. Skeptics like Safe pointed 
out that such chemicals did not have the potency to cause change in organisms at the 
levels most were exposed to (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Safe 1998). And further, some 
natural compounds that humans had been exposed to for generations were more 
hormonally active and had resulted in no discernible health effects (Stone 1994; Safe 
1994; Safe 1995). Using that evidence, challengers of the concept argued that hormonally 
active chemicals did not pose a large ecological or public health risk.  
They also questioned whether many of the chemicals that proponents labeled 
endocrine disruptors could in fact disrupt the hormone systems of living organisms to 
negative effect. Skeptics did not argue that hormonally active chemicals, like DES, could 
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not disrupt the human endocrine system and cause negative health outcomes. But for 
skeptics, DES, a chemical recognized as harmful to humans, differed in significant ways 
from the industrial and agricultural chemicals labeled endocrine disruptors by 
proponents. DES, a synthetic estrogen, is three times more potent that natural estrogen 
and was prescribed in the 1950s and 1960s in very large doses (Meyers 1983; Abboud 
2015). For skeptics, that made DES an environmental estrogen, and estrogenic substance, 
and hormonally active chemical. Not an endocrine disruptor. Unlike DES, most industrial 
and agricultural chemicals are only very weakly estrogenic and humans are exposed to 
very low doses of the chemicals (Safe 1994; Safe 1995). Because of that, skeptics argued 
that the many consumer chemicals labeled endocrine disruptors by proponents were 
unlikely to threaten human health (Safe 1994; Safe 1995).  
 Skeptics deployed two other forms of new evidence to further dispute the claim 
that endocrine disruptors threatened human health. Skeptics noted that several 
phenomena may protect humans from the hormonal activities of endocrine disruptors. 
Researchers like Neil McLusky highlighted that primates respond to estrogen differently 
than other animals, attaching various conjugates to estrogens in the blood, inactivating 
them (Stone 1994). Because of that, some skeptics argued that the minor estrogenic 
activity of industrial and agricultural chemicals was neutralized in the human body, 
meaning that the chemicals could not disrupt hormone function (Stone 1994). For 
skeptics, that partially explained why hormonally active chemicals affected wildlife but 
did not threaten the health of humans, who use conjugates to inactivate circulating 
estrogens. 
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 Safe, a vocal skeptic, proposed a second argument regarding humans’ protections 
against endocrine disruptors: an acid-base argument (Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Stone 1994). 
Safe studied, among other things, anti-estrogens, chemicals that inhibit estrogenic effects 
in the body. He argued that humans were exposed to just as many anti-estrogenic 
chemicals as estrogenic chemicals in their daily lives (Safe 1994; Safe 1995). The effects 
of both kinds of substances cancelled each other out (Safe 1994; Safe 1995). The result, 
for Safe, was a net effect of zero and a non-threat in endocrine disruptors.  
Figure 3. Skeptics lines of evidence for doubting the endocrine disruptor concept.  
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 For skeptics, proponents’ evidence failed to support the claims made for the 
endocrine disruptor concept, and new evidence actively worked against the claims. For 
those individuals, what they called the endocrine disruptor hypothesis was 
unsubstantiated and invalid, not worthy of further scientific consideration. Because of 
that, action taken on the basis of it was unjustifiable. Skeptical researchers spoke out 
against what they called the hysteria engendered by proponents of the concept, authoring 
editorials emphasizing the lack of evidence to fear endocrine disruptors (Safe 1994; Safe 
1995; Stone 1994; Safe 1997). Whelan, in an interview for The New York Times, clearly 
articulated the main point for many skeptics: the endocrine disruptor hypothesis “ha[d] 
never been grounded in any reality” (Kolata 1999; Whelan 1996). Safe and other 
doubters also spoke out against the regulation of endocrine disruptors in 1996, calling for 
Congress to backtrack and remove the unwarranted regulations (Safe 1997).  
 Researchers on both extremes of the spectrum of the validity of the endocrine 
disruptor concept took strong stances on what the evidence surrounding endocrine 
disruptors showed and what should or should not be done on the basis of that evidence. 
Committed proponents and committed skeptics were vocal throughout the 1990s, playing 
out their disagreement in scientific, regulatory, and public spheres. But both ends of the 
spectrum were populated by a minority of endocrine disruptor researchers. Most 
researchers engaged in determining the validity of the endocrine disruptor concept 
resided somewhere in the middle of the spectrum.  
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BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES—THE MIDDLE OF THE SPECTRUM   
 The majority of endocrine disruptor researchers resided somewhere in the middle 
of the spectrum, meaning they saw the endocrine disruptor concept as having some 
validity but still requiring varying degrees more evidentiary support for the scientific 
certainty proponents claimed. Researchers in the middle viewed the evidence used by 
proponents as not fully substantiating the claims made in the endocrine disruptor concept. 
Like skeptics, they noted issues with the evidence for the endocrine disruptor concept. 
For that reason, middle of the spectrum researchers also referred to the concept as the 
endocrine disruptor hypothesis. But unlike skeptics, researchers in the middle of the 
spectrum acknowledged that endocrine disruptor studies indicated a need for further 
research to determine the existence or extent of endocrine disruptor effects in humans and 
wildlife. In keeping with that view, researchers in the middle of the spectrum called for 
more research on the concept rather than any regulatory decision making, conducting 
much of that research themselves.  
 Among those researchers in the middle, the variability of views is messy, meaning 
that the researchers did not organize themselves into well-defined groups with similar 
views. However, there were three views held by different individuals in the middle of the 
spectrum that help illuminate the spread among researchers. First, some of those 
researchers saw the concept as only weakly supported without the addition of further 
research. For those individuals, the hypothesis required more certain evidence to warrant 
further scientific consideration (Kavlock et al. 1996). A second viewpoint held that the 
concept was simply a hypothesis. Like any other scientific hypothesis, the endocrine 
disruptor hypothesis needed further evidence to substantiate it. For both those views, 
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researchers did not make regulatory considerations, firmly placing the concept in the 
scientific realm and no other. Finally, still others held that the endocrine disruptor 
concept required more evidence to solidify its particular claims, namely that endocrine 
disruptors threatened human health (Birnbaum 1994). But for those researchers, the 
claims had enough evidence to view them as likely validated and therefore some 
researchers began thinking about what regulatory action on endocrine disruptors might 
look like (Birnbaum 1994; Stone 1994). The differences among those three views may 
seem imprecise, mainly because the separation between researchers was not clear cut in 
the 1990s. However, those three views generally characterize many of the middle of the 
spectrum and played important roles in determining the fate of the concept.  
 Researchers holding those views emerged in the early 1990s, following the 
publication of the endocrine disruptor concept in 1991. Particularly outspoken middle of 
the spectrum researchers included Linda Birnbaum, John McLachlan, and Robert 
Kavlock (Birnbaum 1994; McLachlan 2016; Kavlock et al. 1996; Stone 1994). It is 
important to note that many researchers in the middle of the spectrum had been studying 
hormonally active chemicals for many years prior to the 1990s (McLachlan 2016; Vogel 
2012). Though not explicitly investigating endocrine disruptors, as the term had not yet 
been coined, researchers in the middle of the spectrum were very familiar with the effects 
of chemicals labeled endocrine disruptors by proponents and had conducted many of the 
studies used by proponents to support their claims. Their familiarity with the study of 
endocrine disruptors, and endocrine disruptor precursors like environmental estrogens, 
shaped their view of the evidence used by proponents.  
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 Regardless of their individual understanding of the validity of the endocrine 
disruptor concept, researchers in the middle of the spectrum interpreted the evidence used 
by proponents differently than proponents did. Like skeptics, researchers in the middle 
noted problems with the studies used by proponents. They also noted the lack of certain 
evidence to support the endocrine disruptor concept. For middle of the spectrum 
researchers, both problems impacted the validity of the concept as a whole, but 
particularly the claim the endocrine disruptors threatened human health.  
 In terms of problems with evidence, researchers in the middle identified some of 
the same problems as skeptics: the use of specific populations and the failure to replicate 
findings. Researchers in the middle commented on the fact that researchers had failed to 
replicate findings linking endocrine disruptors to breast cancer and declining sperm 
counts (Olsen et al. 1995; Saidi et al. 1999; Safe 1994). The failure to replicate findings 
also encompassed the fact that often two studies with similar experimental designs would 
produce differing results (Olsen et al. 1995; Saidi et al. 1999; Safe 1994). For example, 
between 1994 and 1995, three studies examined the effects of dosing female Sprague-
Dawley rats with atrazine, a common ingredient in pesticides (Eldridge et al. 1994; 
Stevens et al. 1994; Connor et al. 1996). One study found that the atrazine resulted in 
decreased body weights and decreased levels of estradiol in the blood (Eldridge et al. 
1994). However, a second study, with almost the same set up, found no change in weight 
(Connor et al. 1996). A third study found that atrazine administration caused breast 
tumors in younger rats, but had no effect on their weight (Stevens et al. 1994; Connor et 
al. 1996). Given scientific norms, such a morass of findings would indicate that some or 
all of the results were anomalies. However, because hormones and hormone-like 
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chemicals can affect many different endpoints, researchers in the middle struggled to 
determine how to make sense of inconsistent results.  
Middle of the spectrum researchers also highlighted that particularly compelling 
wildlife studies, like Guillette’s studies linking hormonal problems in alligators with 
pollution in Lake Apopka, were not generalizable (Stone 1994). The alligators Guillette 
studied were exposed to far higher doses of endocrine disruptors than most wildlife 
species would be, and therefore researchers could not assume that those findings would 
be common (Guillette et al. 1994; Stone 1994). For middle of the spectrum researchers, 
some of the evidence used by proponents suffered from large problems.  
 Further, researchers in the middle remarked on missing evidence that they argued 
was needed to fully support the claims of the endocrine disruptor concept (Kavlock et al. 
1996; Birnbaum 1994). Like skeptics, they questioned why there were no large scale 
epidemiological studies to support the claim that endocrine disruptors threatened human 
health. But they also observed that proponents did not have the research to fully define, 
or characterize, endocrine disruptors (Kavlock et al. 1996; Birnbaum 1994). That 
observation goes back to what proponents presented in 1991. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
in many ways, the endocrine disruptor concept was empty, leaving many not knowing 
what counted as an endocrine disruptor, how to identify such substances, and how those 
substances might cause negative effects. Researchers in the middle saw three major 
questions about the qualities of endocrine disruptors: 
1. What are the biological mechanisms of action for endocrine disruptors? How, 
biologically, does exposure to an endocrine disruptor result in an adverse health 
effect?  
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2. What was the dose response curve for endocrine disruptors? What dose of a 
particular endocrine disruptor resulted in a negative health effect?  
3. What role does development play in the cause/effect relationship of endocrine 
disruptors and health effects? If an animal is at X developmental stage when 
exposure occurs, what kind of health effects can be expected?  
Middle of the spectrum researchers highlighted that the qualities of endocrine disruptors 
were not yet clear, meaning that researchers did not yet have the capability to identify an 
endocrine disruptor from another kind of hormonally active chemical (Kavlock et al. 
1996). That missing evidence, in the minds of researchers in the middle, left the 
endocrine disruptor concept still in question.  
 Where skeptics rejected the claims of proponents due to those problems, middle 
researchers viewed the claims as still open to question (Kavlock et al. 1996; Cooper and 
Kavlock 1997). More or less all researchers acknowledged that endocrine disruptors 
posed a threat to the health of wildlife. What many researchers grappled with was 
whether the substances threatened human health. Most recognized that the studies used 
by proponents demonstrated the potential that endocrine disruptors posed a threat to 
humans. Some argued that animal evidence could be an early warning system of sorts, 
indicating an underlying problem that may soon affect humans (Stone 1994). At the very 
least, researchers in the middle agreed that the studies used by proponents indicated the 
need to look more deeply into potential human health effects (Birnbaum 1994; Kavlock 
et al. 1996; Cooper and Kavlock 1997).  
The conviction that there was a need to look more deeply at the effects of 
endocrine disruptors drove the action called for by researchers in the middle of the 
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spectrum. All called for and conducted more research on endocrine disruptors, while 
refusing to call for a particular kind of regulatory action. For many researchers in the 
middle of the spectrum, endocrine disruptors were not yet ready for regulatory 
consideration. Though proponents clearly set out to make the concept a scientific, 
regulatory, and social concern, researchers in the middle largely rejected that attempt. 
The research conducted by middle of the spectrum researchers can be seen as attempts to 
shore up, or lay to rest, the claims of the endocrine disruptor concept. Though not all 
researchers explicitly worked for or against the concept, the research they conducted 
largely addressed problems with the concept highlighted by skeptics and researchers in 
the middle. 
Many researchers in the middle specifically tried to define the qualities of an 
endocrine disruptor.22 McLachlan, who had studied environmental estrogens throughout 
the 1980s, conducted studies on the dose-response of particular estrogens (McLachlan 
2016; Arnold et al. 1996; Toppari et al. 1996; Andersen et al. 1999). Others experimented 
with exposure at different doses at different developmental stages (Vogel 2012). Such 
                                                 
22 During the 1990s, there was much debate over how to define endocrine disruptors. The 
term, according to some, was either not specific enough or too subjective. On the one 
hand, some researchers argued that the label of endocrine disruptor, as a chemical that 
disrupted the endocrine system, could be applied to nearly every chemical capable of 
affecting the body, given that they all likely affected the endocrine system in one way or 
another (NRC 1999). In that way, the term was too broad. Others argued that the terms 
“disruptor” and “disrupt” were subject to interpretation as far as what counted as relevant 
disruption (NRC 1999). Similarly, researchers argued over whether the definition of 
endocrine disruptors should include that the substances disrupt the endocrine system 
negatively or whether disruption, no matter how small, could be adverse and therefore the 
negative effect could be assumed (EDSTAC 1998). 
 
  176 
researchers sought a clearer understanding of when an endocrine disruptor would be 
dangerous, something that is important in their regulation.  
Other researchers in the middle of the spectrum conducted epidemiological 
studies on the effects of endocrine disrupting chemicals. In 1992, the Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry began the Great Lakes Human Health Effects Research 
Program, “to characterize exposure to contaminants via consumption of Great Lakes fish, 
and investigate the potential for short- and long-term adverse health effects” (ATSDR 
2014). Others conducted studies further investigating the link between breast cancer and 
endocrine disruptors, or examining the long-term health effects of exposure to endocrine 
disruptors in utero (Vogel 2012; vom Saal 1995; McLachlan 2016; Schug et al. 2016). 
Such studies addressed the claim the endocrine disruptors threaten human health, while 
also acting as the epidemiological studies that skeptics had called for.  
 Many researchers in the middle of the spectrum conducted research specifically 
aimed at finding a way to identify endocrine disruptors. Researchers like McLachlan and 
Kavlock developed screening assays to identify endocrine active chemicals and models to 
predict when hormonal activity might result in negative health outcomes (Bergeron, 
Crews, and McLachlan 1994; Andersen et al. 1999; Allen et al. 1994; Barnes et al. 1995). 
Kavlock spent much of the 1990s studying and designing ways to better study endocrine 
disruptors, helping to develop dose-response models and dosing standards (Barnes et al. 
1995; Shuey et al. 1994). Other researchers endeavored to validate predictive assays and 
experimental techniques. Development of screening assays and predictive models by 
researchers in the middle of the spectrum demonstrates that some were thinking not only 
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about addressing scientific problems with the endocrine disruptor concept, but also about 
how to regulate endocrine disruptors should it be necessary.  
 The studies conducted by researchers in the middle of the spectrum stand in stark 
contrast to the strong actions called for by proponents and skeptics of the endocrine 
disruptor concept. Middle of the spectrum researchers stayed away from calling for 
regulatory action, instead calling for scientific action to address issues with the endocrine 
disruptor concept that would be key, should the substances ever be regulated.  
 But researchers in the middle of the spectrum were largely ignored in the 1990s. 
Media stories and Congressional hearings focused on the two extreme viewpoints, rarely 
talking to or quoting researchers in the middle of the spectrum (Luoma 1992a; Luoma 
1992b; U.S. Congress Senate 1991; U.S. Congress House 1993; U.S. Congress House 
1995a; U.S. Congress House 1995b). During the 1990s, two very small and very vocal 
sides of the spectrum played out their disagreements in scientific, public, and regulatory 
spheres, while the much larger but much quieter middle of the spectrum continued to 
conduct research meant to address issues of the endocrine disruptor concept working 
almost entirely in the scientific sphere.   
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CONCLUSION 
Figure 4. Spectrum of opinions on endocrine disruptor concept with accompanying lines 
of evidence.  
 
The spectrum of views on the endocrine disruptor concept had real consequences 
in the 1990s and in 2018. The spectrum on the concept spanned two extremes and a great 
number of views in the middle. Individuals along the spectrum used many of the same 
lines of evidence to support very different views. The spectrum, and those lines of 
evidence, played out in the regulatory and scientific story of endocrine disruptors in the 
1990s. Scientific, regulatory, and public discussions of the endocrine disruptor concept 
focused on the extreme viewpoints espoused by committed skeptics and committed 
proponents. Rarely were researchers in the middle paid much attention, though their 
research helped to further endocrine disruptor science. The result was an apparently 
polarized scientific field with proponents taking center stage in regulatory discussion.  
The work of proponents led to the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program, which 
is a deeply flawed piece of regulation. The testing it requires is expensive, time 
consuming, and largely fails to successfully identify endocrine disruptors. That cause of 
that is two-fold: the way in which the endocrine disruptor concept was situated by 
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proponents and the ignorance of middle views. The first has to do with the way the 
concept was introduced by proponents in 1991. As mentioned previously, that small 
group sought to place the concept in scientific, social, and regulatory contexts and 
worked consistently to bring awareness and action to each. However, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the concept lacked a clear definition and explanation of what does and does 
not count as an endocrine disruptor. Individuals in different contexts handled the lack 
differently, as the spectrum of opinions demonstrates that individuals within the scientific 
community did as well. Proponents largely ignored flaws in the concept, in favor of 
strong social and regulatory action. Skeptics focused on the flaws, highlighting poor or 
missing evidence and arguing against regulation and social hysteria.  
Researchers in the middle were the only group who sought to provide data in 
order to more clearly determine what makes an endocrine disruptor—doses when 
endocrine disruptors might be harmful, developmental stages when risk was high, what 
mechanisms an endocrine disruptor might act through. Researchers in the middle of the 
spectrum conducted studies to elucidate the qualities of an endocrine disruptor, qualities 
that are used to identify chemicals in regulatory settings. By passing regulation while 
ignoring the views held and work done by middle of the spectrum researchers, Congress 
left the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program without the ability to identify endocrine 
disruptors, and therefore without the ability to successfully regulate them.  
Those problems persist in the modern day. The Endocrine Disruptor Screening 
Program continues to struggle with how to identify endocrine disruptors when the 
scientific community cannot agree on a definition for endocrine disruptors. Those 
parameters that researchers in the middle tried to map out remain contested. Most 
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recently, that contestation has played out in the regulation of endocrine disruptors in the 
European Union, where the European Commission spent nine years attempting to come 
to an agreed definition of endocrine disruptors to direct regulation. As of 2018, a 
definition has still not been reached for many of the same reasons that researchers along 
the spectrum in the 1990s could not agree. Studies are interpreted widely, what counts as 
endocrine disruption is still not clear, and mechanisms of action are challenged.  
The origins of disagreement in 2018 are laid out in this chapter. In the following chapter, 
I walk through how the middle of spectrum largely disappeared, leaving only the deeply 
polarized ends of the spectrum today.  
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CHAPTER 5 
HOW NON-SCIENTIFIC ACTORS AFFECTED THE SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION OF 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This dissertation aims to examine how the endocrine disruptor concept appeared, 
got interpreted by different groups, and what role science played in the process. At the 
center of that question is the endocrine disruptor concept, which proponents set up as a 
scientific, social, and regulatory object in 1991. In Chapter 4, I showed how the tripartite 
nature of the concept drove scientists’ evaluation of the endocrine disruptor concept as a 
whole, namely that scientists found themselves weighing in not only on the scientific 
legitimacy of the concept, but also on appropriate regulation. In this chapter, I will focus 
on another aspect scientific response to the social and regulatory nature of the concept. 
Specifically, how societal actors—industry, government, and media—affected the 
research conducted by those studying endocrine disruptors.  
The study of endocrine disruptors and the evaluation of the endocrine disruptor 
concept encompasses almost three decades of research. The science started with the 
concept proposed in 1991 that included the claims that: 1. Endocrine disruptors exist as a 
category of toxic substances capable of disrupting endocrine systems and causing 
negative health outcomes; and 2. That such chemicals threaten the health of humans and 
wildlife. In the decades since that original statement, researchers involved in the field 
have looked at the qualities of endocrine disrupting chemicals (shared chemical makeups, 
similar effects, etc.) as well as how endocrine disruptors cause negative health outcomes 
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(mechanisms of action). Throughout that research, the endocrine disruptor concept 
remained an object of scientific, regulatory, and social concern, as the original 
proponents intended.  
Due to that three-part focus of proponents, the scientific study of endocrine 
disruptors was never without social and regulatory interaction. Throughout the 1990s, 
popular media closely followed scientific progress, with newspaper articles, 
documentaries, and television interviews on the subject. Similarly, proponents directed 
regulatory focus toward endocrine disruptors almost immediately after proposing the 
concept in 1991, meaning that endocrine disruptors were never without questions of how 
to regulate them engaging policymakers and industry in the science. As I argue in this 
chapter, the involvement of those societal actors at key moments drove changes in the 
scientific study of endocrine disruptors, both in terms of what research was conducted as 
well as how the community of researchers interacted. I am interested in not only what 
endocrine disruptor researchers were studying, but also what the scientific community 
around endocrine disruptors looked like and how it changed over time.  
The scientific study of endocrine disruptors breaks down into three eras. The first 
era, from 1991 to 1993, began with the introduction of the concept and ended with the 
engagement of popular media with the topic. The second era, spanning the three years 
between 1993 and 1996, began following the changes to the scientific community driven 
by popular media and ended with the entrance of more societal actors: industry and 
regulation. Industry and regulatory actors then drove toward the third era, which began in 
1996 following the regulation of endocrine disruptors in the US and continues to the 
modern day. In this chapter, I walk through the three eras of scientific research and 
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discussion on endocrine disruptors. Within each era, I explain the main scientific focus, 
represented by a particularly vocal or influential researcher. Throughout the chapter, I 
emphasize how shifts in scientific discussion were often driven by social actors, 
especially the media and government. The eras of scientific research are as follows:  
The first era, beginning in 1991 with the introduction of the endocrine disruptor 
concept, was dominated by discussions of a small group of researchers who spent much 
of their time inviting societal actors into scientific discussions. The presence of societal 
actors that could help proponents reach their goals of regulating endocrine disruptors and 
increasing public awareness of the danger posed by them dictated the actions of 
proponents during the first era, taking them out of the laboratory. Through media 
interviews and Congressional appearances, the small group focused on presenting the 
concept to non-scientific audiences, conducting relatively little scientific research. 
Therefore, the discussions among the endocrine disruptor scientists in the first era, 
scientific discussions of a kind, focused on how to increase regulatory and social 
attention on the concept. It was not that societal actors actively drove or engaged in 
scientific discussions in the first era, but rather that scientific discussions focused on how 
to engage those actors. During the era from 1991 to 1993, that group of researchers, 
represented by Theo Colborn in this chapter, spent time trying to gain social attention for 
the endocrine disruptor concept, which they hoped would lead to regulatory action.  
The shift between the first era and the second era was precipitated by the 
engagement of a societal actor: the media. In 1993, several newspaper stories on the 
endocrine disruptor concept, in which Colborn figured prominently, took the fringe idea 
mainstream. That meant that the concept, which was not well known in the scientific 
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community, became a feature in larger society. With that social recognition, proponents 
of the concept reintroduced it in the scientific community. The result was increased 
scientific research.   
The entrance of a much larger group of researchers into the field of endocrine 
disruptors marks the beginning of the second era in 1993, characterized by growth in the 
scientific community, increased funding for endocrine disruptor research, and deep 
scientific investigation of endocrine disruptors and their potential mechanisms. However, 
during the second era from 1993 to 1996, the media portrayed the scientific community 
as deeply divided and antagonistic, unable to agree. In truth, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
scientists in the second era held a wide variety of opinions on the endocrine disruptor 
concept and conducted intense and fruitful research with each other to investigate the 
different claims of the concept. The discrepancy between the polarized scientific 
community portrayed by the media and the actual scientific discussions occurring within 
that community is demonstrated by the relationship of Stephen Safe with Colborn. Both 
held opposing views on the endocrine disruptor concept, and the media portrayed them as 
enemies, when in reality they used their disagreements for productive investigation of 
hormonally active chemicals and their effects. Together, those two researchers represent 
two sides of the apparently polarized discussion.   
That lack of true polarization changed in 1996, with Congressional action. When 
endocrine disruptors were formally regulated, the scientific discussion shifted 
dramatically. During the second era, researchers were united in trying to evaluate the 
concept as a scientific hypothesis, defining the characteristics of endocrine disruptors left 
undefined by the original proponents. But the regulation in 1996 triggered division in the 
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community in two ways. First, industry began to take a larger interest in endocrine 
disruptor science, funding studies and researchers that aligned with their goal of reducing 
regulatory burden. Second, many scientists engaged with the regulatory process that 
followed Congressional action, weighing in on how to regulate endocrine disruptors. 
Both of those resulted in the science being used in increasingly adversarial contexts, 
causing polarization.  
Two strong and opposing sides reign in the third era of scientific discussion, 
which started in 1996 and continues in 2018. Those opposing sides, which began to form 
in the second era, consolidated after the appearance of industry and government on the 
endocrine disruptor landscape. One side, represented by Frederick vom Saal in this 
chapter, continued to promote the endocrine disruptor concept. The other side, with 
continued representation by Safe, rejected the concept entirely. In this section, I use the 
case of bisphenol A (BPA) and the debate over its safety in the early 2000s to portray the 
kinds of discussions that occur throughout the third era. I then explore the two debates 
that command the endocrine disruptor field in 2018: low dose responses and non-
monotonic dose response curves.  
In this chapter, I show that societal actors can have an outsize role on scientific 
discussion. In the case of the endocrine disruptor concept, societal actors like media and 
government took a science that was fringe, pushed it to mainstream, and then contributed 
to the fragmentation of the scientific community. That resulted in a field of study in 
which researchers largely cannot agree, something that has consequences for regulation 
into the modern day, most especially in contemporary debates in the European Union 
(EU). 
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REFRESHER ABOUT SCIENTIFIC IDEAS OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS 
 Throughout this chapter I take advantage of some of the setup I did in Chapter 4, 
laying out the spectrum of opinions on the endocrine disruptor concept. The development 
of the spectrum, and its eventual destruction, followed the three scientific eras discussed 
in this chapter. Throughout, I refer to different ends of the spectrum as well as the views 
expressed by individuals along the spectrum. Given that, I have included the diagram 
from Chapter 4 to provide a brief overview.  
Figure 4. Spectrum of opinions on the endocrine disruptor concept with accompanying 
lines of evidence.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I refer to each group—committed proponents, committed 
skeptics, researchers in the middle—and their respective beliefs. Because the spectrum 
largely played out during the second era of scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors, 
that section in this chapter is shorter, having large cross over with Chapter 4.  
 
SCIENTIFIC ERA 1 (1991–1993): A SMALL GROUP WITH STRONG VIEWS 
 The scientific discussion around endocrine disruptors began in 1991, with the first 
introduction of the term at the Wingspread meeting on “Chemically Induced Alterations 
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in Sexual Development: The Wildlife-Human Connection” (Colborn and Clement 1992). 
Scientific discussion of hormonally active substances and their effects had begun much 
earlier, as discussed in Chapter 2, but 1991 marks the beginning of discussion specifically 
on endocrine disruptors.  
 The scientific community around endocrine disruptors during the first era was 
made up of a small group of researchers, well-known and respected in their fields, 
holding very strong beliefs about a fringe scientific idea: the endocrine disruptor concept. 
The group of researchers who discussed endocrine disruptors in the first era was small, a 
little over twenty individuals spread across diverse fields. Most of those researchers 
attended the Wingspread meeting in 1991, helping to formulate the endocrine disruptor 
concept, or worked in the labs of Wingspread attendees (Colborn and Clement 1992). 
The researchers almost across the board were respected in their fields: researchers like 
Howard Bern, an endocrinologist who laid out the effects of diethylstilbestrol, and John 
McLachlan, who as Scientific Director of the NIEHS had organized the environmental 
estrogen meetings of the previous decade. It is important to emphasize here that 
committed proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept, who engaged in endocrine 
disruptor discussion in the first era, were by no means fringe researchers. They were all 
well published in their respective fields. However, the researchers engaging with the 
science of endocrine disruptors in the first era did espouse strong support for and belief in 
a peripheral idea: the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 Their discussions about that concept largely did not occur in scientific forums. 
Between 1991 and 1993, there were few if any scientific publications on endocrine 
disruptors, other than the book authored by Theo Colborn and Coralie Clement laying out 
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the endocrine disruptor concept in 1992 (Colborn and Clement 1992). Otherwise, 
scientific actors engaged with endocrine disruptors between 1991 and 1993 spent their 
time inviting societal actors to acknowledge, and act on, the endocrine disruptor concept 
(Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn; 
Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). That can be seen in the testimony of Colborn and 
Ana M. Soto to Congress where they both introduced the endocrine disruptor concept and 
argued for regulation of endocrine disruptors, in the interviews Colborn, Soto, Earl Gray, 
and Michael Fry sat for with The New York Times and similar publications, and in the 
outreach to policymakers Wingspread attendees undertook outside of formal hearings 
(U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn and Ana M. Soto; Luoma 
1992a; Healy 1993; Vogel 2012).  
 Through that invitation of societal actors into the endocrine disruptor space, 
proponents of the concept shaped the way scientific discussions of endocrine disruptors 
played out through the 1990s. As emphasized elsewhere in this dissertation, proponents 
sought to situate the concept as scientific, social, and regulatory. Throughout much of the 
first era, proponents focus was on situating the concept thusly, hence the large emphasis 
they placed on social and regulatory discussions. In creating the three-part concept, 
though, the proponents coupled the scientific questions about endocrine disruptors with 
social and regulatory ones, meaning that during the second era, endocrine disruptor 
researchers across the spectrum were forced to weigh in on not only the science of the 
endocrine disruptor concept, but also whether and how endocrine disruptors should be 
regulated. This was explored in Chapter 4. Following the actions of proponents during 
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the first era, societal actors like media and government had a large role to play in 
scientific discussions about endocrine disruptors.   
 Few researchers epitomize that first era better than Theo Colborn. In 1991, 
Colborn brought together a diverse group of researchers at Wingspread to articulate the 
endocrine disruptor concept. She promoted that concept and what she saw as the political 
and social action demanded by the concept through the first era, from 1991 to 1993.  
 
Scientific Spotlight: Theo Colborn 
 Theodora (Theo) Emily Colborn received her undergraduate education at Rutgers 
University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. After earning her degree in pharmacy, she 
married a fellow pharmacy student and together they operated a drugstore in New Jersey. 
In the early 1960s, Colborn and her husband sold their drugstore and moved to Colorado, 
where they opened another drugstore and raised sheep (and children) (Abboud 2014).  
 In 1978, at the age of fifty-one, Colborn returned to school at Western State 
College of Colorado in Gunnison, Colorado. There, she studied freshwater ecology and 
was appointed to the Colorado National Areas Program, a statewide conservation effort, 
by Colorado governor John D. Vanderhoof. Colborn graduated in 1981 and moved to 
Madison, Wisconsin, soon after, to pursue her doctoral degree (Abboud 2014).  
 At the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Colborn studied zoology, completing 
her dissertation on “The use of stonefly, Pteronarcys californica, Newport, as a measure 
of bioavailable cadmium in high altitude river system, Gunnison County, Colorado” 
(Abboud 2014). Following her graduation in 1985, Colborn was a Congressional fellow 
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in the Office of Technology Assessment in Washington, D.C., where she studied water 
quality and water quality assessment (Abboud 2014).  
 Colborn’s work with water quality was her entry into the science of endocrine 
disruptors. In 1987, Colborn began a two-year project with the Conservation Foundation 
to examine the ecosystem of the Great Lakes area. Following that two year study, 
Colborn and her research team published Great Lakes, Great Legacy?, in which they laid 
out an analysis of the Great Lakes that showed that industrial and agricultural chemicals 
were poisoning the ecosystem (Colborn et al. 1990). Colborn and her colleagues’ analysis 
showed that many of the wildlife species in the Great Lakes suffered from reproductive 
and developmental abnormalities because of chemical pollution (Colborn et al. 1990).  
 Following her work in the Great Lakes, Colborn began to formulate a hypothesis 
about chemicals with the ability to disrupt reproduction and development (Colborn 
1998b). To determine whether her hypothesis had any merit, in 1991, Colborn organized 
a meeting at the Wingspread conference center with the help of John Peterson Myers of 
the W. Alton Jones Foundation. At that meeting, twenty-one researchers from diverse 
backgrounds all agreed on the merits of Colborn’s hypothesis, coming together to 
formulate the endocrine disruptor concept.  
 Colborn saw the Wingspread meeting as changing the whole course and direction 
of her life (Colborn 1998b). As she described in a 1998 interview with PBS,  
Believe me, I didn't plan this. This is not what I had as a career goal or how I 
would spend my retirement years at all. This has just sort of happened, and people 
depend upon me. I can tell you there are a whole bunch of scientists out there who 
can explain this better, who know it better than I do. I feel compelled to do 
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something to try to make change. And I guess that is why I went back to college 
in my old age. I wanted to get the education so that I could maybe undo some of 
the things that my generation basically foisted on society. (Colborn 1998b) 
That quote very much encapsulates Colborn’s outlook and personality. People who knew 
her described her as “a catalyst,” “an empiricist,” and “a fierce … advocate” (Safe 1998; 
Vogel 2012, 98–9). Whether Colborn intended or not, she became the voice of the 
endocrine disruptor concept in the first era, representing it at Congressional hearings and 
in media interviews. Throughout the rest of this section, the discussion of endocrine 
disruptors will be oriented around Colborn, as representative of the scientists and their 
actions in the first era. 
 
A Fringe Scientific Discussion Inviting in Societal Actors 
 In 1991, the authors of the Wingspread consensus statement set the tone of the 
scientific discussion around endocrine disruptors by constructing the endocrine disruptor 
concept as scientific, social, and regulatory. In their statement, they outlined societal 
goals involving regulation and public awareness. Though the group identified several 
areas of needed scientific investigation, they largely focused on work outside of science: 
how to regulate endocrine disruptors and how to increase public awareness of the dangers 
posed by endocrine disruptors (Colborn and Clement 1992).  
The Wingspread statement, as the first documentation of the scientific issues at 
play around endocrine disruptors, was distinctly not science-focused. The researchers 
instead placed emphasis on regulatory issues that the authors indicated could be partially 
addressed with scientific advancement, but that also required political and public buy in. 
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Essentially, the authors of the Wingspread consensus statement oriented the discussion of 
endocrine disruptors in the first era around social and regulatory changes rather than 
scientific investigation.  
 In doing so, proponents set the scientific agenda for the endocrine disruptor 
concept from 1991 to 1993. As the small group of researchers at Wingspread made up the 
entirety of the endocrine disruptor community in the first era, their focus on regulatory 
and social goals very much impacted the trajectory of the concept during its early years. 
Throughout those years, proponents focused on inviting social and regulatory actors into 
the scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors, through testimonies and interviews. 
Importantly, proponents presented the science of endocrine disruptors as certain, not 
inviting questions of what research is necessary but instead what regulatory and social 
action is necessary.   
 As an example of that: just weeks after Wingspread, Colborn spoke at the 1991 
Senate hearing on “Government Regulation of Reproductive Hazards” (U.S. Congress 
Senate 1991). At that hearing, Colborn took the opportunity to restate the endocrine 
disruptor concept and argue for immediate action on endocrine disruptors (U.S. Congress 
Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn). The Senate hearing overall was about the 
implications of a recently published Government Accounting Office (GAO) report, which 
had found that reproductive hazards posed an increasing risk to humans and that the 
government was not doing enough to safeguard against them (U.S. Congress Senate 
1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky).  
In her written testimony for the hearing, Colborn submitted documentation of the 
issues and evidence discussed at Wingspread, drawing largely the same conclusions: that 
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endocrine disruptors posed a threat to humans and not enough was being done. She 
reiterated those conclusions and next steps in her oral testimony, laying out five actions 
points:  
First, it is imperative that the general lack of awareness of the presence of 
hormonally-active environmental chemicals be addressed, and the lack of 
awareness concerning the nature of loss of function which leads to loss of human 
potential and the concept of multi-generational exposure must be addressed as 
well.  
Two, the testing of products for regulatory purposes should be broadened 
to include hormonal activity, and these studies should be conducted over several 
generations, more than two generations.  
Three, because the impacts on wildlife and laboratory animals as a result 
of exposure to these contaminants are of such a profound and insidious nature, a 
major research initiative on humans must be undertaken.  
Four, banning of the production and use of many of these chemicals has 
not solved the exposure problem. These chemicals are still being released into the 
environment. New approaches are needed to prohibit release of these chemicals 
and new chemicals like them to reduce exposure.  
Five, it is urgent to move reproductive effects and functional loss to the 
forefront when evaluating health risks. Cancer and acute toxicity alone are not 
adequate to protect wildlife or human health. (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, 
Testimony of Theo Colborn) 
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Colborn called for regulatory change, public awareness, and a research initiative 
to determine the effects of exposure to endocrine disruptors in humans. Of the five goals 
she laid out, only the third one calls for a research initiative. All four other goals focus on 
increasing public awareness and modifying regulatory frameworks. Even in her call for a 
research initiative, Colborn did not mandate that the initiative attempt to determine 
whether there were effects in humans, but rather to determine what the effects were. 
Colborn’s testimony follows the goals outlined in the Wingspread consensus statement 
and show that proponents seriously worked to establish the endocrine disruptor concept 
as scientific, social, and regulatory during the first era. The scientific community and 
discussion around endocrine disruptors from 1991 to 1993 was dominated by those 
attempts.  
 That becomes clearer through an examination of the popular media articles on 
endocrine disruptors in the first era (Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; Healy 1993; Beil 
1993; Peterson 1993). In 1992, Jon Luoma published two articles on hormonally active 
chemicals, one in The New York Times and the second in the San Diego Union Tribune. 
Respectively titled “New Effect of Pollutants: Hormone Mayhem” and “Cancer Not Only 
Contaminant of Concern,” and both articles featured attendees from Wingspread drawing 
attention to what they saw as ineffective US regulation of endocrine active chemicals and 
the resulting public health crisis (Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b). Other popular news 
articles from the first era show the kind of science proponents used to support their 
claims about endocrine disruptors and generate social and regulatory attention. In articles 
like “Toxic Chemicals’ Role in Breast Cancer Studied” and “Decreasing Sperm Counts 
Blamed on the Environment,” the media picked up on the connection proponents drew 
  203 
between endocrine disruptors and prominent diseases and effects like breast cancer and 
sperm declines (Beil 1993; Peterson 1993).  
In particular, during the first era, proponents highlighted two scientific 
publications between 1991 and 1993: First, Ana Soto and Carlos Sonnenschein’s work on 
how consumer plastics made with endocrine disrupting chemicals caused breast cancer 
cell lines to proliferate abnormally fast (Soto et al. 1991). Second, Nils E. Skakkebaek 
and Richard M. Sharpe’s work linking estrogenic chemicals with declining sperm counts 
worldwide (Sharpe 1993; Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993). Both articles contained science 
that pointed to disastrous outcomes for the public—breast cancer and low sperm counts—
due to endocrine disruptors. Therefore, proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept 
used both articles heavily in their push to direct discussion toward social and political 
action (Luoma 1992a; Luoma 1992b; U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo 
Colborn; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997).   
In that way, social and regulatory actors had a clear impact on the scientific 
discussion around endocrine disruptors not because they actively drove or participated in 
the scientific discussion, but because proponents oriented their actions and the science 
they used around gaining the attention of societal actors. Societal actors acted as magnets 
or lodestones that drew proponents’ attention away from their scientific work and toward 
interaction with social and regulatory actors. In their attempts to gain the attention of 
such actors, proponents of the concept allowed societal actors like policymakers and 
public media to drive their work. Unlike in the second and third eras, where scientific 
discussion around endocrine disruptors changed as a result of actions taken by societal 
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actors, in the first era, scientific discussion around endocrine disruptors was changed in 
order to cause action by societal actors.  
  
SCIENTIFIC SHIFT 1 (1993): MEDIA ATTENTION AND SCIENTIFIC VISIBILITY  
 The first shift in the scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors occurred in 
1993, when two things happened: the endocrine disruptor concept received increased 
media attention and increased scientific visibility. Those two factors helped the endocrine 
disruptor discussion dominate a field. The concept went from fringe to mainstream.  
 The media attention on the endocrine disruptor concept popularized the concept 
and the risk posed by endocrine disrupting chemicals. In 1993, the concept was the 
subject of several popular news articles in sources like the Los Angeles Times and USA 
Today (Cone 1994a; Cone 1994b; Cone 1994c; Peterson 1993). Between 1993 and 1994, 
researchers linked endocrine disruptors with declining sperm counts, breast cancer, and 
shrinking alligator penises—three things almost guaranteed to catch the attention of the 
media (Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Wolff et al. 1993; Davis et al. 1993; Guillette et al. 
1994)). And they did (Begley and Glick 1994; Raloff 1995; Lutz 1996; Cone 1994a; 
Cone 1994b; Cone 1994c; Peterson 1993; Krimsky 2000).  
 In 1993, Skakkebæk and Sharpe connected estrogenic chemicals to declining 
sperm counts worldwide. Later that same year, a group of researchers published a piece 
titled, “Medical Hypothesis: Xenoestrogens as Preventable Causes of Breast Cancer,” in 
Environmental Health Perspectives (Davis et al. 1993). In the article, the authors argue 
that the recent surge in breast cancer diagnoses might be attributable to increased 
exposure to environmental estrogens, citing as evidence several studies that found 
  205 
elevated levels of estrogenic chemicals in the blood of women with breast cancer (Davis 
et al. 1993; Wolff et al. 1993). Those studies linked endocrine disruptors to another issue 
of public interest: breast cancer—the bogey man in the closet hunting mothers, sisters, 
wives. 
A year later, in 1994, Louis Guillette and his colleagues published a study on 
“Developmental Abnormalities of the Gonad and Abnormal Sex Hormone 
Concentrations in Juvenile Alligators from Contaminated Control Lakes in Florida” 
(Guillette et al. 1994). Guillette and his co-authors provided evidence that, among other 
things, juvenile male alligators exposed to estrogenic environmental contaminants had 
abnormally small penises. As public media does, they latched on to the absurd and wrote 
a number of pieces on shrinking penises in alligators (Raloff 1995; Lutz 1996).  
By 1994, endocrine disruptors had been linked to declining sperm counts in 
humans, breast cancer, and alligator penises. The studies were in no way conclusive, 
many only preliminary studies requiring significantly more investigation (Saidi et al. 
1999; Olsen et al. 1995; Safe 1994; Safe 1995; Wolff 1995; Krieger et al. 1994; Safe 
2000). And though media stories did acknowledge that uncertainty, they also used titles 
like, “Something is Attacking Male Fetus Sex Organs,” and “Sperm counts down? 
Penises shriveled? Hey, Rush, don’t blame it on feminists. It may be from chemical 
pollutants in water and food” (Goodman 1994; Begley and Glick 1994). All three 
linkages received large amounts of public attention. The media portrayed endocrine 
disruptors as the next catastrophe and proponents worked to help that perception (Luoma 
1992a; Luoma 1992b; Raloff 1995; Lutz 1996). By the beginning of the second era, 
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endocrine disruptors were well known publically and people began calling for 
policymakers to do something about them.   
At that point, in 1993, proponents reintroduced the endocrine disruptor concept to 
the scientific community. In 1993, Colborn, Frederick vom Saal, and Ana M. Soto 
published “Developmental Effects of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals in Wildlife and 
Humans” in Environmental Health Perspectives (Colborn, vom Saal, and Soto 1993). 
The article was essentially a restatement of the Wingspread consensus statement. The 
authors presented evidence for the claim that endocrine disrupting chemicals pose a threat 
to humans and wildlife. In particular, they used DES as a clear, traceable model for 
endocrine disrupting effects in humans.  
The publication of the endocrine disruptor concept in a well-read journal meant 
that the concept automatically drew increased scientific attention, given its increased 
visibility. Compounded with the work of public media, the endocrine disruptor concept 
was highly visible for scientific, social, and regulatory audiences. That helped the 
concept gain scientific traction. The transition between the first and second era 
demonstrates the success with which proponents situated the concept as scientific, social, 
and regulatory. By 1993, they got actors from all three areas to pay attention to the 
concept, gaining increased awareness, regulatory buy in, and growing scientific 
discussion. 
The combination of the increased scientific visibility of the endocrine disruptor 
concept and the increased media attention pushed more researchers to enter the scientific 
discussion of endocrine disruptors. Between 1993 and 1994, the larger scientific 
community was almost forced to pay attention to the endocrine disruptor concept and 
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many came to realize that they disagreed with it, in part or entirely. The entrance of a 
societal actor—media—into the discussion of endocrine disruptors changed the scientific 
discussion, broadening it and also appearing to polarize it.  
 
SCIENTIFIC ERA 2 (1993–1996): APPARENT POLARIZATION 
 The second era of scientific discussion about endocrine disruptors was dominated 
by an apparently polarized debate among scientists regarding the validity of the endocrine 
disruptor concept put forth by proponents in 1991. The second era saw the emergence of 
the spectrum discussed in Chapter 4. Following the intervention of popular media, many 
more researchers began engaging in the endocrine disruptor discussion, calling into 
question many of the assumptions made by proponents through the first era.  
Committed skeptics began the debate over endocrine disruptors in 1993, where before all 
researchers engaged with endocrine disruptors held largely the same views. But as was 
discussed in Chapter 4, the two vocal and polarized sides of the spectrum only appeared 
to command the scientific discussion from 1993 to 1996. That perception was 
emphasized by the continued role of popular media in the debate, who took advantage of 
the aggressive comments made by both committed proponents and committed skeptics 
about each other.  
In reality, the second era of scientific discussion around endocrine disruptors was 
one of deep scientific investigation into the substances and their potential effects. 
Funding for endocrine disruptor research increased between 1993 and 1996, as the EPA, 
the W. Alton Jones Foundation, and others awarded millions in grants (Krimsky 2000, 
24; EPA 1996a; EPA 1996b; EPA 1996c). Research on endocrine disruptors, especially 
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on areas left undefined by proponents—mechanisms of action, methods of detection, and 
long term health effects in humans—flourished. Several additional meetings were held at 
the Wingspread conference center and the EPA and NIEHS sponsored several work 
sessions on the endocrine disruptor concept and its impact (McLachlan and Korach 1995; 
Bantle et al. 1995; Kavlock et al. 1996; Barnett et al. 1996).  
The second era was perhaps the era where the most scientific discussion actually 
took place between researchers with very different viewpoints on the validity of the 
endocrine disruptor concept. To demonstrate the discussion, and the many different views 
held on the concept, it is worth using Stephen Safe as a counter balance to Colborn in the 
previous section. Safe, throughout the second era, held directly opposing views to 
Colborn. Where she was a committed proponent, working throughout the 1990s to 
convince both scientists and non-scientists of the dangers posed by endocrine disruptors, 
Safe did just the opposite.  
But while each had strong things to say regarding the other’s scientific opinion, 
they also spoke well of each other. The relationship between Safe and Colborn is 
emblematic of broader scientific discussion during the second era, from 1993 to 1996, 
which occurred widely within the scientific community, while being portrayed as almost 
impossible by much of the media.  
For that reason, I argue that the polarization of the scientific community during 
the second era was not as vehement as it was in the third era. Though many researchers 
had very strong things to say regarding the science of individuals on the spectrum, there 
was also a larger scientific push for further investigation, regardless of who was 
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investigating. That tension between the perceived polarization, which was extreme, and 
the actual polarization is typified by the relationship of Safe and Colborn.   
 
Scientific Spotlight: Stephen Safe 
 Stephen Safe received much of his early education in Canada, before completing 
his doctoral degree at Oxford University in Oxford, England. Safe was trained as a 
chemist, and completed his doctoral dissertation on polyacetylenes in Dahlia, a genus of 
plants that includes the Boogie Woogie and the Star Sister.  
 Following a brief time spent at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Safe returned to Canada in 1968 to work as a research officer at the National Research 
Council of Canada in the Atlantic Regional Laboratory in Halifax, Nova Scotia (Safe 
2013b). While working in Canada in the 1970s, Safe studied organochlorines, a group of 
chemicals that include DDT-like pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBS). Safe 
described his first engagement with endocrine disruptors as taking place in the early 
1970s, while he was working with Otto Hutzinger. Safe and Hutzinger studied the 
environmental breakdown of PCBs, finding that the substances are metabolized by 
several species (Safe 2013a; Safe 2013b).  
 During the 1980s, Safe began working at Texas A&M University in College 
Station, Texas. As a professor of veterinary physiology and pharmacology, Safe focused 
on tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin (TCDD). TCDD is a polychlorinated dioxin and became 
the focus of scientific research in the 1980s after researchers had linked exposure to 
negative health effects in individuals exposed directly as well as their children (Abboud 
2017; Schuck 1986; Committee to Review the Health Effects in Vietnam Veterans of 
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Exposure to Herbicides 1994). TCDD was a contaminant in Agent Orange, a pesticide 
used during the Vietnam War to clear dense vegetation as a part of Operation Ranch 
Hand (Abboud 2017; Schuck 1986). As a result, many scientists, including Safe, studied 
the toxicity and effects of TCDD. In particular, Safe looked at TCDD’s effects on 
endocrine pathways, noting that TCDD behaves as an antiestrogen, blocking the action of 
estrogen in the body (Safe et al. 1985; Denomme et al. 1986; Keys, Piskorska-
Pliszczynska, and Safe 1986; Safe et al. 1991; Safe 1999; Safe 2013b).  
 Into the 1990s, Safe continued to study the toxicity and effects of various 
chemicals, including those that act on endocrine pathways. He officially entered the 
scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors in 1994, in response to several publications 
linking breast cancer to environmental estrogens (Safe 2013a; Safe 2013b; Safe 1994). In 
an article addressing that linkage, Safe highlighted the implausibility of such an effect by 
pointing to the many compounds that act counter to environmental estrogens 
(antiestrogens) (Safe 1994; Safe 1995). Following that initial publication in 1994, Safe 
became the face of skeptics of the endocrine disruptor concept, frequently authoring 
editorials in both scientific and popular publications (Safe 1994; Stone 1994; Safe 1995; 
Safe 1997; Safe 2000; Safe 2013a; Safe 2013b).  
 But while Safe was a vocal and often antagonistic critic of the endocrine disruptor 
concept, he was and is a respected researcher within the field of toxicology (Safe n.d.). 
He is well published and has received several awards for his toxicological and 
environmental research (Safe n.d.). Safe also has a more whimsical side that gives insight 
into his character. In 2016, he gave a convocation address at Queen’s University in 
Kingston, Ontario, his bachelors and masters alma mater. Safe wrote his entire address as 
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a poem, in which he emphasized the need to relish small victories and continue looking 
for opportunity (Armes 2016). He ended with the following verse:  
My message to you who are graduating is to work hard and do your best. 
Your studies and lessons learned at Queen’s will help you pass the test. 
Remember the past – wars, ethnic cleansing, any means to all ends.  
Only you and your concern for others can help reverse these horrible trends. 
It is up to you now, as the newest graduates of this fine institution. 
Keeping up with advances in science and technology is only part of the solution. 
Remember, if you fail to do so, your employer and coworkers will not lament, 
and you will wind up living, again, in your parents’ basement. (Armes 2016) 
 
An Apparently Polarized Scientific Discussion 
 Throughout the second era of scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors, from 
1993 to 1996, Safe and Colborn played starring roles, both publishing many scientific 
editorials on the concept and also writing or featuring in more popular stories in places 
like The Wall Street Journal or The New York Times (Luoma 1992a; Safe 1997). As 
noted previously, Colborn and Safe represent two ends of the spectrum of opinions on the 
endocrine disruptor concept. Their opinions received much media attention throughout 
the second era and it appeared as though the two greatly disliked each other.  
 However, Colborn and Safe spoke highly of one another. Colborn called Safe 
“one of the best scientists in the country,” further arguing that endocrine disruptor 
proponents had been relying on his laboratory work for years (Colborn 1998b). To 
Colborn, Safe was funny, someone she laughed and had good times with. She fully 
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acknowledged the negative comments Safe made, certainly questioning his views, but she 
also claimed, “I am almost indebted to Steve Safe. The controversy is good for the issue” 
(Colborn 1998b). Safe, for his part, gave Colborn a Texas A&M nightshirt and portrayed 
her as the catalyst for the endocrine disruptor issue (Safe 1998). He saw both himself and 
Colborn as honest, both simply giving their opinions (different as they might be) on an 
important scientific issue.  
 Safe and Colborn’s relationship sheds light on the scientific discussion of 
endocrine disruptors in the second era, from 1993 to 1996. Though their relationship 
appeared and was portrayed as hostile, the two viewed each other with respect, 
understanding that each offered a different opinion on science they both engaged with. 
Similarly, the scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors appeared polarized in the 
second era, but, in truth, it was a fruitful discussion filled with many different viewpoints 
(Safe 1995; Wolff 1995; see Chapter 4).  
I laid out much of the scientific discussion in Chapter 4, with my detailing of the 
entire spectrum. I want to emphasize here that the majority of endocrine disruptor 
researchers resided in the middle of the spectrum and worked with varied other 
researchers to investigate the endocrine disruptor concept. Though individuals held 
strong viewpoints, often disagreeing with other individuals along the spectrum, much 
work on endocrine disruptors was conducted between 1993 and 1996. The second era of 
scientific discussion on endocrine disruptors was certainly fraught, but not aggressively 
polarized, as the media portrayed it. That changed in 1996 with the actions of more 
societal actors.  
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SCIENTIFIC SHIFT 2 (1996): REGULATORY ACTION AND INDUSTRY  
 The period of apparent polarization ended in 1996, with the intervention of two 
societal actors: government and industry. While the second era of scientific discussion 
was characterized by researchers with a diversity of views, all of whom engaged each 
other on the scientific issues of the endocrine disruptor concept, the third era was 
dominated by truly polarized discussion. That shift was in part caused by regulatory 
action on endocrine disruptors and the entrance of industry in 1996, both of which caused 
the science of endocrine disruptors to be used in increasingly adversarial contexts. 
 In 1996, Colborn, John Peterson Myers, and Dianne Dumanoski published Our 
Stolen Future (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). In the book, written for a public 
audience, the authors lay out the endocrine disruptor concept and their supporting 
evidence. The authors start with a series of historical vignettes that they argue show the 
increasing reproductive and development problems of wildlife species exposed to 
industrial and agricultural endocrine disruptors. Each chapter of the rest of the book 
focuses on particular cases that demonstrate the widespread threat posed by endocrine 
disruptors and what work scientists have done to illuminate that threat. One chapter 
focuses on Colborn and her work in the Great Lakes leading to the Wingspread meeting, 
another showcases Frederick vom Saal’s work on the role of hormones in development. 
The book ends with some ways that readers can reduce their exposure to endocrine 
disruptors in their own lives and a call for more regulatory and social action on the 
chemicals (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997).  
The book was widely read, with a foreword written by then-vice president Al 
Gore (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). It was translated into several languages 
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and reviewed in publications like Science, Environmental Health Perspectives, Scientific 
American, Time, and the Washington Post (Hirschfield, Hirschfield, and Flaws 1996; 
Lucier and Hook 1996; Kamrin 1996; Lemonick 1996; Lee 1996; Krimsky 2000). 
According to several chemical company representatives, Our Stolen Future unsettled the 
industry (Vogel 2012; Forsythe 1998).  
 The chemical industry had not been unaware of endocrine disruptors prior to 
1996. In 1994, in response to committed proponents’ work in DC to publicize the 
endocrine disruptor concept, Dow Chemical Company released a “Position on Endocrine 
Disruptors,” in which they called in to question much of “Colborn’s hypothesis” (Vogel 
2012, 110). Within the document, Dow used many of the arguments of skeptics like Safe: 
that endocrine disruptors were only weakly estrogenic and therefore not dangerous, that 
natural estrogens found in plants had no apparent ill effects in humans, and that current 
regulations already protected against endocrine disruption (Vogel 2012).  
 However, the chemicals industry rarely spoke out against the endocrine disruptor 
concept until 1995, when it became clear that the public cared about endocrine disruptors 
and that some sort of regulation was likely (Vogel 2012; Krimsky 2000) In 1995, five 
industry groups created the Endocrine Issues Coalition: the Society of the Plastics 
Industry, the American Crop Protection Association, the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, the American Petroleum Institute, and the American Forest and Paper 
Association (Krimsky 2000). The group set aside several million dollars to study the 
effects of hormonally active chemicals. That demonstrates industry taking notice of 
endocrine disruptors and the beginning of their public strategy for dealing with them. 
From 1996 on, the chemicals industry frequently issued statements regarding their 
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concern for the safety of chemicals, drawing attention to the money they spent testing 
their chemicals (Vogel 2012). A common refrain: because they care.  
 That public strategy continued after the publication of Our Stolen Future in 1996. 
As others have noted, the chemicals industry borrowed heavily from the tactics of the 
tobacco industry, adopting a united message of uncertainty regarding the endocrine 
disruptor concept (Vogel 2012). However, the chemicals industry did differ slightly in 
their tactics, largely staying away from personal attacks on endocrine disruptor scientists. 
As one representative commented, “… if they came out against Theo Colborn, nails out, 
fists blazing, that wouldn't fit in with their public image that they are trying to cultivate. 
If they say, "We care. We will look at this issue. We will study it," and then behind the 
scenes then try and defeat the amendments or then try and work with EPA to get their 
way, that works better” (Forsythe 1998). And work with (or against) the EPA they did.  
 The year 1996 saw the intervention of another societal actor as well: Congress 
through their legislation on endocrine disruptors. In 1996, Congress passed two pieces of 
legislation relevant to endocrine disruptors: The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 and 
the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–170, 7 USC § 136 et 
seq.; Pub. L. 104–182 § 1316. Both mandated that the EPA establish 
[A] screening program, using appropriate validated test systems and other 
scientifically relevant information, to determine whether certain substances may 
have an effect in humans that is like an effect produced by a naturally occurring 
estrogen, or such other endocrine effect as the Administrator may designate. (Pub. 
L. 104–170, 7 USC § 136 et seq.)  
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That type of regulation was what committed proponents had been working toward since 
1991. They therefore saw the legislation as a victory. Industry did not.  
 A month after the passage of the legislation, the EPA established the Endocrine 
Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee to make recommendations 
regarding the mandated screening program (EDSTAC 1998). The Committee included 
representatives from regulatory agencies, universities, environmental groups, and 
industry. The Committee met ten times between October 1996 and April 1998. Those 
meetings were far from congenial and contributed to the polarization of the endocrine 
disruptor field. In the Committee meetings, very different stakeholders were meant to 
come to some joint recommendations. Not surprisingly, proponents of the concept on the 
Committee, like Colborn, had vastly different recommendations than representatives 
from companies like Bayer Corporation. For Colborn, endocrine disruptors posed a 
serious and immediate public and ecological health threat. Without strong regulation, 
lives were endangered. For industry, testing or removal of potential endocrine disruptors 
represented hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars. Industry did not want strong, 
cumbersome endocrine disruptor regulations. Those two distinct goals in the context of a 
Committee meeting, meant that endocrine disruptor science was used adversarially—
against the other side not to push toward better science, but to ‘win.’ 
 That competition played out with the definition of endocrine disruptor that would 
be used in the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program. In short, industry representatives 
strongly advocated for a narrow definition of endocrine disruptors, one that included the 
causation of adverse effects (Vogel 2012). Such a definition reduced the likelihood that 
just because a chemical tested positive for hormonal activity, that it would be banned. 
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Proponents, on the other hand, argued that studies had shown that even minor endocrine 
activity, at the right point in development, could cause adverse effects. Therefore, the 
inclusion of causation of adverse health effects in the definition of endocrine disruptors 
was unnecessary.  
 A similar disagreement played out at the meetings of a National Academies of 
Science group, who had been tasked in 1995 by several agencies and Congress to 
evaluate the science of endocrine disruptors (NRC 1999). The group tasked with that 
evaluation met five times and had a similar makeup to the EPA Committee, meaning both 
industry and university scientists were represented.  
 Both the EPA Committee meetings and the National Academies meetings show 
the shift the scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors experienced between the second 
and third era. Researchers held increasingly polarized viewpoints argued in competitive 
contexts. The entrance of industry into the debate heightened that.  
 
SCIENTIFIC ERA 3 (1996– ): TRUE POLARIZATION 
 Throughout the third era of scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors, industry 
continued to play a role. Where the second era only appeared polarized, the third era, 
from 1996 on, truly was polarized. In the years after 1996, committed skeptics and 
committed proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept became further entrenched in 
their views, using a series of events between 1997 and 2000 to shore up their claims. 
Middle viewpoints largely disappeared. Industry continued their campaign to demonstrate 
care and consideration of the potential dangers of endocrine disruptors while also casting 
doubt on the endocrine disruptor concept as a whole.  
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 By 2000, the third era was only a discussion, for lack of a better word, between 
two camps and that clearly played out in the case of bisphenol A (BPA). One individual 
set himself up against Stephen Safe, to represent proponents of the endocrine disruptor 
concept: Frederick vom Saal. Vom Saal was one of the leading scientists involved in the 
discussion of BPA in the early 2000s and his very unfriendly relationship with Safe helps 
to show the shifting tone in the scientific discussion of endocrine disruptors.  
 
Scientific Spotlight: Frederick vom Saal 
 Frederick vom Saal completed his graduate education in the 1970s at Rutgers 
University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. He studied genetically identical strains of 
mice and the behavioral differences between those mice. In particular, vom Saal studied 
how the administration of different hormones during development could cause behavioral 
changes like pup-killing and aggression (Gandelman and vom Saal 1975; vom Saal, 
Gandelman, and Svare 1976; vom Saal, Svare, and Gandelman 1976).  
 Following his graduation from Rutgers in 1976, vom Saal continued that same 
research for much of the 1980s, engaging in discussions about environmental estrogens 
and their effects. During the 1980s, at both the University of Texas at Austin and the 
University of Missouri, vom Saal published on what he called the “womb effect.” To 
vom Saal, the “womb effect” described how differing hormone levels in utero changed 
sexual behavior and reproductive development in mice (Vogel 2012, 125; vom Saal and 
Bronson 1980; vom Saal 1981).  
 By the 1990s, vom Saal had begun looking for the “womb effect” in mice 
exposed to synthetic estrogenic chemicals (Vogel 2012). While undertaking that research, 
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vom Saal was contacted by Colborn regarding the similarity between his lab findings and 
the wildlife effect noted by Colborn in the Great Lakes area. Upon hearing Colborn’s 
early ideas about endocrine disruptors, vom Saal recalls saying, “[m]y god, this is 
astounding. I think you are onto something really important” (Mistreanu 2012). Vom Saal 
was an attendee at Wingspread and advocated for the endocrine disruptor concept 
throughout the 1990s and into 2018.  
 Like Safe, vom Saal was and is a respected experimentalist, well published and 
awarded within his field. Unlike Colborn, vom Saal does not have a congenial 
relationship with Safe (Safe 1998; vom Saal 1998; Hood 2005). Vom Saal, in the years 
after 1996, repeatedly attacked Safe due to Safe’s receipt of industry funding for some of 
his research (vom Saal 1998; Safe 1998). Vom Saal’s opinion of Safe and his funding is 
clear in statements like, “does it cause you to lie? And I am not suggesting that anybody 
is overtly lying. You don't need to do that in science. It is very easy for someone who 
understands the way a system works to set up an experiment to find exactly what you 
want to find” (vom Saal 1998). Vom Saal generally refuses to acknowledge differing 
opinions on the endocrine disruptor concept, going so far as to dismiss the opinions of 
Nobel Laureates due to the fast-moving pace of endocrine disruptor science (vom Saal 
1998; Hood 2005).   
 Safe, for his part, openly admits that he and vom Saal are not friends (Safe 1998). 
He has called vom Saal’s attack a “McCarthy-like tactic” and “an outright lie,” while 
pointing to some of vom Saal’s colleagues who have also received industry funding (Safe 
1998). It would be easy to view Safe as simply an industry dupe, used like Clarence Cook 
Little by the tobacco industry, but endocrine disruptor science is more complicated. First, 
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Safe is as respected as vom Saal, each talented a experimentalist who has been 
conducting research on hormonally active chemicals for decades. Second, Safe’s opinion 
is by no means fringe (Vandenberg et al. 2009; Vandenberg et al. 2012; Zoeller et al. 
2014; Nohynek 2013; Lamb et al. 2014; Rhomberg and Goodman 2012). Endocrine 
disruptor science—the cause and effect of endocrine disruptors—is far less certain than 
the connection between smoking and lung cancer. Even in 2018, debate continues and 
neither side is without scientific merit.   
 
Discussion of BPA as a Way to Conceptualize a Truly Polarized Field 
 The relationship between vom Saal and Safe is indicative of the larger scientific 
discussion of endocrine disruptors in the third era beginning in 1996. Discussion became 
antagonistic, publications filled with small jabs and dismissals, arguments becoming 
more heated. That is especially clear in the conversation around bisphenol A (BPA) in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s (Sharpe 2010; Ashby, Tinwell, Haseman 1999; Cagen et al. 
1999; Vogel 2012; Sheehan and vom Saal 1997; vom Saal and Sheehan 1998; Lamb 
1997; Fagin 2012). BPA is a widely-used plasticizer, used to make plastic clear and 
tough. BPA was originally synthesized in the late nineteenth century, and then 
investigated as a synthetic estrogen in the 1930s (Dodds et al. 1938). After the 
development of DES as a much more potent synthetic estrogen, BPA was largely 
forgotten until the 1950s, when it was rediscovered by chemists at Bayer and General 
Electric (Vogel 2009). Since 1957, BPA has been a major industrial chemical. By the 
1980s, the chemicals industry produced one million tons of BPA worldwide, and in 2018, 
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production is over eight billion pounds (EPA 2010; CDC 2016). BPA production 
worldwide is a fifteen to twenty-billion-dollar industry.  
 Use of BPA in ubiquitous consumer products like food cans and plastic bottles 
went unnoticed until 1997. In 1997, vom Saal and his lab published a study on the effects 
of in utero exposure to DES and BPA on male reproduction in mice (vom Saal et al. 
1997b). As vom Saal and his co-authors lay out in their 1997 article, researchers had 
proposed that estrogen played a role in prostate development just as androgen does (vom 
Saal et al. 1997b). Based on some previous research, vom Saal’s lab attempted to 
determine the effect of in utero exposure to two synthetic estrogens on prostate 
development in mice. They found that administration of synthetic estrogens in very low 
doses resulted in prostate enlargement while high doses resulted in stunted prostate 
growth (vom Saal et al. 1997b).  
From their data, vom Saal and his colleagues proposed that synthetic estrogens 
like BPA follow an inverted U dose response curve. Traditional toxicology assumes that 
dose response curves are linear: the more of a poison an individual is exposed to, the 
worse the effects of that poison. Though poisons had been shown to violate that 
assumption by the 1990s, most notably x-ray radiation, researchers still assumed that 
most substances followed a linear dose response curve (Fagin 2012). In 1997 and in 
follow up publications in 1998, vom Saal and his colleagues raised the possibility that 
BPA and other synthetic estrogens followed non-monotonic (non-linear) dose response 
curves (vom Saal et al. 1997b; vom Saal and Sheehan 1998). That meant that BPA and 
other endocrine disruptors could disrupt normal function at very low doses—parts per 
trillion, or a hundred-million-fold less than normal blood estrogen levels (Vogel 2012).  
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Vom Saal’s findings were hugely impactful in 1997 because of their implications. 
For much of the 1990s, some researchers argued that endocrine disruptors did not 
threaten human health because humans are exposed to such low doses of endocrine 
disruptors in their daily lives (Stone 1994; Safe 1995; Safe 2000; Fagin 2012). But vom 
Saal’s study showed that low doses, those encountered in daily life, could impact health if 
exposure occurred at certain points. That gave credence to the endocrine disruptor 
concept and the threat endocrine disruptors posed to human health.  
It also threw a wrench in the regulatory testing of endocrine disruptors. To 
determine the toxicity of chemicals, toxicologists usually seek to find the no observed 
adverse effect level (NOAEL) and/or the lowest observed adverse effect level (LOAEL). 
The NOAEL is the highest level of exposure the results in no adverse effects. In other 
words, the NOAEL is a conservative value under which it is assumed that the chemical is 
safe. Many regulations of toxic chemicals take as their starting point the NOAEL. Once a 
chemical NOAEL is established, a regulatory agency may then decrease the value by one 
order of magnitude and make that smaller amount the amount of the chemical that is 
legally allowed to appear in a food product (Lagarde, 2015).  
The potential toxicity of endocrine disruptors at very low doses identified by vom 
Saal reduced the value of NOAELs as a starting point. In light of vom Saal’s findings, 
BPA’s safe minimum dose may be zero, which would require its complete ban. Zero 
tolerance for trace levels of chemicals is very hard to enforce and also to achieve, if the 
particular chemical is in any way used in the production process. Given the wide use of 
BPA, that could be catastrophic. Further, because BPA and other endocrine disruptors 
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may follow a non-linear dose response curve, testing would require examination of far 
more doses than usual, making testing more expensive and time consuming.  
Given the implications of vom Saal’s findings for industry and regulation, a large 
controversy developed (Vogel 2012; Fagin 2012). First, according to vom Saal, he was 
approached by a representative of Dow Chemical Company. The representative stated the 
company’s distress at vom Saal’s findings and proceeded to dispute vom Saal’s data 
(Shannon 2008). Vom Saal and his colleague, Wade Welshons, interpreted the 
representative’s words as an unsubtle threat. Second, Colborn, as a member of the EPA 
Committee determining recommendations for endocrine disruptor testing, raised vom 
Saal’s research to argue for the need for low dose testing and testing at different 
developmental stages. Industry representatives again disputed vom Saal’s findings, 
pointing to the lack of replication. As Sarah Vogel put it, industry dismissed vom Saal’s 
work as a “misguided attempt to hold up a flawed theory of endocrine disruption” (Vogel 
2012).  
In order to demonstrate the erroneous conclusions of vom Saal’s study, industry 
(the Society of the Plastics Industry and the European Chemical Industry Council) funded 
John Ashby at AstraZeneca to replicate vom Saal’s work (Vogel 2012). Vom Saal’s lab 
played an active role in the replication, teaching Ashby’s team their methods. Ashby’s 
study found no statistically significant effects from the low dose BPA administration 
(Ashby, Tinwell, Haseman 1999). Neither did a second group’s study, funded by Shell 
Chemical, Dow Chemical, General Electric, and Bayer (Cagen et al. 1999; Vogel 2012).  
Industry, and skeptics of the endocrine disruptor concept, framed both studies as putting 
to rest vom Saal’s claims and definitively disproving the idea that low doses of endocrine 
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disrupting chemicals could have any effect. Following that message by industry, vom 
Saal and his colleague Danial Sheehan exchanged a set of essays with James Lamb, who 
worked for the private consulting firm Jellinek, Schwartz, and Connolly Inc (Sheehan and 
vom Saal 1997; vom Saal and Sheehan 1998; Lamb 1997; Vogel 2012). In those essays, 
neither side could agree on what was at issue. Vom Saal and Sheehan highlighted the 
need to reevaluate regulatory testing to account for low dose and non-monotonic dose 
response curves (Sheehan and vom Saal 1997). Lamb disputed the existence of such 
curves, explaining them away and sidestepping the issue of regulatory change (Lamb 
1997). That conversation between vom Saal and Lamb demonstrates proponents 
continued efforts to make endocrine disruptors the subject of regulatory and social 
concern and to frame endocrine disruptors as a unique problem, something to worry 
about.  
Given that viewpoint, vom Saal and other proponents pushed the FDA to 
reevaluate the safety of BPA (vom Saal et al. 2007). The FDA refused (Vogel 2009; 
Fagin 2012). The EPA, however, did consider low dose response and its implications 
(NTP 2000). The EPA asked the National Toxicology Program to review low dose 
literature and make recommendations (NTP 2000). The National Toxicology Program 
report, published in 2000, struck a moderate note, stating that:  
Low-dose effects, as defined for this review, were demonstrated in laboratory 
animals exposed to certain endocrine active agents. The effects are dependent on 
the compound studied and the endpoint measured. In some cases where low-dose 
effects have been reported, the findings have not been replicated. The 
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toxicological significance of many of these effects has not been determined. (NTP 
2000, vii)  
Not a ringing endorsement, but the report did acknowledge the existence of non-
monotonic dose response curves, a step forward from complete disagreement over their 
existence.  
While agencies grappled with whether low dose response impacted their mandate, 
popular media grappled with the increasingly fractured endocrine disruptor field. 
Throughout the early 2000s, vom Saal was savaged in several publications (Milloy 2001; 
Butterworth 2014; Shannon 2008; Fagin 2012). Steve Milloy, in an article for Fox News, 
called vom Saal a “cult leader” and claimed that vom Saal’s lab mice were interbred to 
the point of being useless (Milloy 2001). An article in Forbes mocked vom Saal’s 
portrayal as “a cross between Tiresias and Helen of Troy,” sarcastically implying that 
vom Saal was far from prophetic and that he launched an unnecessary war on BPA 
(Butterworth 2014). Vom Saal did not take such criticism lying down, calling out 
industry and the “Third World” regulations of the US, while also rallying like-minded 
scientists to issue a consensus statement in 2007 (Shannon 2008; vom Saal et al. 2007). 
In that statement, the researchers stated that, “[c]oncern regarding exposure throughout 
life is based on evidence that there is chronic, low level exposure of virtually everyone in 
developed countries to BPA” (vom Saal 2007). They noted that current testing 
mechanisms did not account for BPA.  
 Though vom Saal was certainly villainized by industry and skeptics of the 
endocrine disruptor concept and the low dose concept, he won in the court of public 
opinion. His research showing the risk of BPA exposure spurred wide scale public 
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concern over the use of BPA, particularly in baby bottles. Vom Saal played into the 
heroism, interviewing with the Environmental Working Group and Mother Jones 
(Shannon 2008; Blake 2014a; Blake 2014b). By 2009, public boycotts resulted in the 
removal of BPA from baby bottles, and as of 2018, many plastic products are 
prominently labeled “BPA Free,” as testament to the success of vom Saal’s work to affect 
social change.  
 The case of BPA characterizes the third era of scientific discussion of endocrine 
disruptors. The apparent polarization of the second era came to an end, to be replaced by 
a very strong animosity between the two sides of the endocrine disruptor debate. Few, if 
any, researchers maintained a moderate position on BPA and the ‘conversation’ between 
either side was harsh and not particularly fruitful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The third era of discussion continues into the modern day. Endocrine disruptor 
literature published in 2018 frequently includes digs at opposing viewpoints or long 
descriptions of the best ways to bring together a fractured field—usually either by 
abandoning endocrine disruptor research all together or accepting that endocrine 
disruptors exist and are damaging (Vandenberg et al. 2009; Vandenberg et al. 2012; 
Zoeller et al. 2014; Nohynek 2013; Lamb et al. 2014).  
As of 2018, researchers studying endocrine disruptors remain in two camps: those 
who think endocrine disruptors pose a threat to humans and those who do not. Each 
group investigates largely the same question of generally how do endocrine disruptors 
work. Each group especially works to establish cause (exposure to endocrine disruptors) 
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and effect (development of adverse health effect). Debate over non-monotonic dose 
response curves and low dose effects continues, serving as two major fighting points over 
whether endocrine disruptors pose a threat to human health (Vandenberg et al. 2009; 
Vandenberg et al. 2012; Rhomberg and Goodman 2012; NRC 2014). Relatively little has 
changed in terms of opposing viewpoints since 1997.  
Recently, the fractured nature of the scientific community around endocrine 
disruptors has played out most clearly in discussions of how to regulate endocrine 
disruptors in the European Union (EU), and in particular how to define endocrine 
disruptors for regulation. In 1999, the European Commission responded to public 
pressure to regulate endocrine disruptors with a “Strategy for Endocrine Disruptors” 
(European Commission 1999). In the strategy, the Commission made research 
cooperation its short-term goal, leaving the development of testing methods and 
regulations for further in the future, perhaps reflecting a better awareness of the scientific 
dissidence over endocrine disruption (European Commission 1999).  
In the short term, research cooperation did not come about, but in 2009 (and again 
in 2012) the EU passed regulation that established consequences for use of endocrine 
disruptors in biocides and plant protection products (European Commission 2018a). In 
both pieces of legislation, the EU required the Commission to develop “scientific criteria 
for the determination of endocrine-disrupting properties” (European Commission 2016, 
2). In other words, to decide on the definition of endocrine disruption in order to direct 
regulatory efforts. The deadline for that decision was 2013. The Commission failed to 
meet that deadline. By 2015, a Court of Justice of the European Union ruling forced the 
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Commission to reconfirm their work toward a definition and promise a draft by the 
summer of 2016 (European Commission 2016, 3).  
In June 2016, the Commission released their definition, one from a 2002 meeting 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) on the “Global Assessment of the State-of-the-
Science of Endocrine Disruptors” (WHO 2002). The Commission defined an endocrine 
disruptor as “an exogenous substance or mixture that alters function(s) of the endocrine 
system and consequently causes adverse health effects in an intact organism, or its 
progeny, or (sub)populations,” where adverse effect is further defined as “change in the 
morphology, physiology, growth, development, reproduction, or, life span of an 
organism, system, or (sub)population that results in an impairment of functional capacity, 
an impairment of the capacity to compensate for additional stress, or an increase in 
susceptibility to other influences” (European Commission 2016, 4–5; WHO 2002, 1). The 
definition and associated criteria was met with immediate backlash from endocrine 
disruptor researchers and environmental groups who claimed that the definition set the 
standard for establishing endocrine disruption impossibly high (Neslen 2016). Industry 
also complained due to the Commission’s decision to exclude potency as part of 
identification (Paun 2018). As of 2018, the Commission’s definition has not been agreed 
upon by the EU Parliament, meaning that member states have not adopted the proposed 
criteria (European Commission 2018a).  
The continued debate in the EU over the definition of endocrine disruptors and 
how to assess dangerous endocrine disruption is reflective of many of happenings 
detailed in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I showed how the scientific community could 
not come to a consensus on the endocrine disruptor concept in the 1990s, and in this 
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chapter, I have shown how the intervention of societal actors in the endocrine disruptor 
discussion polarized the endocrine disruptor community in the US. That polarization has 
become international, leaving countries trying to establish regulations for endocrine 
disruptors fighting a losing battle. There is no scientific consensus, and the absolute 
beliefs held by many endocrine disruptor researchers makes discussion difficult. 
Regulators, in looking for an agreed upon and scientifically supported definition to focus 
their regulation, find none.  
Social actors have played a role in the scientific polarization of 2018. As I have 
argued in this chapter, had popular media not mainstreamed the endocrine disruptor 
concept in 1993, the concept may very well have languished at the scientific fringe or 
been subsumed into the continuing conversation on environmental estrogens. Had 
industry and government not intervened in 1996, the endocrine disruptor field may not 
have polarized to such a degree, where studying endocrine disruptors becomes a political 
endeavor. Social factors provoked scientific response. In an age where media, industry, 
and government play such a large role in the conduct and presentation of science, it is 
necessary to consider the role of societal actors.  
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CHAPTER 6 
HOW THE SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS MADE ITS WAY INTO 
REGULATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When proponents introduced the endocrine disruptor concept in 1991, they made 
clear that one of their main goals was to get endocrine disruptors regulated. In their 
statement, they laid out clear regulatory goals, and the concept itself was not only 
scientific and social, but also regulatory. The legwork proponents did in situating the 
endocrine disruptor concept in three different spheres ultimately helped them get the 
substances regulated. Throughout the 1990s, proponents took advantage of the scientific, 
social, and regulatory appeal of endocrine disruptors, playing actors in each area off each 
other and cultivating a particular narrative in each area. In this chapter, I explore how 
proponents of the endocrine disruptor concept used a series of social and political 
circumstances, along with a carefully crafted scientific narrative, to get the empty concept 
of endocrine disruptors regulated in 1996 with the Food Quality Protection Act and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments.   
 In this chapter, I advance a two-part argument to explain how endocrine 
disruptors came to be regulated in the US. The first part deals with the regulatory 
landscape in the early 1990s that significantly aided proponents of regulating endocrine 
disruptors. That landscape was dominated by four circumstances: 1. The revision of 
pesticide regulation in the US through the demise of the Delaney clause, 2. The 
environmental emphasis of the Clinton administration and the receptiveness of several 
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EPA administrators to the endocrine disruptor concept, 3. The wider social fear of breast 
cancer incidence as something that was increasing and stealing the lives of loved ones, 
and 4. The growing awareness of development as easily perturbed and therefore infants 
and children as a vulnerable group that needed pesticide regulations to protect them. Each 
of those circumstances increased the probability that an endocrine disruptor screening 
program could be passed in the US by either lowering the barriers to such a passage or by 
increasing social pressure to regulate endocrine disruptors.  
 However, that window of opportunity in the early 1990s would not in itself have 
resulted in the regulation of endocrine disruptors. Proponents of regulating the substances 
had to take advantage of the opportunity and advance a narrative about endocrine 
disruptors that fit. They did that partially through a public campaign in the media to 
portray endocrine disruptors as substances that would detrimentally impact all of our 
lives, as discussed in other chapters. But much of their work took place in Congressional 
hearings, where they could explicitly use scientific evidence to argue for a particular kind 
of regulation.  
In the early history of endocrine disruptors, five relevant hearings with proponents 
of regulating endocrine disruptors advanced a very narrow set of scientific facts, 
especially emphasizing that endocrine disruptors cause breast cancer and disrupt 
development, in order to solidify the empty category of endocrine disruptors in particular 
ways. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, proponents of the concept crafted the endocrine 
disruptor category in broad strokes, leaving out important details like how to identify 
endocrine disruption. But during the hearings leading up to the passage of the Food 
Quality Protection Act, proponents solidified the concept in carefully selected ways that 
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left the impression that endocrine disruptors had been conclusively and causatively 
connected to effects like breast cancer and declining sperm counts. In that way, 
proponents took advantage of the unique window of opportunity to reinforce the idea that 
endocrine disruptors must be regulated.  
 The result of both the window of opportunity and the inclusion of very specific 
science was the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program, the only regulation of endocrine 
disruptors in the US. In this chapter, I give a brief overview of the regulation, before 
walking through the four circumstances that combined to enable its passage. Then I detail 
the hearings through which endocrine disruptors were regulated, paying special attention 
to the science presented at each hearing as well as the attendees presenting the science. 
Finally, I highlight some general trends across the hearings to demonstrate the inclusion 
of very specific scientific facts.   
 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTOR SCREENING PROGRAM 
 The Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program was established in 1996 with 
passage of two federal bills: the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 (Pub. L. 104–170, 7 USC § 136 et seq.; Pub. 
L. 104–182 § 1316). For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the Food Quality 
Protection Act as it was passed first, each Act contained the same language, and most of 
the discussion of endocrine disruptors centered around the Food Quality Protection Act.  
 The regulation of endocrine disruptors comes from a single section within the 
larger Act. That section states:  
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ESTROGENIC SUBSTANCES SCREENING PROGRAM.-  
(1) DEVELOPMENT.-Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this 
section, the Administrator shall in consultation with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services develop a screening program, using appropriate validated test 
systems and other scientifically relevant information, to determine whether certain 
substances may have an effect in humans that is similar to an effect produced by a 
naturally occurring estrogen, or such other endocrine effect as the Administrator 
may designate. (Pub. L. 104–170, 7 USC § 136 et seq.)  
In essence, the Act mandated that the EPA establish a program to test for hormonal 
activity in new chemicals. Notice that the language of the Act does not specifically 
require the establishment of an endocrine disruptor screening program, only an estrogenic 
substances screening program. Nor does it use the term endocrine disruptor. The 
incorporation of the term into the final EPA program was due to the behind the scenes 
work of Lynn Goldman and, to a lesser extent, Carol Browner (Krimsky 2000; EPA 
1996d; EPA 1996e; EPA 1996f). Both high ranking EPA officials, Goldman and 
Browner integrated the idea of endocrine disruptors and their testing into the EPA long 
before the passage of the Food Quality Protection. As discussed later in this chapter, 
Goldman and Browner served as administration insiders for the endocrine disruptor 
concept and proponents of regulating the substances.  
 The section requiring a screening program was a last-minute addition to a much 
larger bill. On the whole, the Food Quality Protection Act reshaped chemical regulation 
in the US, through the streamlining and standardization of pesticide approvals through 
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the EPA and mandating health-based standards for pesticide evaluation. The added 
section on estrogenic substances was only a small piece of a much larger bill. The 
addition was added the very day that the Act passed in the House and did not appear in 
any prior versions of this specific bill nor in other food quality bills more generally (H.R. 
4739 100th Cong.; H.R. 1725 101st Cong.; S. 2875 100th Cong.; S. 722 101st Cong.; H.R. 
2342 102nd Cong.; S. 1074 102nd Cong.; H.R. 2597 102nd Cong.; H.R. 3216 102nd Cong.; 
S. 331 103rd Cong.; H.R. 872 103rd Cong.; S. 1478 103rd Cong.; H.R. 4091 103rd Cong.; 
S. 2084 103rd Cong.; H.R. 4362 103rd Cong.).  
The version of the Food Quality Protection Act that passed in 1996 was first 
introduced in 1995 by Thomas J. Bliley Jr., a Republican Representative from Virginia 
(H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). H.R. 1627 went through two committees and was amended 
twice before passage (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.; H.R. 1627 IH, RH, RDS, EH; Committee 
on Agriculture 1996; Committee on Commerce 1996). Because hormonally active 
chemicals, estrogenic substances, endocrine disruptors, and reproductive or 
developmental toxicity were not mentioned in any previous versions of the bill, I will not 
be dealing with any previous versions in this chapter.23  
  
 
                                                 
23 Only one Congressional bill prior to the Food Quality Protection Act included 
language mandating the testing of estrogenic chemicals, the Pesticide Reform Act of 
1994 introduced by California Representative Henry Waxman. Waxman’s bill had no 
cosponsors and was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Health and Environment, which did nothing with it (H.R. 4362 103rd Cong.). Waxman 
played a pivotal role in getting endocrine disruptors regulated, as discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter. His 1994 bill was a first attempt, but because it died well before any 
meaningful discussion of it took place, I will not cover it in this chapter.  
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PART I: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
The first part of my argument regarding how the Endocrine Disruptor Screening 
Program was enacted deals with a unique window of opportunity in the 1990s that 
significantly increased the likelihood that something like the program could be passed. In 
the US, regulatory overhaul like that of the Food Quality Protection Act and the 
Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program is relatively rare, with most changes in 
regulation being more incremental. That makes the passage of the Program something 
worthy of explanation.  
 The passage of the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program was enabled by a set 
of four circumstances, all of which increased the likelihood that such a thing could pass. 
The first two set of circumstances were specific governmental changes that lowered 
barriers to the passage: the demise of the Delaney clause and a receptive Clinton 
administration. The second two circumstances both increased the attention paid to 
endocrine disruptors, and therefore increased the pressure to and benefit of doing 
something to address them. I walk through each circumstance below.  
 
The Demise of the Delaney Clause 
The first circumstance that increased the probability that an endocrine disruptor 
screening program would pass in Congress came out of several decades of legal and 
judicial maneuvering. By the 1990s, Congress was put in a position of having to change 
regulation of chemicals due to a 1958 clause in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (Pub. L. 75–717, 21 USC § 301 et seq.). In order to establish how that came about, I 
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go back and detail that initial clause, the Delaney clause, and its implementation in the 
three decades between its passage and its removal.  
The first regulation of food in the US came in 1906, riding a wave of concern 
regarding the safety of meat products after the publication of Upton Sinclair’s novel The 
Jungle (Sinclair 1906; Greenberg 2016). In 1906, Congress passed the Food and Drugs 
Act of 1906 (34 Stat. 768), which forbade the marketing of products that “contain[ed] any 
added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may render [the food] 
injurious to health” (34 Stat. 768, 770). The Act granted the newly formed Food and 
Drug Administration24 (FDA) the ability to punish violations of the policy after the fact, 
but no ability to regulate production of food and drugs prior to marketing. The Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906 was the first attempt by the US government to regulate threats to food 
safety, which was in turn part of a progressive movement to regulate products that 
affected public health (Merrill 1997).  
The 1906 Food and Drugs Act (also known as the Pure Food and Drugs Act) was 
revised in 1938 as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. The revision, titled the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA), was in direct response to the 
marketing of Elixir sulfanilamide, a therapeutic agent that resulted in the deaths of more 
than 100 people, poisoned by the improperly prepared product (Merrill 1997). The 1938 
Act reinforced the FDA’s role as a policing agency and bolstered the FDA’s capacity 
                                                 
24 The Food and Drug Administration was not known as the Food and Drug 
Administration until 1930. However, the federal agency that we now know as the Food 
and Drug Administration can trace its origin to the Food and Drugs Act of 1906. For 
purposes of clarity, I will refer to the predecessor agency as the FDA.  
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(and the US government’s ability more broadly) to regulate consumer products that could 
harm public health.  
 In 1958, Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, passing 
the Food Additives Amendment of 1958. The 1958 Amendment broadly required FDA 
approval for all new food ingredients and food-contact materials like packaging. 
However, the Amendment contained one clause that significantly changed food and 
pesticide regulation in the US. Within the Food Additives Amendment, the Delaney 
Clause states,  
… No additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer when 
ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for 
the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal ... 
(52 Stat. 1041, 1785)  
In short, the Delaney clause precluded the FDA from approving any chemical that could 
be carcinogenic when fed to animals or humans. As many noted at the time of its passing, 
the Delaney clause was widely problematic, not least of which because most chemicals 
on earth can be shown to be carcinogenic in animals under the right circumstances 
(Degnan and Flamm 1995, 237). That meant that under strict interpretation of the 
Delaney clause, no chemical could be approved, which would make industry in the US 
difficult.   
 In the early 1960s, the widespread use of one particular substance underlined the 
issues with strict interpretation of the Delaney clause. In 1938, researchers in the UK 
synthesized one of the first synthetic estrogens, diethylstilbestrol (DES) (Dodds et al. 
1938). DES was inexpensive to produce and highly effective as an estrogen mimic 
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(Abboud 2015). Throughout the 1940s, several studies demonstrated that administration 
of DES to livestock animals, like cows and chickens, resulted in increased size and 
improved feed conversion (the efficiency with which livestock convert feed to increased 
body mass) (Lorenz 1943; Dinusson, Andrews, and Beeson 1948; Dinusson, Andrews, 
and Beeson 1950; Raun and Preston 2002). As a synthetic estrogen, DES acted as a 
growth hormone for chickens and cows. By 1954, the FDA approved oral administration 
of DES in beef cattle, and in 1957, the agency approved the use of DES implants 
(compressed tablets placed subcutaneously) in cattle (Raun and Preston 2002). Uptake of 
DES as a growth hormone in livestock was rapid. By the 1960s, DES was the most 
common growth promoter used in the US (Marcus 1994; Epstein 1990). Upwards of 95 
percent of cattle were fed DES over their lifetimes, meaning that much of the livestock 
industry relied on its use (Marcus 1994). 
 However, DES should not have been approved for use under the Delaney clause. 
Several studies throughout the 1950s demonstrated the carcinogenic effects of DES at 
high doses, particularly in estrogen-sensitive tissues like mammary tissue (Bern 1960; 
Gardener 1939; Cole et al. 1975). Such studies should have disqualified the use of DES, 
but the carcinogenicity of DES was less than clear cut. Additional studies of DES 
indicated that the chemical was not carcinogenic at low doses, leaving many researchers 
questioning whether the doses of DES given to livestock would increase cancer rates in 
the animals (Marcus 1994). Additionally, detection methods in the 1950s and 1960s 
could not detect DES in the meat from DES-fed livestock, apparently abrogating any risk 
to humans (Raun and Preston 2002). Though under strict interpretation of the Delaney 
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clause, the FDA should have barred the use of DES, they instead relied on the lack of 
residues in meat to support the continued use of DES.  
 To codify that policy, in 1962, the FDA proposed (and Congress passed) the DES 
proviso (Committee on Pesticide Use Patterns 1987; 21 U.S.C. 360b(d)(1)(I)). The DES 
proviso stated that the FDA did not have to apply the Delaney clause to carcinogenic 
drugs or feed additives given to livestock as long as the agency could show that the 
substances could not be found in the resulting meat. In essence, the assumption was that 
as long as the carcinogens could not be detected in products, then the products could not 
pose any risk to public health.  
The DES proviso allowed the FDA to continue to approve the use of DES in 
livestock until the 1970s. By the 1970s, though, improved sensitivity of detection tests 
made clear that any administration of DES during life resulted in residues after slaughter 
(Merrill 1997). The resulting residues invalidated the FDA’s work-around of the Delaney 
clause. Additionally, in 1971, the work of Arthur Herbst and Robert Scully revealed DES 
as a potent human carcinogen, increasing scrutiny of its use in livestock (Raun and 
Preston 2002; Herbst and Scully 1970). Thus began the FDA’s (and later the EPA’s) two-
decade effort to evade the Delaney clause.  
In order to allow for the continued use of DES, as well as many other chemicals 
used in food production, the FDA adopted a quantitative risk assessment protocol for 
chemical residues in food (Committee on Pesticide Use Patterns 1987). Under the 
protocol, the FDA approved carcinogenic chemicals as long as sponsors could 
demonstrate that the resulting residues did not increase lifetime cancer risk by more than 
1 in 1,000,000 (1×10-6) (Committee on Pesticide Use Patterns 1987; Merrill 1997). Not 
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only did that pacify the agricultural industry, which had come to rely on a wide range of 
chemicals, but it more generally made the Delaney clause practical to enforce.  
The FDA’s numerical contortion did not go unnoticed, especially given the 
increased attention paid to industrial and agricultural chemicals with the growing 
environmental movement. Environmental groups brought numerous challenges to the 
FDA’s enforcement of the Delaney clause throughout the 1970s (Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. DHEW 1970; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus 1971; 
Chemetron Corp. v. DHEW 1974; Hess & Clark, Division of Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA 1974). 
Organizations like the Environmental Defense Fund repeatedly lost the cases as judges 
deferred to the FDA on the best way to interpret and apply the Delaney clause 
(Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. DHEW 1970; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Ruckelshaus 1971). Such deferral fits into a much larger narrative about the relationship 
between federal agencies and the judicial branch in light of the Administrative 
Procedures Act of 1946, which is not relevant for this chapter (Pierce 1996; Shapiro 
1996). What is relevant is that by the 1980s, courts had ceased to defer to the FDA on 
appropriate enforcement of the Delaney clause and instead repeatedly referred to the 
explicit language of the clause itself (Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., ETC. v. FDA 1980; Scott v. 
FDA 1984; Public Citizen v. DHHS 1986; Public Citizen v Young 1987; Public Citizen v. 
Bowen 1987; Simpson v. Young 1988; Nader v. EPA 1988). Federal courts vacated FDA 
approvals of several new chemicals in the late 1980s25 due to strict interpretation of the 
                                                 
25 Cases in the 1980s dealt both with new pesticides as well as with color additives.  
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Delaney clause in court. Those cases signaled the beginning of the end of the Delaney 
clause as a viable regulation.  
That end came quickly in the 1990s with decisions in three California court cases: 
California v. Reilly (1990), Les v. Reilly (1992), and California v. Browner (1994). Each 
case was brought against the EPA, which had replaced the FDA in regulating pesticides 
following its creation in 1970. In each case, decided subsequently in 1990, 1992, and 
1994, courts required the EPA to apply the Delaney clause to an increasing number of 
pesticides, until the decision in the 1994 case California v. Browner required the EPA to 
revoke approval for 121 pesticide/crop combinations (California v. Browner 1994; 
Merrill 1997). If the EPA had in fact barred the use of so many pesticides, the agricultural 
industry in the US would have been severely impacted. Because of that, the decision in 
California v. Browner necessitated the replacement of the Delaney clause.   
The necessity of leaving behind the Delaney clause did not go unnoticed by 
Congress. Beginning in 1990, many Congressional representatives proposed bills to 
overhaul the regulation of chemicals in the US (H.R. 4739 100th Cong.; H.R. 1725 101st 
Cong.; S. 2875 100th Cong.; S. 722 101st Cong.). Both Democrats and Republicans 
suggested a number of solutions, but the bills failed to generate any sense of urgency. 
However, California v. Browner increased the need to get some sort of bill passed, 
especially after 1994. A new system for regulating food-related chemicals (pesticides, 
chemicals used in food packaging, food additives, etc.) was going to be passed before 
1997, when the Browner decision had to be implemented.  
The fact that such a reorganization was going to occur created an opening for 
proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors. Proponents like Colborn wanted to see 
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endocrine disruptors regulated. Total overhaul of regulations in the US is quite rare; most 
changes are more incremental. If Colborn and others could convince enough 
representatives of the need to regulate endocrine disruptors and that regulation was 
incorporated into the larger changes to chemical regulations, then proponents had a better 
than normal chance of getting an endocrine disruptor screening program on the books. 
The demise of the Delaney clause and the anticipated reconceptualization of chemicals 
approval was one of a series of circumstances that increased the probability of regulating 
endocrine disruptors in the early 1990s.  
 
A Receptive Clinton Administration 
 The second circumstance of proponents’ window of opportunity became clear in 
1993. Bill Clinton was sworn in as 42nd president of the US on 20 January 1993, along 
with his vice president, Al Gore. Clinton came to the White House with a poor 
environmental record (NYT 1993; Vogel 2012). As governor of Arkansas, he worked 
closely with the poultry industry, heavy polluters in the state. He admitted to overlooking 
pollution to charm industry and bring jobs to his poor state (NYT 1993). However, his 
selection of Gore as his running mate gave many environmentalists hope that his 
presidency would be different (NYT 1993; Ifill 1992). Gore passionately supported 
environmental issues during his time in Congress and it appears Clinton and his 
campaign specifically selected Gore to appeal to an increasingly environmentally-
conscious electorate (Ifill 1992).  
 After inauguration, Gore seemed to have an outsize effect on Clinton and his 
administration. Clinton, on the campaign trail and in office, emphasized that 
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environmental regulations need not eliminate jobs and that he was committed to a cleaner 
America (Schneider 1992). More concretely, Clinton appointed several environmental 
sympathizers to key positions, including Bruce Babbitt, former governor of Arizona 
(Friedman 1992).  
 Most importantly for endocrine disruptors, Clinton appointed Carol Browner, 
Florida Secretary of Environmental Regulation and Gore student, as Administrator of the 
EPA and Lynn Goldman, a pediatrician from California’s Department of Public Health, 
as Assistant Administrator of the Office for Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances 
(Friedman 1992). Both women were aware of endocrine disruptors and their potential 
impact on health. As told by Goldman in her foreword to Sheldon Krimsky’s Hormonal 
Chaos,  
The endocrine disrupter issue was at the center of my radar screen from the first 
day of my term (1993–1999) … Such was the sense of urgency attached to the 
issue that, one day in October 1993, EPA Administrator Carol Browner was asked 
to swear me into office on an urgent basis so I could testify before a hearing of a 
subcommittee of the House Government Oversight Committee about estrogens in 
the environment … The testimony [of the scientists at the hearing] … convinced 
me that the issue should become a priority for the EPA’s chemical and pesticide 
programs. (Krimsky 2000: vii–viii)  
Goldman and Browner were both aware of endocrine disruptors as a new category 
of toxic substances and believed that the EPA should play a large role in their regulation. 
Goldman had conducted a significant amount of research in California on the impact of 
pesticides on the health of children and testified in 1991 on “Government Regulation of 
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Reproductive Hazards” (Goldman et al. 1985; Paigen et al. 1987; U.S. Congress Senate 
1991, Testimony of Lynn Goldman). Colborn introduced endocrine disruptors for the 
first time at the same hearing (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn).  
 Clinton’s election and appointments created a receptive environment for the 
science and regulation of endocrine disruptors. Both Browner and Goldman saw it as a 
priority—not simply reorganizing pesticide regulation in the US, but more specifically 
addressing hormonally active agents and their impact on children and infants. Gore was 
also aware of endocrine disruptors, writing the preface for Colborn’s book, Our Stolen 
Future, in 1996 (Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1997). For proponents of the regulation 
of endocrine disruptors, the Clinton administration’s awareness and belief in the problem 
of endocrine disruptors meant they had sympathetic ears inside an administration that 
sought to make a mark on environmental regulation in the US.  
  Such a welcome, in combination with the changes occurring to chemicals 
regulation, created a unique moment in history whereby novel legislation regarding a new 
category of toxic substances could be passed, if the right people were spoken with and the 
right science emphasized. The receptive Clinton administration formed the second of four 
circumstances that together enabled the implementation of the Endocrine Disruptor 
Screening Program.  
 
Widespread Fear of Breast Cancer 
 The final two circumstances that increased the probability of endocrine disruptor 
regulation differed slightly from the first two. While the demise of the Delaney clause 
and the receptive Clinton administration were specific governmental changes, the 
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widespread fear of breast cancer and the growing awareness of development as a 
vulnerable time were more general trends that created strong social pressure on 
legislators to act.  
 A vast amount of social pressure grew out of the focus on breast cancer in the 
1990s. In 1990, experts estimated that one in ten women in the US would develop breast 
cancer, a 25 percent increase26 from the 1980s (Andsager and Powers 1999; Kahi and 
Lawrence-Bauer 1996). That increase, along with the work of several non-profit breast 
cancer groups, brought attention to the disease. Women’s magazines like Ladies Home 
Journal and Ms. intensified their coverage of breast cancer by 33 percent and news 
sources like TIME and Newsweek also published more stories on breast cancer (Andsager 
and Powers 1999).  
 A number of other happenings in the 1990s grew the attention to breast cancer 
still further. In 1990, Medicare began covering biannual mammograms for women, 
meaning that more women discussed breast cancer with their physicians as part of their 
annual care (Beck et al. 1990; Andsager and Powers 1999). That same year, at the 
University of California, Berkeley, Mary-Claire King discovered the BRCA1 gene, 
associated with breast and ovarian cancer (Hall et al. 1990). In 1991, the newly formed 
National Breast Cancer Coalition started a grassroots campaign to increase funding for 
                                                 
26 Information on the increased incidence of breast cancer in the 1990s varies, with some 
postulating that it was only a 15 percent increase while others indicate that the increase 
could have been closer to 30 percent (Glass et al. 2007). However, the actual value 
matters less than the fact that there was widespread public belief that rates had increased 
significantly and that the lives of many women were threatened by the increase.  
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breast cancer research (Gorman 1993). All of those occurrences heightened the general 
public’s knowledge and fear of breast cancer.27 
 In short, much of the public and Congress was familiar with breast cancer as a 
modern problem and many demanded action. Clinton’s voice joined the demand for 
action after his mother was diagnosed with breast cancer (Osuch et al. 2012). She died in 
1994 from the disease (Osuch et al. 2012). The social pressure to act to stem the flow of 
mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters affected by breast cancer was high.  
 Action took many forms, including an increased budget for breast cancer research 
from the National Cancer Institute and the passage of several bills emphasizing women’s 
health (Osuch et al. 2012). But it also took the form of regulating endocrine disruptors. 
As I will discuss in part II of this chapter, much of the expressed logic for regulating 
endocrine disruptors was as a means to reduce the incidence of breast cancer in the US. 
The public fear and pressure to act on breast cancer made up the third circumstance that 
enabled the passage of endocrine disruptor regulation.  
 
Awareness of Development as Vulnerable to Perturbation 
 Awareness of development as a special or different time for the toxicity of 
chemicals was the final circumstance that created the window of opportunity through 
                                                 
27 It is important to point out here that much of the public feared breast cancer as a 
disease that could steal their female family and friends from them and also feared breast 
cancer risk and all the invisible, unknown, and subtle factors that could add to that risk. 
Proponents, in their work with public news media and at Congressional hearings, clearly 
established endocrine disruptors as one of those factors that significantly increased an 
individual’s risk of developing breast cancer, thereby using the ides of risk in the public 
imagination to their advantage.  
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which endocrine disruptors were regulated. That awareness had grown throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, with the realizations about thalidomide and DES, 
but reached a new level in the early 1990s following the release of a report from the 
National Research Council.  
 In 1988, at the request of Congress, the National Academy of Sciences established 
a committee to examine the effects of pesticides in the diets of infants and children28 
(Committee on Pesticides 1993). The committee released their report in 1993. In the 
report, the committee highlighted the important difference between a fully mature adult 
and a developing sub-adult: “children are not little adults” (Committee on Pesticides 
1993, 3). Most, if not all, chemical testing and regulation at the time assumed that those 
exposed to chemicals would be fully grown adults, meaning that they did not account for 
the varying vulnerability of still-developing humans (Committee on Pesticides 1993). 
The committee’s main finding was in line with that, namely that infants and children 
differ qualitatively and quantitatively in their exposure to pesticides in food and their 
susceptibility to the toxicity of those pesticides. They recommended strong changes to 
pesticide regulation to reflect that.  
 The National Academy report received widespread media coverage, not only in 
larger newspapers like The New York Times but also in local newspapers and news 
broadcasts (Burros 1993). Parents in the US were inundated with the information that 
pesticides could threaten the health of their children. Many environmental groups hyped 
                                                 
28 The Committee on Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children defined infants and 
children as any individual between twenty-six weeks’ gestation and eighteen years old 
(Committee on Pesticides 1993, 2–3). 
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the report, adding to the coverage. The Environmental Working Group (EWG) published 
their own report, just days after the National Academy published theirs (Burros 1993). In 
the EWG report, the organization claimed that a child in the US received the acceptable 
lifetime doses of eight pesticides within the first year of life (Burros 1993). That report 
also received quite a bit of coverage.  
 The National Academy report and the attention it brought to development as a 
sensitive time was the last circumstance that combined to create an opening for the 
regulation of endocrine disruptors. The idea of developing organisms as more easily 
perturbed by toxic chemicals fit into the narrative that many were already telling about 
endocrine disruption. Endocrine disruptors were those chemicals doubly affecting 
children and infants. The fear of breast cancer and the awareness of development both 
influenced the science used by proponents to argue for regulating endocrine disruptors.  
 The regulation of endocrine disruptors in 1996 was passed as a result of unique 
circumstances in the early 1990s. In particular, two governmental changes and two larger 
social trends combined to create a window of opportunity for proponents of the endocrine 
disruptor concept, whereby there was both a mechanism for passing legislation and a 
significant amount of social pressure that made doing so beneficial for representatives. 
Without the set of four circumstances, it is unlikely that the US would have regulated 
endocrine disruptors in the 1990s. The European Union, generally the more cautious of 
the two regulatory systems, did not release a statement on endocrine disruptors until 1999 
and earlier bills proposing to reform the chemical regulation in the US make it clear that 
no one within Congress was thinking to regulate endocrine disruptors (H.R. 4739 100th 
Cong.; H.R. 1725 101st Cong.; S. 2875 100th Cong.; S. 722 101st Cong.; H.R. 2342 102nd 
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Cong.; S. 1074 102nd Cong.; H.R. 2597 102nd Cong.; H.R. 3216 102nd Cong.; S. 331 103rd 
Cong.; H.R. 872 103rd Cong.; S. 1478 103rd Cong.; H.R. 4091 103rd Cong.; S. 2084 103rd 
Cong.; H.R. 4362 103rd Cong.). The statute that created the Endocrine Disruptor 
Screening Program was a last-minute addition after Committee review. It was not popular 
among industry groups. A significant segment of the scientific community disagreed with 
the regulation. The Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program is a bit miraculous and part 
of that is due to the four circumstances outlined above: 1. The demise of the Delaney 
clause, 2. The receptive Clinton administration, 3. The fear of breast cancer, and 4. The 
growing awareness of the vulnerability of infants and children.  
 
PART II: INCLUSION OF SELECT SCIENCE TO SOLIDIFY ENDOCRINE DISRUPTORS  
 However, those four things on their own would not have resulted in the creation 
of the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program. All four changes only created an opening 
that had to be taken advantage of by proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors. As I 
have detailed in other chapters, those proponents were largely scientists turned activists 
who worked diligently in public and regulatory spheres to tell a narrative about endocrine 
disruptors that prompted action. Environmental groups also took up that task. Groups like 
the National Resource Defense Council, the National Coalition Against the Misuse of 
Pesticides, and the EWG released their own public statements and participated actively in 
many of the hearings on endocrine disruptors.  
 The scientists and environmental groups that pressed for regulation of endocrine 
disruptors capitalized on the opportunity created in the early 1990s by pushing a 
particular set of what they saw as scientific facts, backed up by a select number of 
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studies. The science that was incorporated into the regulation was controlled by those 
individuals and fit in neatly to the fears and trends of the time. In that way, proponents 
used the tripartite nature of the endocrine disruptor concept to push for their ultimate 
goal. Because they situated the concept in scientific, social, and regulatory arenas, 
proponents could use evidence or capital from all three to push for regulation. They used 
select science that corresponded to social trends of the time allowing them to use both the 
weight of the scientific evidence as well as the social capital from acting on things like 
breast cancer and developmental threats. By presenting both the science and the social 
awareness in Congressional hearings, proponents put pressure on regulators to act on 
topics their constituency cared about. The work proponents did in Congressional hearings 
leading to the regulation of endocrine disruptors was really the culminating piece in 
making the endocrine disruptor concept scientific, social, and regulatory.  
 The science used by proponents at the Congressional hearings detailed in this 
chapter served a second purpose, beyond connecting to social trends. Proponents used 
specific studies to solidify the endocrine disruptor category in key ways. When the 
category was initially presented in 1991, proponents outlined some broad characteristics 
of endocrine disruptors, but largely left the categorical box empty. They did not lay out 
what chemicals should be included as endocrine disruptors, how to identify endocrine 
disrupting chemicals, or through what mechanisms endocrine disruptors functioned. In 
those ways, the category of endocrine disruptors was not real or solid enough to regulate. 
However, through their work at Congressional hearings, proponents solidified the 
concept enough by connecting the category to larger public health threats like breast 
cancer and sperm count declines. Proponents used specific studies to answer the question 
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of “What are endocrine disruptors?” The studies they used showed that endocrine 
disruptors are chemicals that cause breast cancer, and chemicals that cause sperm 
declines, and chemicals that threaten the health of children. Those answers politically 
reified the endocrine disruptor category, in so far as it placed particular effects in the 
endocrine disruptor category box that convinced regulators of the need to regulate the 
category. That, in combination with their situation of the endocrine disruptor concept, 
ultimately led to the regulation of endocrine disruptors.  
 To show that, I examine the five Congressional hearings relevant to endocrine 
disruptors. The hearings are all explicitly about regulating toxic chemicals, meaning that 
the scientific evidence presented in the hearings is unambiguously to spur regulation (or 
to hinder it). The five hearings are also instances when the different stakeholders 
interested in whether endocrine disruptors would be regulated directly interacted. At the 
hearings, industry group representatives were asked the same questions as environmental 
group representatives as activist scientists as government agency representatives. The 
differences in their answers reveal tensions over the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category, with the final bill perhaps serving as the score board. To bring out those 
tensions and to make clear the work of proponents at each hearing, I walk through each 
hearing, highlighting the science referenced in each, by whom, as well as any other 
relevant points. At the end, I then draw attention to similarities between the hearings and 
the overall work of proponents to push for the regulation of endocrine disruptors.  
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Senate Hearing on “Government Regulation of Reproductive Hazards,” 1991 
 The first hearing relevant to endocrine disruptors took place in 1991, just days 
after the Wingspread conference (Colborn and Clement 1992). The Senate hearing on 
“Government Regulation of Reproductive Hazards” was the first instance where the 
science of endocrine disruptors was presented in a regulatory context and very much set 
the pattern for later hearings (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn). 
During the hearing, one proponent began to tie the endocrine disruptor category to key 
diseases in order to solidify it in a regulatory context while also introducing the endocrine 
disruptor concept to policymakers for the first time.   
 John Glenn, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, oversaw the 
hearing, which oriented around a report authored by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) (U.S. Congress Senate 1991). Glenn had asked the GAO to investigate whether 
four government agencies (the FDA, EPA, OSHA, and the CPSC) adequately regulated 
reproductively hazardous chemicals. The GAO report dictated the testimony of many of 
the hearing witnesses, which included representatives from the agencies (U.S. Congress 
Senate 1991, Testimony of Eleanor Chelimsky). Only three other individuals attended as 
witnesses: Lynn Goldman, then Chief of the Office of Environmental and Occupational 
Epidemiology in the California Department of Health Services; Theo Colborn, Director 
of the Toxics in Wildlife Program at The Conservation Foundation; and Donald Mattison, 
Dean of the Graduate School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh. All three 
were researchers who studied the reproductive effects of industrial and agricultural 
chemicals. All three had found grave effects as a result of exposure.  
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 The hearing started with a statement by Glenn on the purpose of the meeting. 
Glenn’s statement reveals that a certain set of scientific facts inspired the hearing, 
scientific facts that picked up on the developmental underpinnings of the endocrine 
disruptor concept discussed in Chapter 2. Glenn started by mentioning three instances of 
developmental abnormalities caused by chemical exposures in utero: limb deformities 
caused by thalidomide worldwide, reproductive cancers caused by DES in the US, and 
neurological abnormalities caused by methylmercury in Minamata, Japan29 (U.S. 
Congress Senate 1991, 1). He also highlighted a multiyear study from the Great Lakes 
region that linked ingestion of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contaminated fish by 
pregnant women with developmental delays in the resulting children (U.S. Congress 
Senate 1991, 2).  
Glenn’s statement is almost entirely about endocrine disruptors, though he did not 
use that term. In 2018, DES, methylmercury, and PCBs are all recognized as endocrine 
disruptors (NIEHS 2017b). Glenn’s statement makes it clear that he and others were 
worried about chemicals ingested by pregnant women that could harm fetuses. Congress 
people like Glenn were perhaps already interested in hearing about a new category of 
toxic substances that caused such effects and could be regulated as a group.  
                                                 
29 Methylmercury is a potent endocrine disruptor (Tan, Meiller, and Mahaffey 2009). 
Glenn referred to an event in Minamata, Japan, where a chemical factory contaminated 
local water with methylmercury that then bioaccumulated in shellfish and fish (Ekino et 
al. 2007). Local people exposed directly were diagnosed with Minamata disease, a 
neurological syndrome characterized by muscle weakness, ataxia, paralysis, insanity, and 
eventual death. Children exposed to methylmercury in utero had a congenital form of the 
disease, which was initially mistaken as cerebral palsy (Harada 1978).  
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 In her testimony, Colborn30 played in to those interests, presenting the two-part 
endocrine disruptor concept and the connecting category as a group of chemicals that 
seriously threatened the health of children and pregnant women. In her oral testimony, 
Colborn laid out the concept and category, supplementing her explanation with the 
Wingspread consensus statement (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo 
Colborn; Colborn and Clement 1992). Colborn then started to create the scientific 
narrative that would solidify the category and connect the concept to social and 
regulatory actors. She did that through inclusion of two studies: her work in the Great 
Lakes region and a study linking PCBs with birth abnormalities (U.S. Congress Senate 
1991, Testimony of Theo Colborn; Colborn et al. 1990; Jacobson, Jacobson, and 
Humphrey 1990). Colborn highlighted her finding linking contaminated fish consumed 
by pregnant women and rats with negative health effects and the linkage of PCB 
exposure in utero with low birth weight (Colborn et al. 1990; Jacobson, Jacobson, and 
Humphrey 1990).  
The scientific evidence Colborn used in her testimony very much oriented around 
the effects of endocrine disruptors in children. That emphasis matched the emphasis 
placed by Glenn in his opening statement and also picked up on the growing trend 
emphasizing development as a unique process for perturbation by toxic chemicals. In 
connecting endocrine disruptors to effects in children, Colborn began to pinpoint one 
                                                 
30 A note on Colborn’s presence at the 1991 Senate hearing: In the years prior to 1991, 
Colborn worked in the Great Lakes region studying the effects of environmental pollution 
on the wildlife and humans there (Colborn et al. 1990). In his opening statement, Glenn 
references one of the papers to come out of that research (U.S. Congress Senate 1991). 
Glenn, as Chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, had helped appropriate 
funds for Colborn’s research in the Great Lakes (Colborn et al. 1990).  
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aspect of the endocrine disruptor category: that the chemicals within it threaten the health 
of children. In doing so, Colborn reified the category in a key way for policymakers, who 
could justify (and politically capitalize on) action on endocrine disruptors based on that 
connection.  
 Something else of note in Colborn’s testimony: She took pains to presents 
endocrine disruptor scientists as underdogs fighting for the greater good. In response to a 
question from Glenn on the organization of research on reproductive hazards, Colborn 
responded,  
Well, it is very interesting. The only reason I was able to bring these 21 
experts together was because I had so much evidence from wildlife around the 
Great Lakes, and the work that has been done around the Great Lakes has not 
been generally funded by the Federal Government. It has been work that 
researchers have been doing on the side through universities on grants, and they 
have had to bootleg much of the analysis to Japan and to Sweden to get the 
chemistry done because we don't have the facilities …  
So it has been really a network of robust, vital wildlife biologists and 
toxicologists that have formed the network that led us to the conclusions that we 
have today. They need help. (U.S. Congress Senate 1991, Testimony of Theo 
Colborn)  
In that statement, Colborn portrayed endocrine disruptor researchers as altruistic, with no 
hidden motivations, and also called for increased funding for what really was a fringe 
idea with little support in the scientific community.  
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The first hearing in which the science of endocrine disruptors played a role left a 
sense that endocrine disruptors posed a serious threat, particularly to children, and that 
endocrine disruptor researchers could be trusted. Both were key to the scientific narrative 
proponents used in the 1990s to get endocrine disruptors regulated. 
 
Joint Hearing on the “Safety of Pesticides in Food,” 1993 
 The second hearing relevant to endocrine disruptors picked up the widespread 
social concern about breast cancer, pinpointing another aspect of the endocrine disruptor 
category to make the category real and scary enough to prompt regulatory action. In 
1993, the House of Representative’s Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and 
the Senate’s Committee on Labor and Human Resources held a joint hearing on the 
“Safety of Pesticides in Food” (U.S. Congress 1993). The hearing came out of early 
efforts to reform pesticide regulation in light of issues with the Delaney clause. The 
hearing started shortly after publication of the National Academy report on pesticides in 
the diets of infants and children and a failed attempt by the Bush administration to create 
a Delaney clause exemption (Committee on Pesticides 1993; U.S. Congress 1993).  
The 1993 hearing was much broader in focus than the 1991 hearing, interested 
more generally in pesticide regulation (U.S. Congress 1993). No proponents of the 
endocrine disruptor concept attended the meeting, and endocrine disruptors were not 
mentioned explicitly. However, the hearing makes clear the increasing focus on children 
as a special group for pesticide regulation and the linkage of hormonally active chemicals 
and breast cancer, both larger social trends that helped to pass endocrine disruptor 
legislation.  
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The hearing was overseen by Henry Waxman and Edward Kennedy, who co-
sponsored one of the first bills to reform the Delaney clause. Waxman was a Democrat 
from California and Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts. The hearing was attended 
by Carol Browner, the new EPA Administrator, David Kessler, the FDA Commissioner, 
several Congressional representatives, and a representative from the National Resource 
Defense Council (NRDC) (U.S. Congress 1993, V). 
Most of the testimonies focused on the recently released National Academy report 
and on the carcinogenic properties of many pesticides. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
regulators were slow to move from cancer endpoints as the pinnacle of toxicity testing. 
Only one testimony focused on hormonally active chemicals, the testimony of Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato.  
D’Amato was Senator in New York and had taken note of the high breast cancer 
rates in Nassau and Sulfolk counties (U.S. Congress 1993, Testimony of Alfonse 
D’Amato). As he stated in his testimony, he believed that the high rates were a result of 
estrogenic chemicals and pesticides. D’Amato referenced in support of that a 1993 study 
published by Mary Wolff (Wolff et al. 1993; U.S. Congress 1993, Testimony of Alfonse 
D’Amato). Wolff conducted a blind study looking for a link between PCB and DDT 
exposure and breast cancer in 14,290 blood samples from New York University’s 
Women’s Health Study (Wolff et al. 1993). Wolff and her colleagues found that blood 
levels of a DDT metabolite were 35 percent higher in women who eventually developed 
breast cancer. The authors posited that exposure to estrogenic pesticides like DDT caused 
breast cancer (Wolff et al. 1993). In his testimony, D’Amato laid out Wolff’s study as 
reason to insert a specific provision in the Food Quality Protection Act that the EPA test 
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pesticides for estrogenicity (U.S. Congress 1993; U.S. Congress 1993, Testimony of 
Alfonse D’Amato). Following the testimony of D’Amato, much of the hearing focused 
on breast cancer, with attendees taking time out of their statements to comment on the 
need to address breast cancer and how important D’Amato’s point was (U.S. Congress 
1993). 
D’Amato was the first policymaker to suggest that the EPA test specifically for 
estrogenicity of chemicals. His connection to estrogenic chemicals rather than endocrine 
disruptors is a result of proponents’ inability to control how media presented the 
endocrine disruptor concept. During the early 1990s, when newspapers began first 
publishing on endocrine disruptors, journalists largely focused on the feminization caused 
by such chemicals, meaning that they linked to the estrogenicity of chemicals rather than 
the much broader hormonal activity of chemicals highlighted by proponents in the 
endocrine disruptor concept. The feminizing effects of certain chemicals sold a lot of 
newspapers, and left an indelible connection between estrogenic chemicals and negative 
effects. That connection was only strengthened by the studies proponents highlighted, 
which connected endocrine disruptors to breast cancer, sperm count declines, shrinking 
penises, and other effects perceived as feminizing. As a result, the legislation in the Food 
Quality Protection Act calls for an estrogenic chemical screening program, rather than an 
endocrine disruptor screening program. The shift to endocrine disruptors was a result of 
the work of Browner and Goldman in the EPA, and demonstrates how the work of 
proponents in Congressional hearings took advantage of a window of opportunity made 
up of both social trends and sympathizers in key positions.   
  269 
Though no Wingspread proponents attended the second hearing, their work was 
clear in the focus on breast cancer. As discussed in Chapter 4, the connection between 
endocrine disruptors and breast cancer was a key part of proponents’ argument that 
endocrine disruptors threatened human health. They spent time emphasizing Wolff’s 
study in public news and with policymakers they spoke with outside of Congressional 
hearings. Wolff’s study linking estrogenic pesticides with breast cancer was another key 
way proponents solidified the endocrine disruptor category for policymakers, again 
connecting the chemicals in the category with a politically actionable disease. The second 
hearing relevant to endocrine disruptors shows that endocrine disruptors were quickly 
linked to breast cancer via one study and that that linkage was hugely powerful. 
 
House Hearing on “Health Effects of Estrogenic Pesticides,” 1993 
 The third hearing emphasized that further. In 1993, the House Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment held a hearing on “Health Effects of Estrogenic Pesticides” 
(U.S. Congress House 1993). Within the hearing, proponents continued to reinforce the 
link between endocrine disruptors and breast cancer while also introducing another study, 
one showing global sperm declines as a result of exposure to hormonally active 
chemicals. Both studies helped proponents fill in the endocrine disruptor category but 
also continued to emphasize the feminizing effects of hormonally active chemicals, 
which had consequences for the language in the final regulation.  
Henry Waxman oversaw the proceedings of this hearing as well. Waxman was a 
liberal Representative from California who had an interest in the politicization of science. 
He was involved in the hearings on tobacco, in 1994 getting several tobacco executives to 
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swear under oath that they did not believe nicotine was addictive (Hilts 1994). In 2003, 
Waxman authored a report asserting that the Bush administration “manipulated the 
scientific process and distorted or suppressed scientific findings” on several topic areas, 
including the toxicity of pesticides generally and one endocrine disrupting chemical in 
particular, perchlorate (Committee on Government Reform 2003)). Those facts are 
relevant in so much as they give insight into a man who was instrumental in the 
establishment of the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program. Waxman was committed to 
scientific truth and had experienced the duplicity of the tobacco industry. I would argue 
that he was predisposed, in many ways, to believe that pesticides were responsible for 
any number of ills. And he not only oversaw the hearings on endocrine disruptors, but 
also helped to author the Food Quality Protection Act that regulated them. 
In the 1993 hearing, breast cancer was clearly the focus, not just for Waxman, but 
for all the attendees. Attendees at the hearing included: Mary Wolff, author of the study 
linking endocrine disruptors and breast cancer; Devra Davis Lee, who authored several 
articles with Wolff confirming the link; Louise Slaughter, who had secured $500 million 
for NIH breast cancer research the year before; and Jane Reese-Colbourne, a board 
member of the National Breast Cancer Coalition (U.S. Congress House 1993). Also in 
attendance were three Wingspread attendees—Colborn, Ana M. Soto, and Richard 
Wiles—, a representative from both Greenpeace and the EWG, and two long-time 
environmental estrogen researchers, Louis Guillette and John McLachlan. A look at the 
list of testifiers makes it clear that endocrine disruptors would be front and center. And 
they were. 
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In the testimonies themselves, several studies came up repeatedly and those 
studies built on the scientific narrative Colborn had started in the first hearing 1991. 
Wolff’s study on breast cancer and pesticides dominated the proceedings, showing how 
powerful the connection between endocrine disruptors and breast cancer was (Wolff et al. 
1993). Almost everyone who spoke at the hearing talked about breast cancer at length, 
taking time to mention friends and family who had been diagnosed (U.S. Congress House 
1993). Wolff’s study was treated as fact by many of the participants—breast cancer is 
caused by pesticides, or we should at least assume it is and ban them anyway. That 
Wolff’s study had received criticism in the scientific community, both for experimental 
set up and the inability of others to replicate her findings, was not mentioned (Safe 1994; 
Safe 1995; Krieger et al. 1994).  
Several other studies got repeated mention in the hearing as well: the worldwide 
declining sperm counts found by Nils E. Skakkebæk and Richard M. Sharpe, the 
shrinking alligator penises described by Guillette, and Soto’s finding of the estrogenicity 
of endosulfan (Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Guillette et al. 1994; Soto, Chung, and 
Sonnenschein 1994; Soto et al. 1995). Other chapters in this dissertation detail Sharpe 
and Guillette’s work, so I won’t describe them here (see Chapter 4). I will point out, 
though, that both deal explicitly with what the media dubbed a loss of maleness and that 
most of Congress is male. Soto’s work with endosulfan showed that the commonly-used 
pesticide caused cell proliferation in breast cancer cell lines (Soto, Chung, and 
Sonnenschein 1994; Soto et al. 1995). The study itself and endosulfan’s effects were 
referenced several times to indicate the scope of the problem posed by endocrine 
disruptors.  
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Testimonies at the hearing focused on Wolff’s breast cancer study, the study 
showing declining sperm counts, and Guillette’s findings on shrinking alligator penises. 
Each study picked up on social trends like fear of breast cancer and men’s general fear of 
loss of virility while also helping proponents to pinpoint aspects of the endocrine 
disruptor category that would motivate action. Endocrine disruptors threatened the health 
of babies, increased the risk of breast cancer, and endangered the size and contents of 
men’s reproductive organs. Those became the characteristics of endocrine disruptors, a 
category that could be regulated to head off those hazards, as presented by proponents. 
While politically motivating, the studies proponents emphasized also left the impression 
that the danger of hormonally active chemicals was from their estrogenic effects, rather 
than their broader hormonal effects, hence the final legislation on estrogenic chemicals 
rather than endocrine disruptors.  
The third hearing makes clear what science was becoming indelibly linked to 
endocrine disruptors, namely their link to breast cancer and the decline of male fertility. 
Those links paralleled the attention paid to endocrine disruptors in the media. Though 
breast cancer and sperm count declines were far from the focus in the scientific study of 
endocrine disruptors, they were in the spotlight publicly and politically. They also helped 
proponents to detail what an endocrine disruptor was for regulators. Proponents did not 
have to rely on intricate scientific explanations, or even the general explanations they 
offered in the Wingspread consensus statement. Instead, to explain the endocrine 
disruptor concept and category, all proponents needed to do was mention breast cancer 
and shrinking penises.  
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Hearing before House Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign 
Agriculture on the “Food Quality Protection Act of 1995,” 1995 
Following the 1993 hearing on the “Health Effects of Estrogenic Pesticides,” 
Thomas J. Bliley Jr., a Republican Representative from Virginia, introduced the Food 
Quality Protection Act in the House (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). The original draft of the 
Act contained no mention of endocrine disruptors or estrogenic pesticides, though it did 
heavily emphasize children and infants (H.R. 1627 104th Cong., IH, RH, RDS, EH). 
Between the third hearing and the fourth hearing relevant to endocrine disruptors, both 
the House and the Senate went from Democrat hands to Republican hands. However, 
change to the chemical approval system in the US was widely bipartisan, with Waxman, 
a Democrat from California, reaching across the aisle to work with Bliley and formulate a 
Food Quality Protection Act (Waxman and Green 2009). Both industry and 
environmentalists saw change as an improvement to the current system.  
The bill Bliley and Waxman came up with was H.R. 1627, which would 
eventually pass. First though, it was turned over to two committees—the Subcommittee 
on Department Operations Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture and the Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment (U.S. Congress House 1995a; U.S. Congress House 1995b). 
Both held hearings on the bill and generated a report with recommendations from those 
hearings. 
The first hearing, held by the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, 
and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture, occurred on 16 May 1995 
(U.S. Congress House 1995a). Ten out of thirteen witnesses at the hearing were industry 
representatives. Attendees included Jay Vroom, president of the American Crop 
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Protection Association, and Warren Stickle, of the Chemical Producers and Distributors 
Association. The other three attendees were Rebecca Doyle, from the Illinois Department 
of Agriculture, Lynn Goldman from the EPA, and Jay Feldman from the National 
Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides (U.S. Congress House 1995a).  
In a meeting attended almost entirely by industry representatives, estrogenic 
chemicals and endocrine disruptors went almost entirely undiscussed (U.S. Congress 
House 1995a). At the hearing, only one attendee mentioned endocrine disruptors and 
pointed to the fact that the proposed Act contained nothing specifically addressing 
endocrine disruptors. Feldman, Executive Director of the National Coalition Against the 
Misuse of Pesticides, used his prepared statement to advocate for the need to address 
endocrine disrupting chemicals (U.S. Congress House 1995a, Prepared Statement of Jay 
Feldman). Feldman emphasized that endocrine disruptors particularly affect children and 
that their vulnerability should be dealt with by the new law. He referred to several 
familiar studies to make his point: declining sperm counts and rising rates of cancer. 
Feldman also emphasized wildlife studies to demonstrate the wider threat posed by 
endocrine disruptors, including Louis Guillette’s work with alligators near super fund 
sites in Florida.  
Endocrine disruptors made no other appearance at the hearing. There could be 
several reasons for that. First, the hearing was on the Food Quality Protection Act more 
broadly and industry representatives had other more important concerns for the Act that 
would regulate much of their business in the coming years. The proposed bill in no way 
mentioned endocrine disruptors or hormonally active chemicals and therefore would not 
prompt discussion of the topic. Second, the endocrine disruptor concept, which many in 
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the chemical industry referred to as “Colborn’s hypothesis,” was not popular with 
industry (Vogel 2012, 110). During the mid-1990s, they spent time and money publicly 
addressing the hormonal activity of their chemicals, downplaying its ability to cause 
negative effects, and funding studies showing the safety of their chemicals (Vogel 2012). 
Any regulation of endocrine disrupting chemicals would pose increased cost to chemical 
manufacturers, so it is no surprise that they did not bring up endocrine disruptors in the 
hearing. Ideas, trends, and fears that permeated previous hearings on chemical regulation 
were absent from the first hearing on the Food Quality Protection Act.  
However, even given that, the Committee addressed endocrine disruptors in their 
final report (Committee on Agriculture 1996). In that report, the Committee commented 
they “[were] aware of recent scientific reports indicating that some pesticides may 
imitate, enhance, or block the activity of hormones in humans and wildlife,” and asked 
that the EPA keep data on hormone disrupting pesticides (Committee on Agriculture 
1996, 56). Proponents’ work to integrate endocrine disruptors with the conversation 
about the Food Quality Protection Act clearly succeeded, even after a hearing where they 
played no role. The Committee did not recommend any changes to the bill specifically 
for endocrine disrupting chemicals, instead arguing that “the EPA … [had] sufficient 
authority to request information related to such effects [endocrine effects]” and to use 
that information in their approval process (Committee on Agriculture 1996, 56). But such 
a statement is an argument about executive branch authority rather than about the 
necessity of regulating endocrine disruptors. In essence, the Committee argued that the 
EPA should be taking endocrine disruptors into account, but that they did not need more 
authority from Congress to do it. By 1996, proponents had successfully convinced many 
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policymakers involved in regulating chemicals of the endocrine disruptor concept and 
category through linkage with big name diseases like breast cancer.  
 
Hearing Before House Subcommittee on Health and Environment on the “Food Quality 
Protection Act,” 1995 
 A month after the industry-dominated hearing took place, the Subcommittee on 
Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce held a hearing on the “Food 
Quality Protection Act of 1995” (U.S. Congress House 1995b) The hearing was attended 
by a very different group. While several industry representatives testified, so too did 
representatives from several environmental groups like the NRDC and Citizens Action. 
Lynn Goldman and Mary Wolff both attended, as did Nancy Gould Chuda, the woman 
who first got Waxman interested in protecting children from pesticides (Waxman and 
Green 2009).  
 The final hearing brought back many of the patterns seen in previous hearings, 
namely the emphasis on breast cancer, children, and their connection to endocrine 
disruptors. Much of the testimony dealt with the fact that the proposed bill did not make 
special provisions to protect women from breast cancer. In particular, Wolff emphasized 
that strongly. In his questioning of her, Waxman revealed just how strongly breast cancer 
had been linked to endocrine disruptors, repeatedly using the catchall phrase “breast 
cancer and reproductive disorders” to refer to the effects of endocrine disruptors (U.S. 
Congress House 1995b).  
That is revelatory of the work proponents successfully achieved with 
policymakers. During the hearings on chemical regulation in the US, proponents 
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advanced a narrow set of scientific studies that picked up on social fears and also helped 
to fill in the endocrine disruptor category. By the 1995 hearing, policymakers knew that 
endocrine disruptors caused breast cancer and reproductive disorders. Though many 
scientists still had serious questions about what counted as an endocrine disruptor and 
how to identify such chemicals, proponents had filled in the category enough for 
policymakers to know what endocrine disruptors do and why they should regulate them.  
 The report generated by the committee at the final hearing strongly recommended 
the addition of an estrogen substances screening program, a program run by the EPA “to 
determine whether certain substances may have an effect in humans that is similar to an 
effect produced by a naturally occurring estrogen, or such other endocrine effect” 
(Committee on Commerce 1996, 25). They amended Bliley’s bill, H.R. 1627, to include 
such a provision before sending it back to the House in July (Committee on Commerce 
1996). On 23 July 1996 at 1:32pm, Representative Pat Roberts motioned to suspend the 
rules and vote on the amended Food Quality Protection Act of 1996. The Act passed 
unanimously, with 417 votes in favor (Congressional Record House 1996). The next day, 
the Senate unanimously passed the bill (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.). Bill Clinton signed it 
into law on 3 August 1996 (H.R. 1627 104th Cong.).  
 
Proponents Work Across Hearings to Achieve the Endocrine Disruptor Screening 
Program 
 Throughout the 1990s, proponents worked to solidify the endocrine disruptor 
category as a group of chemicals linked to politically powerful diseases in such a way 
that pushed for the regulation of those chemicals. In their testimony at hearings, as well 
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as their work with popular media, proponents used a specific group of studies to portray 
endocrine disruptors as a threat to the health of children, women, and men’s reproductive 
organs. In doing so, they filled in necessary details of the endocrine disruptor category, 
but could not uncouple the connection between hormonally active chemicals and 
feminization, ultimately leading to legislation for an estrogenic substances screening 
program.  
 Across the hearings, proponents could largely control the endocrine disruptor 
narrative based on who was invited to testify. Witnesses at Congressional hearings have a 
fair amount of control over the information disseminated at the hearing, and therefore a 
fair amount of control over what science gets incorporated into regulation. No skeptics 
and few if any moderates on the endocrine disruptor concept attended any of the 
hearings. Individuals like Stephen Safe did not have the opportunity to present their 
scientific facts about endocrine disruptors, facts that called into question the linkage of 
endocrine disruptors with politically powerful diseases like breast cancer and undermined 
the solidity of the endocrine disruptor category proponents were trying to develop (Safe 
1994; Safe 1995). Inclusion of those facts may well have led to very different regulatory 
conclusions. The attendance list at most of the hearings included environmental groups, 
Wingspread attendees, and breast cancer advocates, all of whom promoted the regulation 
of endocrine disruptors.31  
                                                 
31 Industry groups worked against the concept, but were excluded from hearings more 
than once. They played a much larger role after the Endocrine Disruptor Screening 
Program was passed and parameters were being set by the EPA. Sarah Vogel details that 
extensively in her work Is it Safe? (Vogel 2012). 
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They did so by emphasizing endocrine disruptors and their connection to socially 
and politically powerful diseases and populations. At nearly every hearing, the same 
studies were referenced, the same facts given, the same story told. In particular, following 
the linkage of endocrine disruptors and breast cancer, the Wolff study dominated the 
hearings. In fact, at each hearing, the same studies or kinds of studies were mentioned 
each time: 1. Wolff’s study linking breast cancer with exposure to DDT, 2. Nils E. 
Skakkebæk and Richard M. Sharpe’s study linking estrogenic chemicals with sperm 
declines, and 3. A study linking in utero exposure to a chemical with developmental 
abnormalities in children (Wolff et al. 1993; Sharpe and Skakkebæk 1993; Jacobson, 
Jacobson, and Humphrey 1990; Jacobson and Jacobson 1996).  
 That collection of studies picks up almost exactly on the larger social concern 
about breast cancer and children, with the addition of Skakkebæk and Sharpe’s study on 
sperm declines that seemed particularly horrifying to Congressmen. The repeated studies 
emphasized a certain view of endocrine disruptors, that they threatened women and 
children and should be regulated. By referencing those studies, proponents of the 
endocrine disruptor concept could take advantage of a particular kind of social capital 
generated by the fear of breast cancer and awareness of development. The studies also 
paralleled the emphasis laid by the same scientists in interviews with the media, meaning 
that the science in public spheres fed in to the science in regulatory spheres and vice 
versa. Hence, proponents really did take advantage of the tripartite nature of the concept 
to get endocrine disruptors regulated.  
 The studies proponents used also helped them clarify the endocrine disruptor 
category enough for policymakers. The category as proposed by researchers at 
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Wingspread in 1991 lacked specifics as to what chemicals counted as endocrine 
disruptors, how to identify endocrine disruption, and through what mechanisms endocrine 
disruptors function. Scientifically, that posed serious problems for the acceptance of the 
category and the concept throughout the 1990s, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Socially, the broad strokes painted by proponents were enough to garner interest and 
drive fear of the new category, with few if any in the public pushing for a more fleshed 
out listing of endocrine disruptor characteristics. Within the regulatory sphere, 
proponents used their hearings to head off issues with the insubstantiality of the category 
by filling it with connections to breast cancer, sperm count declines, and effects in 
children. Proponents did not answer the question of most scientists at the time, of how a 
chemical would count as an endocrine disruptor. But they did solidify endocrine disruptor 
effects in their testimony and that drove the regulation of the substances.  
 That solidification was not without cost, however. The studies the proponents had 
to rely on to argue for the regulation of endocrine disruptors all highlighted the 
feminizing effects of estrogenic chemicals: increased rates of breast cancer, shrinking 
penises, sperm count declines. While the studies were politically and socially powerful, 
they created a lasting connection between estrogenic substances and the negative effects 
policymakers wanted to head off. That is apparent in the final language of the Food 
Quality Protection Act, which provides for an estrogenic substances screening program 
and makes no mention of endocrine disruptors anywhere. Without the work of Goldman 
and Browner, who had already introduced endocrine disruptor language at the EPA prior 
to passage of the Act, and the continued role of proponents in arguing for endocrine 
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disruptors at EPA meetings on how to implement regulation,32 the US may not have 
ended up with the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program.  
   
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I’ve laid out a two-part argument to explain how the Endocrine 
Disruptor Screening Program was passed and what role science played in the process. 
The 1990s were characterized by a unique set of circumstances that opened a window of 
opportunity for proponents of regulating endocrine disruptors. Those circumstances 
included the necessary end to a thirty-year-old regulatory clause and the welcoming 
Clinton administration that worked to regulate endocrine disruptors from within the EPA 
and Congressional hearings. It also included wider social engagement with the incidence 
of breast cancer and the awareness of development as a vulnerable time. Those four 
circumstances combined to increase the probability that endocrine disruptor regulation 
might pass by lowering barriers to its passage as well as increasing pressure to take action 
on the substances.  
 That opportunity, though, had to be capitalized on by the proponents of regulating 
endocrine disruptors. Those individuals—activist scientists, environmental groups, breast 
cancer advocates—used a narrow set of facts about endocrine disruptors in order to 
increase the sense that the substances needed to be regulated. By emphasizing the link 
between endocrine disruptors and breast cancer and endocrine disruptors and 
                                                 
32 The work of proponents in the planning process after passage is documented 
thoroughly by Sarah Vogel in Is it Safe? (Vogel 2012). 
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development, proponents fit endocrine disruptors within a larger push to address those 
issues and took advantage of a kind of social capital that put pressure on legislators.  
 In that way, only very specific endocrine disruptor science got integrated into the 
regulation of endocrine disruptors. It was not a holistic understanding of the substances 
that led to their regulation. In fact, that may have led to the exact opposite. Instead, a 
specific kind of science was used to complete an agenda set by attendees at Wingspread, 
when they first defined the problem of endocrine disruptors: to regulate the substances.  
 The result of proponents’ work was the single section in the Food Quality 
Protection Act calling for the establishment of a program to screen chemicals for 
estrogenic and other endocrine activity. Quickly after passage of the Act, the EPA 
convened the Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee to 
determine the best methods to evaluate hormonally active pesticides. In 1998, the 
committee released its final report, urging the EPA to expand the testing of pesticides to 
commercial chemicals, environmental contaminants, cosmetics, polymers, and several 
other substances, as well as to include estrogen, androgen, and thyroid effects (EDSTAC 
1998). Following the committee’s report, the EPA spent close to a decade creating the 
initial list of chemicals to be tested and the tests that would be used to screen those 
chemicals.  
In 2018, the Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program is a two-tiered screening 
program for possible endocrine disruptors. The company seeking approval for a new 
substance carries out all screening. The purpose of Tier 1 is to identify the chemical 
substance’s interactions with estrogen, androgen, and thyroid screening pathways (Marty, 
2014: 1). Tier 1 uses eleven chemical assays (five in vitro and six in vivo) to test that with 
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the goal of minimizing false negatives (though allowing for an increase in false positives) 
(Marty, 2014). Tier 2 aims to identify the adverse effects from the substance’s 
interactions with the endocrine pathways identified in Tier 1 as well as to generate dose 
response data.  
The Endocrine Disruptor Screening Program represents the totality of the US’s 
attempts to regulate possible endocrine disruptors. Once a chemical has successfully 
made it through the program, companies are able to use the chemical with impunity. 
However, the program has received much scrutiny. Some of the scrutiny revolves around 
the cost of the program (Marty, 2014). More of the scrutiny, though, revolves around 
whether the program is effective at screening for endocrine activity and harm especially 
given the toxicological uniqueness of the chemicals in question. 
As has been shown in this chapter as well as others in this dissertation, endocrine 
disruptors followed a unique regulatory path. Unlike many science policy issues, they did 
not start with broad scientific consensus, or even much scientific investigation. Instead, 
proponents set out from the beginning to direct social and regulatory attention to the 
chemicals and to push for their regulation in the face of deep scientific division. Their 
ability to successfully get endocrine disrupting chemicals regulated was the result of that 
tactic as well as the unique circumstances in the 1990s that allowed for large scale 
changes to the chemical regulations in the US. Given such criticisms of the Endocrine 
Disruptor Screening Program, it is worth thinking through whether the unique regulatory 
path taken by endocrine disruptors was the right path in terms of getting us to effective 
and useful regulations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have laid out the life of the endocrine disruptor concept. The 
concept is a two-part idea originally proposed in 1991. Proponents of the concept first 
stipulate that some chemicals can interact and interfere with the normal functioning of 
hormones, resulting in negative health outcomes in humans and wildlife species exposed. 
Those chemicals are called endocrine disruptors and include the very common plasticizer 
bisphenol-A (BPA) as well as antimicrobials, pesticides, and many food packaging 
materials (Schug et al. 2016). The second part of the concept follows from the first, 
namely that endocrine disrupting chemicals, due to their potential to interfere with the 
health of organisms, pose a clear and immediate threat to human and wildlife 
populations. Throughout this work, I have emphasized that I am interested in the concept 
as a whole rather than the category of chemicals connected to it. That is because for much 
of the past thirty years, the concept and the category have been inseparable as a result of 
the way proponents introduced the concept in 1991, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 In telling the biography of the endocrine disruptor concept, I have focused on one 
particular aspect: the construction of the concept as a scientific, social, and regulatory 
concern. Throughout these chapters, I have returned to the idea that when Theo Colborn 
and her colleagues proposed the concept in 1991, they explicitly and intentionally 
established it as a multifaceted object. That original group of twenty-one did not simply 
note that endocrine disruptors existed and should be investigated scientifically. They 
called for scientific investigation, social awareness, and regulatory action. Over the 
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course of the following years, members of that original group acted to ensure each of 
those goals, by speaking extensively in public media outlets like newspapers, by lobbying 
with policymakers and regulators to speak at hearings, and by publishing in scientific 
journals. The three-sided nature of the endocrine disruptor concept was a main driver 
throughout its life history, impacting its reception by the scientific community (Chapter 
4), its study by that same community (Chapter 5), and its regulation by the US 
government (Chapter 6). The scientific, social, and regulatory aspects of the concept 
continue to drive the life of endocrine disruptors in the present day.  
 The historical moments covered in these chapters have very real implications for 
the modern day. When considering the endocrine disruptor concept in 2018, I am 
confronted by the deep disagreements between the scientists who study the chemicals, 
disagreements that originated in the 1990s. The varied interpretation of evidence of 
endocrine disruption that drove the animosity between Stephen Safe and Frederick vom 
Saal continues to drive the animosity between the new generation of endocrine disruptor 
scientists, many of them students of Safe and vom Saal. The persistent questions about 
the definition of endocrine disruptors and how to identify them lies at the heart of current 
discussions of how to regulate endocrine disruptors in the European Union (EU). The 
European Commission spent nine years attempting to establish a definition of endocrine 
disruptors to focus potential regulatory efforts (Paun 2018; European Commission 
2018b). It failed. Regulations in the US also show the effects of the history laid out in this 
work. Modern efforts to improve testing mechanisms, shifting toward in silico models, 
have come up against the continued uncertainty about how endocrine disruptors disrupt 
as well as the persistent argument over what counts as a safe level of endocrine 
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disruption, wrapped up in new and old debates about low dose effects (EPA 2011a; EPA 
2011b).  
 If there is one thing readers can take away from this dissertation, it’s that how the 
endocrine disruptor concept was originally introduced had an outsize effect on how 
endocrine disruptors were studied, regulated, and talked about in 1991 and in 2018. The 
intentions and actions of activist scientists like Colborn to establish endocrine disruptors 
as objects of scientific social, and regulatory concern had profound impacts. I have laid 
out those impacts throughout this work and in doing so allow for reflection on whether 
the actions of Colborn and others and the regulatory, scientific, and social responses to 
those actions were appropriate. And what can be done in 2018 to move past them. 
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